United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL United States Magistrate Judge
This is
an administrative appeal following the denial of the
plaintiff, Pedro Juan Rivera's, application for Title II
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Social Security Income (“SSI). It is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).[2] Plaintiff now
moves for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), or in the alternative, an order
remanding his case for a rehearing. [Doc. #13]. The
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming his
decision. [Doc. # 15]. After careful consideration of the
arguments raised by both parties, and thorough review of the
administrative record, the Court grants Plaintiff's
motion and remands the case for further proceedings.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will meet this definition if his or
her impairments are of such severity that the claimant cannot
perform pervious work and also cannot, considering the
claimant's age, education, and work experience,
“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner must follow a sequential evaluation process for
assessing disability claims. The five steps of this process
are as follows: (1) the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe
impairment, ” the Commissioner must ask whether, based
solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which “meets or equals” an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the Listings). If
so, and it meets the durational requirements, the
Commissioner will consider the claimant disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; (4) if not, the Commissioner then asks
whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or
she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or
her past work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform
his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work in the national economy which the
claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520; 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof on
the first four steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden
of proof on the final step. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014).
“A
district court reviewing a final . . . decision [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v.
Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly, the district court may not make a de
novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in
reviewing a denial of disability benefits. Id.;
Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court's
function is to first ascertain whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal principles in reaching his
conclusion, and then whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d
983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, absent legal error, a
decision of the Commissioner cannot be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Berry v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be
“more than a scintilla or touch of proof here and there
in the record.” Id. If the Commissioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, that decision
will be sustained, even where there may also be substantial
evidence to support the plaintiff's contrary position.
Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1982).
I.
BACKGROUND
a.
Facts
Plaintiff filed his DIB application on January 26, 2017, and
SSI application on April 20, 2017, alleging an onset of
disability as of August 18, 2016. His claim was denied at
both the initial and reconsideration levels. Thereafter,
Plaintiff requested a hearing. On February 28, 2018, a
hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge John T.
Molleur (“the ALJ”). Plaintiff, who was
represented by counsel, Maria Velasquez, Plaintiff's
mother, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified
at the hearing. On March 20, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision
denying Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff timely requested
review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. On
December 11, 2018, the Appeals Council denied review, making
the ALJ's decision the final determination of the
Commissioner. This action followed.
Plaintiff
was thirty-one years old on the alleged onset of disability
date. (R. 93). He attended high school through the tenth
grade and can communicate in English. (R. 95). Plaintiff has
past employment as a tow truck driver, deliverer, cook, and
laborer-construction. (R. 29-30). Plaintiff's complete
medical history is set forth in the Statement of Facts filed
by the parties. [Doc. ##13-1; 15-1]. The Court adopts these
statements and incorporates them by reference herein.
b.
The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ
followed the sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act.
At Step
One, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since August 18, 2016. (R. 22). At Step Two,
the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
schizophrenia/substance induced psychotic disorder and
polysubstance abuse disorder. (R. 22). At Step Three, the ALJ
found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments. (R. 22-24). Next, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff retains the following residual
functional capacity[3]:
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but
with the following nonexertional limitations: The claimant
should avoid tandem work or other team-oriented work; and
there should be no requirement to interact with the general
public. Additionally, the claimant should avoid fast-paced
production work; and there ...