United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S
DECISION
ALVIN
W. THOMPSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Christopher Paul Cournoyer appeals the Commissioner’s
final decision denying the plaintiff’s application for
disability insurance benefits pursuant to the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The
plaintiff filed a motion for reversal or remand, contending
that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed
to provide good reason for assigning partial weight to the
opinions of Drs. John Haney and Paige Westerfield as to
concentration, persistence, pace and social functioning
because both opinions are “entirely consistent with the
record”. Pl.’s Mem. to Reverse (“ECF No.
19-1”) at 3, 4, 6, 8 of 10. The plaintiff also argues
that the ALJ erred (1) by finding that the plaintiff had the
ability to perform activities of daily living[1], (2) by
mischaracterizing the evidence as to hobbies[2], (3) by giving
partial weight to every psychiatric opinion[3], (4) by using the
same reasoning for different mental conditions to support the
weight given[4], and (5) by providing the vocational
expert with an incomplete hypothetical[5]. See ECF No. 19-1
at 4-9 of 10.
The
defendant filed a motion for an order affirming the
ALJ’s decision, maintaining (1) that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate any significant error of fact or law,
(2) that “the ALJ was entitled to rely on the record as
a whole”, (3) that the ALJ “thoroughly explained
his reasoning” for assigning partial weight to the
opinions of Drs. Haney and Westerfield, and (4) that the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Def.’s Mot./Mem. to Affirm (“ECF No. 21”)
at 5, 6, 9-12 of 12.
For the
reasons set forth below, the court concludes that the ALJ
applied the correct legal standard and his findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is being affirmed.
I.
Legal Standard
“A
district court reviewing a final [] decision . . . [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to . . . the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is performing an
appellate function.” Zambrana v. Califano, 651
F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). The court may not make a de
novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in
reviewing a denial of disability benefits. See Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856,
860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court’s function is to
ascertain whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
principles in reaching a conclusion and whether the decision
is supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Williams v. Bowen, 859
F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (emphasis added).
Substantial evidence must be “more than a mere
scintilla or touch of proof here and there in the
record.” Williams, 859 F.2d at 258 (emphasis
added). Absent legal error, this court may not set aside the
decision of the Commissioner if it is supported by
substantial evidence. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675
F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. §
405(g)(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Thus,
if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, that decision will be sustained, even
where there may also be substantial evidence to support the
plaintiff’s contrary position. See Schauer
v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis
added).
II.
Discussion
Medical
opinions from acceptable medical sources are entitled to
“controlling weight” if “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques” and “not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record”. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2). When these opinions are either not
well-supported or are inconsistent with other substantial
evidence, the ALJ must, inter alia, give good
reasons for the weight given. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c); Social Security Ruling 96-2p (Rescinded by
Federal Register Notice Vol. 82, No. 57, page 15263 effective
March 27, 2017, after February 10, 2015, the filing date of
the plaintiff’s application). The ALJ’s
explanation should be supported by the evidence and be
specific enough to make clear to the claimant and any
subsequent reviewers the reasons and the weight
given.[6] See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(f)(2); Social Security Ruling 96-2p (Rescinded by
Federal Register Notice Vol. 82, No. 57, page 15263 effective
March 27, 2017, after February 10, 2015, the filing date of
the plaintiff’s application).
The psychiatric review technique described in 20 CFR
404.1520a and 416.920a and summarized on the Psychiatric
Review Technique Form (PRTF) requires adjudicators to assess
an individual's limitations and restrictions from a
mental impairment(s) in categories identified in the
"paragraph B" and "paragraph C" criteria
of the adult mental disorders listings. The
adjudicator must remember that the limitations identified in
the "paragraph B" and "paragraph C"
criteria are not an RFC assessment but are used to rate the
severity of mental impairment(s) at steps 2 and 3 of
the sequential evaluation process. The mental RFC
assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation process requires a more detailed
assessment by itemizing various functions contained in the
broad categories found in paragraphs B and C of the adult
mental disorders listings. . . .
Social
Security Ruling 96-8p (emphasis added).
An
“RFC does not represent the least an
individual can do despite his or her limitations or
restrictions, but the most.” Social
Security Ruling 96-8p (emphasis added).
RFC must not be expressed in terms of the lowest exertional
level (e.g., “sedentary” or “light”
when the individual can perform “medium” work) at
which the medical vocational rules would still direct a
finding of “not disabled.” This would concede
lesser functional abilities than the individual actually
possesses and would not reflect the most he or she can do
based on the evidence in the case record, as directed by the
regulations.
Social
Security Ruling 96-8p
The
ALJ’s Decision demonstrates his understanding of the
paragraph B and C criteria:
To satisfy the "paragraph B"
criteria, the mental impairments must result in at least one
extreme or two marked limitations in a broad area of
functioning which are: understanding, remembering, or
applying information; interacting with others; concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace; or adapting or managing
themselves. A marked limitation means functioning in
this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a
sustained basis is seriously limited. An extreme
limitation is the inability to function independently,
appropriately or effectively, and on a sustained basis.
In understanding, remembering, or applying
information, the claimant had moderate limitation.
The claimant reported experiencing memory problems during the
relevant period (Exhibit 7F-9F). Additionally, cognitive
testing revealed the claimant had variable working memory
abilities with deficient mental processing in the
impaired-to-borderline range (Exhibit 8F). However,
cognitive testing also showed the
claimant had average language skills and that his memory
performance was grossly intact (Exhibit 8F at 4). Further,
the record showed that the claimant had several higher
education degrees, which strongly suggests that he has
retained some significant understanding abilities (Exhibit 5F
at 2). Additionally, the claimant also
reported that he could repair automobiles and small engines
during the relevant period, which strongly suggests that he
has retained significant understanding and
concentration-related abilities despite his complaints
(Exhibit 3E at 5). Overall, the record showed that
the claimant had only a moderate limitation in his ability to
understand, remember, and apply information.
In interacting with others, the claimant had
moderate limitation. The claimant told providers that he
often felt angry and reported that he had been fired from
past jobs due to difficulty getting along with others,
including his supervisors (Exhibit 6F at 7; 8F; 11F; 13F;
15F). Mental status examinations from the relevant period
showed the claimant appeared anxious, sad, and talkative with
a blunted affect, intermittent paraphasic errors when
speaking (Exhibit 8F; 11F). However, a
neuropsychological consultative examination revealed the
claimant appeared engaged and cooperative during that visit
(Exhibit 8F). Additionally, treatment records showed that the
claimant appeared cooperative during meetings with providers
(Exhibit 7F). Treatment records also showed he often appeared
pleasant (Exhibit 9F; 18F at 2). Moreover, the claimant
maintained a relationship with his wife during the relevant
period, which also suggests that he has retained a
significant ability to get along with others (Exhibit 13F;
14F). Moreover, the claimant self-reported that he goes
shopping and attends a sporting event with a family member
every year, which strongly suggests that he has retained some
significant ability to tolerate crowds and strangers (Exhibit
3E). Overall, the record showed that the claimant
had only a moderate limitation in his ability to interact
with others.
With regard to concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace, the claimant had moderate
limitation. The claimant complained of experiencing some
attention problems during the relevant period (Exhibit
7F-9F). Cognitive testing revealed the claimant had variable
attention abilities with deficient mental processing in the
impaired-to-borderline range (Exhibit 8F). However,
mental status examinations from the relevant
period also showed the claimant displayed an
intact ability to calculate and intact concentration during
visits with providers (Exhibit 11F). Examinations performed
by his providers also showed normal concentration and
attention as well (Exhibit 7F; 14F). Moreover, the claimant
self-reported that he can repair small engines and follow
written instructions (Exhibit 3E). Further, the claimant
admitted to providers that he wrote for enjoyment and that he
completed adult coloring books, which suggests that he has
retained significant concentration abilities (Exhibit 14F at
10). Similarly, the claimant also noted at the time of his
application that he could search for jobs, check the
newspaper for employment ads, run errands, and complete some
chores (Exhibit 3E). Overall, the record showed that
the claimant had only a moderate limitation in his ability to
concentrate, persist, and maintain pace.
As for adapting or managing oneself, the
claimant had moderate limitation. The claimant complained of
some suicidal ideation during the relevant period, and he
reported that he had trouble handling stress and changes in
routine (Exhibit 3E; 11F; 13F). Additionally, the claimant
reported that he had difficulty performing activities of
daily living due to poor motivation at times (Exhibit 3E).
However, a neuropsychological evaluation reported
that the claimant could maintain independence in all
activities of daily living (Exhibit 8F at 4). Additionally,
treatment records showed that the claimant appeared
well-groomed during meetings with providers and he told
providers that he could independently complete his activities
of daily living (Exhibit 7F; 11F at 18). The claimant also
self-reported that he could complete household chores and
yard work, and that he could prepare his own meals (Exhibit
3E). Overall, the record showed that the claimant
had only a moderate limitation in his ability to adapt or
manage himself Because the claimant's mental impairments
do not cause at least two "marked" limitations or
one "extreme" limitation, the "paragraph
B" criteria are not satisfied.
The undersigned has also considered whether the
"paragraph C" criteria are
satisfied. In this case, the evidence fails to establish the
presence of the "paragraph C" criteria. The record
does not establish that the claimant has only marginal
adjustment, that is, a minimal capacity to adapt to changes
in the claimant's environment or to demands that are not
already part of the claimant's daily life. An
neuropsychological examination reported the claimant
maintained independence in all activities of daily living
during the relevant period, and treatment records did not
document any significant decline in functioning following his
loss of work (See Exhibit 1F- 7F; 8F at 4;
9F-18F). Similarly, after he lost his prior
employment, the claimant noted that he could search for jobs,
check the newspaper for employment ads, run errands, and
complete some chores, which suggests that he retained
significant adaptive functioning during periods of change
(Exhibit 3E). This ...