United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Kari
A. Dooley, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Lisa Richardson (the “Plaintiff”) brings this
administrative appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
She appeals the decision of defendant Nancy A. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,
(the “Commissioner”) denying her applications for
disability and disability insurance benefits pursuant to
Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”)
and supplemental security income benefits pursuant to Title
XVI of the Act. The Plaintiff moves to reverse the
Commissioner’s decision, challenging the Administrative
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) determination of her
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and the jobs
she is capable of performing in light of that RFC. The
Commissioner contends that its decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and moves for an order
affirming the decision. For the reasons set forth below, the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF
No. 24) is DENIED and the Commissioner’s Motion to
Affirm (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
It is
well-settled that a district court will reverse the decision
of the Commissioner only when it is based upon legal error or
when it is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1433
(2d Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive. . . .”). “Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). The court
does not inquire as to whether the record might also support
the plaintiff’s claims but only whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
decision. Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523
Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013). Substantial evidence can
support the Commissioner’s findings even if there is
the potential for drawing more than one conclusion from the
record. See Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114, 1120
(8th Cir. 2017). The court can reject the
Commissioner’s findings of facts “only if a
reasonable factfinder would have to conclude
otherwise.” Brault v. Social Sec. Admin. 683
F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). Stated simply, “if there
is substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner’s]
determination, it must be upheld.” Selian v.
Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013).
Factual
and Procedural History
On June
24, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an application for disability
and disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the
Act. On September 19, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an
application for supplemental security income benefits
pursuant to Title XVI of the Act. In both applications, she
alleged an onset date of February 22, 2014. The
Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially on
October 17, 2014 and upon reconsideration on February 26,
2015. Thereafter, hearings were held before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September 15, 2016, May 1,
2017, and August 21, 2017. On September 13, 2017, the ALJ
issued a written decision denying the Plaintiff’s
applications.
In her
decision, the ALJ followed the sequential evaluation process
for assessing disability claims.[1] At Step 1, the ALJ
determined that the Plaintiff has not been engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the claimed onset date. At
Step 2, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff had several
severe impairments, including obesity, osteoarthritis, muscle
disorder, degenerative joint disease, and affective
disorders. At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff
does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments in Appendix 1. At Step 4, the ALJ
concluded that the Plaintiff, in relevant part, has:
the residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to
perform light work . . . except she could stand and walk four
hours. . . . She is capable of performing simple, routine
tasks with occasional interaction with others with tasks
performed independently rather than in groups or teams. She
requires a predicable routine.
(R. 16.) The ALJ further found that the Plaintiff does not
have the RFC to perform her past relevant work. Finally, at
Step 5, the ALJ concluded that there are a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that the Plaintiff could
perform, including Assembler, Solderer, and Gluer. In
addition to these light exertional level jobs, the ALJ
further noted that the vocational expert testified that there
were three other sedentary jobs that the Plaintiff could
perform. Accordingly, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the Act. This appeal
followed.
Discussion
The
Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity
The Plaintiff raises four challenges to the ALJ’s RFC
determination. She claims that the ALJ erred: (1) by
concluding that she could perform light work even though the
state agency consultant at the reconsideration level found
that she had an RFC for only sedentary work; (2) by not
including some of the restrictions imposed by the state
agency consultant; (3) by relying on the opinions of the
Commissioner’s consulting psychologist over that of her
treating social worker; and (3) by failing to develop the
record adequately concerning her mental RFC. The Commissioner
disputes each of these claims of error. The Court addresses
the claims in turn.
The
ALJ’s Physical RFC Findings
The
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination
is erroneous because the ALJ credited the findings of the
consulting physician, Dr. Khurshid Khan, but rejected Dr.
Khan’s finding that the Plaintiff could perform only
sedentary work. The Commissioner responds that the
ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial
evidence in the record and is, in fact, consistent with Dr.
Khan’s opinion. The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
In the
Plaintiff’s Disability Determination Explanation at the
reconsideration level, Dr. Khan made several findings
concerning the Plaintiff’s exertional limitations. For
example, he found that the Plaintiff could frequently lift or
carry ten pounds, but she could only occasionally lift or
carry twenty pounds. He also found that the Plaintiff could
stand and walk for a total of four hours and sit for about
six hours a day. The ALJ accepted Dr. Kahn’s findings
concerning the Plaintiff’s exertional limitations and
explicitly included almost all of them in the physical RFC
determination. The only limitation that Dr. Khan found that
the ALJ did not include in the RFC was a limitations with
respect to right foot controls, specifically, “[n]o
constant foot controls [right lower extremity].” The
Plaintiff argues that this discrepancy undermines the
accuracy of the ALJ’s RFC determination, as she gave
weight to Dr. Khan’s opinion.
The
discrepancy is immaterial. Light work requires only
“some pushing and pulling of . . . leg controls.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The RFC, even were it to
include this additional limitation, would therefore not
preclude the finding that Plaintiff can engage in
“light work, ” i.e., positions that do
not require “constant” foot control usage.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the light work jobs that
the ALJ found that the Plaintiff could perform at Step Five
are ones that require right-leg foot controls such that they
would be inconsistent with this allegedly missing
limitation.[2]See Whitaker v. Berryhill, No.
3:17-cv-01337 (SRU), 2018 WL 4583508, at *13 (D. Conn. Sept.
25, 2018) (“Even in the face of an oversight, the
ALJ’s decision may be upheld if the error was
‘harmless, ’ that is, if ...