United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
JANET
BOND ARTERTON, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff
Franklin Jones filed this action against his former employer,
Defendant Natchaug Hospital ("Natchaug"), claiming
violations of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act
("CFEPA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Plaintiff claims that Natchaug's decision to
promote another employee over him was motivated by
discrimination on the basis of race and sexual orientation.
Defendant moves for summary judgment ([Doc. # 32]), which
Plaintiff opposes ([Doc. # 39]). For the reasons that follow,
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
I.
Background
Plaintiff
was employed by Defendant as a Registered Nurse from May 2014
through December 2016. (Parties' L.R. Stmts. [Doc. ## 34,
39-1] ¶¶ 1, 29.) In addition to a Bachelor
of Arts in Psychology from Central Connecticut State
University earned in 1999, Plaintiff has a Diploma in Nursing
from the University of Connecticut, earned in 2004; a
Bachelor of Science in Nursing ("BSN") from the
University of Connecticut, earned in 2013; and a Master of
Science in Nursing ("MSN") from the University of
Connecticut, earned in March 2016. (Ex. 16 (Resume) to Ex. 5
(Jones Aff.) to Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ.
J. [Doc. # 39-3] at 1.) Plaintiff has worked as a Registered
Nurse since 2005. (Id.) From March 2010 to May 2014,
he was the Assistant Nurse Manager at Alcohol Drug Recovery
Center, Inc. in Hartford, Connecticut. (Id.)
In June
2016, Natchaug created and posted an opening for a new Nurse
Manager position on the night shift. (Id. ¶ 3.)
The job posting included that a BSN was required and an MSN
was preferred. (Id. ¶ 9.) It noted that a
successful applicant was required to have "[s]trong
communication, interpersonal and leadership and teambuilding
skills" as well as "good organizational skills,
" and the ability "to work with others, take
direction, and work varying hours." (Ex. A (Job Posting)
to Ex. 1 (Sullivan Aff.) to Def.'s L.R. Stmt. [Doc. #
34-1].) The Nurse Manager would be "responsible for the
coordination, management and supervision of the unit staff,
including nursing staff, clinical and therapy staff as
assigned." (Id.)
Gino
D'Eliseo, then a Registered Nurse at Natchaug Hospital,
was the first applicant to express interest in the new Nurse
Manager position. (Id. ¶ 4.) Mr. D'Eliseo
has a 1990 Bachelor of Science in Marketing from Central
Connecticut State University and a 2013 Associate's
Degree in Nursing from Goodwin College School of Nursing.
(Ex. 15 (D'Eliseo Resume) to Pl.'s Opp. [Doc. # 39-3]
at 1.) While employed by Defendant, Mr. D'Eliseo had
volunteered to be trained as a "Super User" during
Natchaug's implementation of two new programs, the EPIC
medical records management program and the Pyxis medication
management program. (Id.) In that role, he served as
an expert for other employees with questions about those
programs. (Id.) Mr. D'Eliseo also had experience
managing a restaurant. (Ex. 3 (Tr. of Jones Dep.) to
Pl.'s Opp. [Doc. # 39-3] at 66.)
Mr.
D'Eliseo interviewed for the open position on July 22,
2016 with Gale Sullivan, Defendant's Regional Director of
Nursing. (Parties' L. R. Stmts. ¶ 4.) He interviewed
again on August 8, 2016 with Nurse Managers Susan Woodman and
Amanda Watkins, as well as the Regional Medical Director,
Nursing Supervisors, and other nurses and mental health
workers from the unit. (Id.)
Ms.
Woodman asked Plaintiff whether he planned to apply for the
open Nurse Manager position, and several weeks later, on
August 15, 2016, Plaintiff applied. (Id. ¶ 7;
Jones Dep. at 30.) He interviewed that day with Ms. Sullivan
and Ms. Watkins separately, and with Ms. Woodman a few days
later due to scheduling conflicts. (Parties' L. R. Stmts.
¶¶ 7-8.) During her interview with Plaintiff, Ms.
Sullivan discussed some concerns regarding his follow-through
on a project designed to reduce patient falls, as well as
some issues with scheduling. (Id. ¶ 7; Sullivan
Aff. ¶ 15; Pl.'s Dep. at 32-33.) Following his
interview, Ms. Sullivan, Ms. Woodman, and Ms. Watkins
discussed Plaintiffs clinical and managerial strengths and
weaknesses and decided not to conduct a second round of
interviews with Plaintiff. (Parties' L.R. Stmts. ¶
17.) Laurie Clinton, Regional Director of Human Resources,
agreed with that decision. (Id.)
Ms.
Sullivan made the decision to hire Mr. D'Eliseo as the
new Nurse Manager following discussions with Ms. Woodman, Ms.
Watkins, and Ms. Clinton about each candidate's degrees,
leadership skills, and operational skills. (Id.
¶ 16.) According to Ms. Sullivan, her decision was based
on her "conclu[sion] that Mr. D'Eliseo was a
stronger candidate for the Nurse Manager position due to
demonstrated leadership skills." (Ex. 1 (Sullivan Aff.)
to Def.'s L.R. Stmt. [Doc. # 34-1] ¶ 17.)
"Based on" his interview performance and Ms.
Sullivan's "knowledge of his employment record,
" she "believed that Mr. D'Eliseo had
demonstrated considerable leadership skills in his time at
Natchaug, and had also demonstrated initiative by, for
example, volunteering to serve as a Super User .... He was
dedicated, enthusiastic, and well thought of by both staff
and management." (Id. ¶ 11.) Ms. Sullivan
represents that "Mr. D'Eliseo had significant
managerial experience from his career before he entered
nursing" and "agreed to enroll [] in a BSN
program." (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.)
On
September 2, 2016, before the decision was announced
publicly, Plaintiff was informed that another employee had
been hired to fill the open Nurse Manager position.
(Parties' L.R. Stmts. ¶ 19.) During that meeting,
Ms. Sullivan gave Plaintiff feedback about why he was not
chosen for the open position. (Id. ¶ 20-21;
Sullivan Aff. ¶ 20.) She also offered to mentor
Plaintiff for a leadership position, offered to send him to
internal leadership classes, and provided a list and schedule
of those classes.[1] (Id. ¶ 20-21; Sullivan Aff.
¶ 20.)
On
September 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a discrimination
complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities ("CHRO") claiming that the decision
to promote Mr. D'Eliseo was influenced by Plaintiffs
"race (African-American), color (black), and sexual
orientation." (Ex 4. (Verified Answer of Respondent) to
Pl.'s L.R. Stmt. [Doc. # 39-3]; see Ex. 1
(Amended CHRO Complaint) to Pl.'s L. R. Stmt. [Doc. #
39-3]; Parties L.R. Stmts. ¶ 24.)
On
November 21, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a resignation later to
Defendant by email, indicating that his last day of work
would be December 11, 2016 and that he was leaving for a job
at Windham Hospital. (Parties' L.R. Stmts. ¶ 25.)
Defendant Natchaug Hospital and Windham Hospital are both
Hartford HealthCare facilities. (Ex. A (Pl.'s Email to
Woodman and King) to Ex. 3 (Clinton Decl.) to Def.'s L.R.
Stmt. [Doc. # 34-3].)
Between
November 21 and December 8, 2016, a Licensed Practice Nurse
("LPN") working with Plaintiff reported that she
witnessed Plaintiff pocketing a patient's medication and
that Plaintiff encouraged her to take some too, due to the
medication's high street value. (Parties' L.R. Stmts.
¶ 26.) While Defendant investigated this report,
Plaintiff was placed on a paid administrative suspension.
(Id. ¶ 27.) During this time, Ms. Sullivan and
the Human Resources department took statements from
employees, reviewed medication documentation, and reported
the matter to the Department of Public Health as required.
(Id.)
On
December 8, 2016, Plaintiff and his union representative were
scheduled to meet with Ms. Sullivan, Ms. Clinton, and others
concerning the LPN's allegations. (Id. ¶
28.) Before that meeting, Plaintiff met with his union
representative. (Id.) The representative advised
Plaintiff that he should resign from his position at Natchaug
effective immediately, instead of waiting until December 11,
2016. (Id.) That day, Plaintiff sent a second
resignation email to Defendant, "confirming [his]
resignation at Natchaug Hospital effective immediately."
(Id. ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff
was not told the results of any investigation into the
allegations by the LPN, but he was told by his union
representative that an investigation was conducted.
(Pl.'s Dep at 142-43.) Plaintiff concluded that the
investigation did not find anything because otherwise his
license would have been suspended. (Id.)
Plaintiff
asserts that when he arrived at Windham Hospital on December
12, 2016 for orientation, he was told that he was not cleared
to begin orientation there and that his job offer had been
rescinded. (Id. at 143; Pl.'s Decl. [Ex. 5] to
Pl.'s L.R. Stmt. [Doc. # 40] ¶ 51.)
II.
Discussion
Summary
judgment is appropriate where, "resolv[ing] all
ambiguities and draw[ing] all permissible factual inferences
in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought, " Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130,
137 (2d Cir. 2008), "the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, " Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Williams v. Utica
Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.
2006) (quotation marks omitted). "The substantive law
governing the case will identify those facts that are
material, and '[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'"
Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 442 F.3d
55, 59 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When considering a
motion for summary judgment, the Court may consider
depositions, documents, affidavits, interrogatory answers,
and other exhibits in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
"The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing why it is
entitled to summary judgment." Salahuddin v.
Goord,467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
"Where, as here, the nonmovant bears the burden of proof
at trial, the movant may show prima facie entitlement to
summary judgment in one of two ways: (1) the movant may point
to evidence that negates its opponent's claims or (2) the
movant may identify those portions of its opponent's
evidence that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, a tactic that requires identifying evidentiary
insufficiency and not simply denying the opponent's
pleadings." Id. at 272-73 (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). "If the movant makes
this showing in either manner, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to point to record evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact." Id. (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). "Like the
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