Argued
May 13, 2019
Page 1117
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 1118
Superior
Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Oliver, J.
Affirmed.
Vishal
K. Garg, West Hartford, for the appellant (petitioner).
Denise
B. Smoker, senior assistant states attorney, with whom, on
the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., states attorney,
and Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory states attorney, for the
appellee (respondent).
Lavine,
Keller and Harper, Js.
OPINION
HARPER,
J.
[193
Conn.App. 2] The petitioner, Sergio Echeverria, appeals from
the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners sole claim on appeal
is that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that
he had received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his
attorneys failure to advise him properly of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea pursuant to Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284
(2010). We disagree [193 Conn.App. 3] and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. The petitioner is a Bolivian citizen who entered the
United States without authorization at the age of six. On
February 7, 2014, police officers executed a search warrant
on the petitioners Stamford apartment. Pursuant to the
executed warrant, the police officers found and subsequently
seized 4.3 pounds of marijuana, a large sum of cash, and a
semiautomatic pistol with the serial number removed. A police
report admitted into
Page 1119
evidence at the habeas trial also revealed that the police
seized, inter alia, a marijuana grinder, a digital scale, and
several plastic bags containing the drug commonly referred to
as "Molly." The petitioner subsequently was
arrested and charged with two counts of possession of a
hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana or more than
four ounces of marijuana in violation of General Statutes §
21a-279 (b); possession of marijuana with intent to sell in
violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (b); operation of a
drug factory in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (c);
possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who
is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes §
21a-278 (b); and illegal alteration of a firearm
identification mark in violation of General Statutes §
29-36.[1] Thereafter, the petitioner retained
Attorney Michael Skiber to represent him.
Following
the petitioners arrest, the state and Skiber, on behalf of
the petitioner, entered into pretrial negotiations. The state
initially offered a plea deal by which the petitioner would
plead guilty to a charge stemming from the sale of
marijuana,[2] as well as alteration of a [193
Conn.App. 4] firearm identification mark, and the state would
recommend a sentence of five years of incarceration,
execution suspended after three years, followed by three
months of probation.[3] The petitioner did not accept the
offer, and the case was placed on the jury list.
On June
3, 2015, after the petitioner received another plea offer
from the state, the trial court indicated that it would allow
the petitioner to enter an open guilty plea with no agreed
upon sentence to possession of marijuana with intent to sell
in violation of § 21a-277 (b) and alteration of a firearm
identification mark in violation of § 29-36. If, however, the
petitioner paid a $10,000 fine, the trial court offered to
vacate the plea and grant the petitioners application for
accelerated rehabilitation. The petitioner subsequently
entered a guilty plea. The trial court accepted the
petitioners plea, finding that it was made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. After the trial court
accepted his plea, the petitioner stated that he was unsure
of whether he previously had been convicted of a crime,
calling into question his ability to receive accelerated
rehabilitation.[4] In light of the petitioners
statement, Skiber asked the trial court to let the petitioner
withdraw his plea. The trial court declined Skibers request,
opting instead to determine whether the petitioner was in
fact eligible for accelerated rehabilitation before allowing
the petitioner to withdraw his plea.
After
it was determined that the petitioner was ineligible for
accelerated rehabilitation, the state and the petitioner
...