Argued
March 5, 2019
Procedural
History
Action
to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants’
alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where
the court, Cobb, J., granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the plaintiff appealed. Reversed;
further proceedings.
Neil
Johnson, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Gretchen G. Randall, with whom, on the brief, was Emily
McDonough Souza, for the appellees (defendants).
Alvord, Moll and Bear, Js.
OPINION
ALVORD, J.
The
plaintiff, Delores Peek, appeals from the summary judgment
rendered in favor of the defendants, Manchester Memorial
Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that
her action was barred by the statute of limitations in
General Statutes § 52-584.[1] Because we conclude that the
evidence before the trial court demonstrated a genuine issue
of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered her
injury as contemplated by § 52-584, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court.
The
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
as the nonmoving party, reveals the following relevant facts
and procedural history. On January 30, 2015, the plaintiff
was admitted to Manchester Memorial Hospital with a medical
diagnosis of C-Diff diarrhea. On or about that date, she was
assessed at the hospital and found to be at risk for falling.
She was placed on ‘‘fall prevention
protocol’’ and required assistance to leave her
hospital bed. On February 10, 2015, the plaintiff fell while
using the restroom and sustained injuries to her shoulder and
neck, for which she received medication and treatment. She
‘‘was unaware, ’’ on the date of her
fall, ‘‘what was the cause of [her]
fall.’’ The plaintiff left the hospital on
February 12, 2015, and received follow up care through
December 10, 2015, on which date she underwent neck
surgery.[2] On or about April 6, 2015, staff at the
office of the plaintiff’s doctor informed the plaintiff
that ‘‘a nurse or nurse’s aide should have
been responsible for [her] safety while inpatient at [the
defendants’ hospital].’’
On
November 22, 2016, the plaintiff received an automatic ninety
day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-190a (b).[3] The plaintiff delivered the
action to the state marshal for service of process on May 22,
2017. In her one count complaint, the plaintiff alleges that
her fall resulted from the defendants’ negligence in
‘‘fail[ing] to exercise the degree of care,
skill, and diligence ordinarily exercised by hospitals
engaged in the treat[ment] of patients . . . on . . . fall
prevention protocol . . . .’’ On July 26, 2017,
the defendants filed an answer and a special defense alleging
that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of
limitations in § 52-584. On July 31, 2017, the plaintiff
filed her reply to the special defense, stating therein:
‘‘The plaintiff . . . denies any and all
allegations of the defendants’ special defense in its
entirety, the plaintiff was inpatient for the stay subject of
the plaintiff’s complaint until February 28,
2015.’’[4]
On
September 13, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, maintaining that the plaintiff’s action was
barred by the statute of limitations in § 52-584. The
documents submitted with the defendants’ motion and
memorandum of law in support of their motion were the
plaintiff’s certificate of good faith pursuant to
§ 52-190a and attached written opinion letter, the
plaintiff’s request for an extension of the statute of
limitations, the state marshal’s return of service, the
defendants’ answer and special defense, and the
plaintiff’s reply thereto.
On
December 29, 2017, the plaintiff objected to the motion for
summary judgment, arguing that her action was timely because
the statute of limitations was tolled under the continuous
course of treatment doctrine. She also maintained that the
statute of limitations did not begin running until April 6,
2015, on which date she claimed that she
‘‘learned that she was on fall risk protocol and
that while on fall risk protocol that the hospital was
required to provide her assistance whenever she left her
bed.’’ She argued that she ‘‘was not
aware that the defendants’ conduct or lack thereof was
the cause of her injury until she was informed by the
defendant provider on or about April 6, 2015.’’
The plaintiff attached to her opposition memorandum her
affidavit averring that she ‘‘was unaware,
’’ on the date of her fall, ‘‘what
was the cause of [her] fall.’’ She further
averred that staff at her doctor’s office informed her
on April 6, 2015, that ‘‘a nurse or nurse’s
aide should have been responsible for [her] safety while
inpatient at [the defendants’ hospital].’’
The defendants did not file a reply memorandum.
On
January 2, 2018, the court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, stating that ‘‘the
plaintiff did not place the action in the hands of the
marshal until May 22, 2017. Because the plaintiff suffered
actionable harm-the fall and injuries-on February 10, 2015,
she should have brought the action on or before February 10,
2017. Having received a ninety day extension . . . the suit
should have been initiated on or before May 10, 2017. Having
failed to initiate this action within the applicable statute
of limitations, the action is time barred.’’ This
appeal followed.
On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
determined that her action was barred by the statute of
limitations in § 52-584. She argues that the statute of
limitations was tolled by the continuous course of treatment
doctrine[5] and, thus, the statute did not begin
running until December 10, 2015, on which date she underwent
neck surgery. In the alternative, she argues that actionable
harm did not occur until April 6, 2015, on which date she
claims that she learned that the defendants’ negligence
had caused her injury. We disagree that the statute of
limitations was tolled by the continuing course of treatment
doctrine. As to ...