Argued
April 10, 2019
Procedural
History
Substitute
information charging the defendant with three counts of the
crime of interfering with an officer and with the crime of
disorderly conduct, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, geographical area
number one, and tried to the jury before Blawie, J.;
verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed in part;
affirmed.
Yoon
Chul Shin, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Sarah
Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the
brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., state’s
attorney, and Daniel E. Cummings, deputy assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Keller, Bright and Beach, Js.
OPINION
KELLER, J.
The
self-represented defendant, Yoon Chul Shin, appeals from the
judgment of conviction, rendered by the trial court following
a jury trial, of three counts of interfering with an officer
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a and one
count of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-182. On appeal, the defendant raises a plethora of
claims. Primarily, he claims that (1) he was illegally seized
by the police because he was arrested without probable cause
or an arrest warrant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to
find him guilty of any of the crimes with which he was
charged because testimony elicited from police officers at
trial was fabricated; (3) the court improperly admitted
testimony from police officers about statements the defendant
made in a video he posted on the Internet; (4) the court
abused its discretion in denying his request to excuse a
prospective juror for cause during voir dire; (5) the court
violated his constitutional right to compulsory process by
declining to issue a subpoena; (6) the court improperly found
him incompetent to stand trial but restorable before later
determining that he was competent;[1] and (7) the court improperly
imposed on him as part of his conditional discharge a special
condition that he stay out of the state of
Connecticut.[2] We dismiss the last claim as moot and,
with respect to the remaining claims, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
On the
basis of the evidence adduced at trial, the jury reasonably
could have found the following facts. In August, 2016, the
Maccabi Games, an athletic event for Jewish athletes, were
held over a span of four days at West Hill High School
(school) in Stamford. On August 10, 2016, the Stamford Police
Department (department) received from the Stamford Jewish
Community Center’s internal security staff a memorandum
alerting it that a suspicious individual from California,
later identified as the defendant, was driving a blue Toyota
Celica covered in white painted writing across the country to
various synagogues and that he may be seen around the school
during the Maccabi Games. Upon receipt of the memorandum, the
department forwarded it to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) joint terrorism task force,
which, in turn, sent an email to the department stating that
it had opened an investigation of the defendant in
Cincinnati, Ohio, and that it found a video posted on the
Internet by the defendant in which he stated that he was in
the process of desecrating Jewish temples and that he was
‘‘on a mission to rid the Jew . . . of the
planet.’’ This information was disseminated to
the Stamford police officers assigned to provide security at
the Maccabi Games on August 11, 2016.
On the
morning of August 11, 2016, Officer Michael Montero alerted
other officers via radio that he had seen the
defendant’s vehicle passing the school and continuing
north on Roxbury Road. After receiving the radio call,
Lieutenant Christopher Baker and Sergeant Steven Perrotta
drove north on Roxbury Road, where they eventually observed
the defendant’s parked vehicle blocking a residential
driveway directly across from Temple Beth El, a Jewish
temple. Lieutenant Baker and Sergeant Perrotta turned on
their vehicle’s overhead lights and pulled behind the
defendant’s vehicle. When Lieutenant Baker approached
the defendant’s vehicle, he noticed that the rear
window was covered in tin foil, making it impossible to see
who or what was in the vehicle. When Lieutenant Baker asked
the defendant for his driver’s license and vehicle
registration, the defendant did not comply with his request.
The defendant also was agitated and repeatedly stated that he
was only praying and that the police had no right to stop
him. Lieutenant Baker observed on the dashboard of the
defendant’s car two pyramid shaped metal devices, one
of which had 12 gauge wire sticking out of it. When
Lieutenant Baker asked about the objects, the defendant
stated that they were what he used to desecrate the temples.
Lieutenant
Baker subsequently asked the defendant several times to turn
off his vehicle’s motor, but he refused. Sergeant
Perrotta then reached into the vehicle and shut it off.
Lieutenant Baker on several occasions ordered the defendant
out of his vehicle, but he repeatedly refused. Due to the
defendant’s noncompliance, Lieutenant Baker opened the
defendant’s door and extricated him from the vehicle.
Sergeant Felix Martinez, who had arrived to assist Lieutenant
Baker and Sergeant Perrotta, attempted to escort the
defendant to the back of his police vehicle. As he was being
placed in the back of the police vehicle, the defendant was
screaming anti-Semitic comments loud enough to be overheard
by a group of civilians who had gathered near the scene.
Sergeant Martinez and Sergeant Perrotta attempted to place
the defendant in the police car, but the defendant braced
himself against the vehicle to prevent himself from being
placed into the car. Eventually, Sergeant Martinez and
Sergeant Perrotta were able to physically push the defendant
into the police car.
On the
basis of the information provided by the FBI, the video made
by the defendant, the defendant’s behavior while
interacting with the police officers, and the pyramids on the
dashboard of the defendant’s car, Lieutenant Baker
requested the presence of a bomb sniffing dog to ensure that
the defendant’s car did not contain any explosives.
Upon arrival, the bomb sniffing dog indicated that explosives
were either present or had been present.[3] Accordingly, a
safety perimeter around the defendant’s vehicle was
established while it was being searched. As a precaution,
children who had been playing outside at a nearby school were
evacuated from the area. While the defendant’s vehicle
was being searched for explosives, the defendant was twice
taken out of Sergeant Martinez’ police car so that
Sergeant Erin Trew could question him about the pyramid
devices on his dashboard. During his second conversation with
Sergeant Trew, the defendant again began to scream
obscenities and anti-Semitic comments audible to a crowd of
bystanders. The defendant then was put in handcuffs and
placed under arrest. When Sergeant Martinez again tried to
place the defendant back in his police vehicle, the defendant
began yelling and screaming while he resisted attempts to be
placed in the vehicle. Due to the defendant’s
resistance, Sergeant Trew needed to go to the other side of
the vehicle and pull the defendant into the car. The
defendant was thereafter transported to the police station.
The
defendant originally was charged with breach of the peace in
the second degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-181 and inciting injury to persons or property in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-179a. [See file] In
a substitute information filed before trial, the defendant
was charged with three counts of interfering with an officer
in violation of § 53a-167a[4] and one count of disorderly
conduct in violation of § 53a-182.[5]
After a
jury trial, in which the defendant elected to represent
himself, [6] the defendant was found guilty on all
counts. The court rendered a judgment of conviction in
accordance with the jury’s verdict and imposed a total
effective sentence of three years of incarceration, execution
suspended after seven months, with two years of conditional
discharge.[7] This appeal followed. Additional facts
will be set forth as necessary.
I
The
defendant first claims that he was illegally seized by the
police because he was arrested without probable cause or an
arrest warrant. The state argues that, even if the
defendant’s arrest was illegal, it cannot serve as the
basis to overturn the defendant’s conviction. We agree
with the state.
Our
Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[t]he
relationship between an illegal arrest and a subsequent
prosecution under federal constitutional law is well settled.
In an unbroken line of cases dating back to 1886, the federal
rule has been that an illegal arrest will not bar a
subsequent prosecution or void a resulting
conviction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Bagnaschi, 180 Conn.App. 835, 857, 184 A.3d
1234, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 912, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018).
‘‘[E]ven when an arrest is made without probable
cause, a subsequent conviction is not void if no evidence was
obtained as the result of the illegal arrest.’’
State v. Silano, 96 Conn.App. 341, 344, 900 A.2d
540, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 911, 908 A.2d 542 (2006).
In the
present case, the defendant does not argue in his principal
appellate brief that evidence was obtained or used against
him at trial as a result of his purported illegal arrest.
Rather, his argument merely centers on the assertion that he
was illegally seized. As a result, even if his arrest was
illegal, it cannot serve as the basis for overturning his
conviction. Therefore, the defendant’s claim fails.
Moreover,
the defendant in his reply brief claims for the first time
that photographs of his vehicle and the pyramids on his
dashboard, police officer testimony adduced at trial, and
police reports are ‘‘invalid’’ due to
his illegal seizure. It is, however, a ‘‘well
established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the
first time in a reply brief.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Myers, 178
Conn.App. 102, 106, 174 A.3d 197 (2017). Furthermore, the
defendant never moved to suppress this evidence. Accordingly,
the record is inadequate for appellate review because the
court did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions
regarding whether any evidence was illegally
seized.[8]See, e.g, State v. Collins, 124
Conn.App. 249, 256–57, 5 A.3d 492 (record inadequate
for review where defendant failed to file motion to suppress
and no evidentiary hearing held), cert. denied, 299 Conn.
906, 10 A.3d 523 (2010); State v. Necaise, 97
Conn.App. 214, 220, 904 A.2d 245 (declining to review claim
regarding out-of-court identification due to inadequate
record where defendant failed to file motion to suppress and
to object at trial, and no evidentiary hearing held), cert.
denied, 280 Conn. 942, 912 A.2d 478 (2006).
II
The
defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to
find him guilty of the offenses with which he was charged
because the police officers’ testimony adduced at trial
was fabricated.[9] We disagree.
We
begin by briefly setting forth the standard of review for
claims of evidentiary insufficiency in a criminal appeal.
‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test.
First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon
the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have
concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘We
note that the [finder of fact] must find every element proven
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant
guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and
inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable
and logical for the [finder of fact] to conclude that a basic
fact or an inferred fact is true, the [finder of fact] is
permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in
combination with other proven facts in determining whether
the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the
defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘In
evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to
accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent
with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of
fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts
established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and
logical. . . .
‘‘On
appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that supports the [finder of
fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dojnia, 190
Conn.App. 353, 371–72, 210 A.3d 586 (2019).
In the
present case, the defendant essentially asks us to assess the
credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial. It is
well settled, however, that ‘‘[a reviewing court]
cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Frauenglass & Associates, LLC v. Enagbare, 149
Conn.App. 103, 114, 88 A.3d 1246, cert. denied, 314 Conn.
927, 101 A.3d 273 (2014). ‘‘[W]e must defer to
the finder of fact’s evaluation of the credibility of
the witnesses that is based on its invaluable firsthand
observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . .
[The fact finder] is free to juxtapose conflicting versions
of events and determine which is more credible. . . . It is
the [fact finder’s] exclusive province to weigh the
conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of
witnesses. . . . The [fact finder] can . . . decide what-all,
none, or some-of a witness’ testimony to accept or
reject.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 117 Conn.App. 150,
154, 978 A.2d 99 (2009). ‘‘Because it is the sole
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of
witnesses, it is not our role to second-guess such
credibility determinations.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn.App.
195, 200, 138 A.3d 1090, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906, 140
A.3d 977 (2016).
In the
present matter, the jury as the finder of fact was free to
credit or discredit the testimony of the police officers.
Moreover, the jury heard testimony from the defendant that
the police officers’ testimony was false. Accordingly,
the jury was free to weigh the conflicting testimony and
assess the credibility of the various witnesses. Thus, after
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict, we conclude that there is a
reasonable view of the evidence that supports the
jury’s verdict of guilty. Therefore, we reject the
defendant’s claim.
III
The
defendant next claims that the court improperly admitted
testimony from police officers about statements made in an
Internet video posted by the defendant, of which the officers
were made aware by the FBI, before their interaction with him
on August 11, 2016. In that video, the defendant made
derogatory remarks about Jewish people and discussed
desecrating Jewish temples. Specifically, the defendant
argues that the testimony was ...