United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ANTHONY G. VILLANO, also known as ANTONIO VILLANO Plaintiff,
v.
WOODGREEN SHELTON, LLC, et al. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF
NOS. 24, 27)
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Anthony Villano (the “Plaintiff”) brings this
action against the Milford Police Department, Chief Keith
Mello of the Milford Police Department, [1] the Orange Police
Department, and Chief Robert J. Gagne of the Orange Police
Department (collectively, the
“Defendants”).[2] The Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 24, 27.) The Plaintiff did not
file any opposition to the motions. Notwithstanding, the
Court considers the merits of each Defendant's motion.
For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are
GRANTED.
The
Complaint
On
January 18, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this
matter using the form complaint for this District. At the
outset, the Court notes that the Complaint is largely
inscrutable. In the “Nature of the Case” section,
the Plaintiff states the following:
THeFT oF TRusT Property's & Violation's of S.S.D
WelFARe plus [violations of] BAnkRuptcy Law's . . . ABUSE
Holding My Personal ITEMS HOStAGE Lock OUT.
(Compl. at 3.) The Plaintiff's claim is identified as a
violation “under Elderly Criminal Act under
Medicare.” (Id.) Significantly, the Plaintiff
does not include any factual allegations regarding the
conduct of the Defendants. Near the end of the
“Supporting Facts” there is a single reference to
law enforcement. The Plaintiff states “I need
PRotection's [sic][.] THe Police Told me yesterday not To
CAll 911 WHen THe CAr I was DRiving got stolen In MilFord
couRt w[ith] my gun and medison [sic][.] IT wAs A set up
Involving mulTiple Agency's [sic.]” (Id.
at 4.) A second reference to law enforcement appears in the
“Request for Relief” section of the form
complaint. The Plaintiff states, “I request the
following relief: My liFe Back[.] THey HAVe Wrong PeRson
& I AM a victom [sic] PRotection[.] THey said I will Be
killed soon[.] THey HAVE All my InFo Stolen By MilFord
Police.” (Id. at 5.) Chief Mello, Chief Gagne,
and the Orange Police Department are not mentioned anywhere
in the body of the Complaint.
Standard
of Review
To
survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, ” are not entitled to a
presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Discussion
The
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to state a claim. They argue that the Complaint
should be dismissed because it does not contain any factual
allegations against them and, therefore, does not state any
plausible basis for relief. The police department defendants
further move to dismiss this action on the grounds that they
cannot be sued because they are not legal entities subject to
suit. The Plaintiff has not responded to the motions to
dismiss, and his time to do so has long since passed.
Dismissal
is appropriate here because, even construing this pro
se complaint liberally, the Court cannot discern any
claims, let alone any plausible claims, against these
Defendants. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” [citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). The Plaintiff
has not made any factual allegations against Chief Mello, the
Orange Police Department, or Chief Gagne.
The
Complaint does suggest that the Milford Police Department, in
an unknown fashion, was involved in the theft of information
from or about the Plaintiff. Even if the Court were to
conclude that these allegations set forth a cognizable claim
against the Milford Police Department, the Milford Police
Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued.
Salaman v. Bullock, No. 3:05-cv-00876 (JCH), 2007 WL
879130, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2007) (“Although a
municipality is subject to suit . . . a municipal police
department is not.”). “A municipal police
department is a sub-unit or agency of the municipal
government through which the municipality fulfills its
policing function. Because a municipal police department is
not an independent legal entity, it is not subject to suit. .
. .” Nicholson v. Lenczewski, 356 F.Supp.2d
157, 164 (D. Conn. 2005); accord Salaman, 2007 WL
879130, at *2; see also Weitz v. Greenwich Police
Dep't, No. CV-04-0200464-S, 2005 WL 375302, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005) (“there is no
provision [in the Connecticut General Statutes] providing
that municipal police departments constitute a legal entity
separate and apart from the municipality they serve, or that
they have the power to sue or be sued”).
Accordingly,
the motions to dismiss are granted. The dismissal is with
prejudice as to the Milford Police Department and the Orange
Police Department because any efforts to amend the claims
against these defendants would be futile, as neither
defendant is a legal entity capable of being sued. Danis
v. Moody's Corp., 627 Fed.Appx. 31, 32 (2d Cir.
2016) (summary order) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due
to futility); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
(2d Cir. 2000) (“The problem with [Plaintiff's]
causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not
cure it. Repleading would thus be futile. Such a futile
request to replead should be denied.”); Roller
Bearing Co. of Am., Inc. v. Am. Software, Inc., 570
F.Supp.2d 376, 386 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that leave to
amend may be denied where the proposed amendment would be
futile).
The
dismissal is with prejudice as to Chief Gagne because there
is nothing in the current complaint implicating any conduct
on the part of him, the Orange Police Department, or any of
its officers. Ordinarily, the district court should not
dismiss a pro se plaintiff's complaint without
granting leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated.” Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. But here,
there is no indication that a valid claim might be stated
against this defendant because there are no factual
allegations asserted against him. See Hariprasad v. New
York, 722 Fed.Appx. 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary
order) (affirming dismissal of complaint without leave to
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