United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MOTION TO STRIKE (ECF NOS. 11, 21)
Kari
A. Dooley, United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Anthony Villano (“Villano”), proceeding pro
se, filed this action against Defendants the State of
Connecticut Judicial Department and the Connecticut Division
of Public Defender Services (collectively, the
“Defendants”), alleging violations of his civil
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Defendants moved to dismiss Villano's First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), principally on the grounds that the
Eleventh Amendment precludes this Court's exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction. Villano did not file an
opposition to the motion. He instead filed a purported Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) without seeking
Defendants' written consent or leave of the Court as
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Defendants then moved to
strike the SAC, asserting, inter alia, that
whether construed as a request for leave to file an amended
complaint or a supplemental complaint, leave should be denied
as futile. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED and the Motion to Strike is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
“A
case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court
lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
it.” Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Israel, 919
F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d
Cir. 2000)). “In resolving a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all
uncontroverted facts in the complaint . . . as true, and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Mercer v. Schriro, 337
F.Supp.3d 109, 122 (D. Conn. 2018) (quoting Tandon v.
Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d
239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014)). On a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court must likewise accept the complaint's
factual allegations as true and draw inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. Littlejohn v. City of New
York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015). The complaint,
however, “must ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face, '” setting forth
“factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Kolbasyuk v. Capital Mgmt.
Servs., LP, 918 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
Although
a pro se complaint must be liberally construed
“to raise the strongest arguments it suggests, ”
pro se litigants are nonetheless required to
“state a plausible claim for relief.” Walker
v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (brackets
and internal quotation marks and citations omitted). So too
must a pro se litigant be able “to allege
facts demonstrating that her claims arise under this
Court's . . . jurisdiction.” Gray v. Internal
Affairs Bureau, 292 F.Supp.2d 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Absent such a showing the “complaint must be
dismissed.” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(3)).
Finally,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) instructs that leave to amend should be
freely given, though the Court may deny it for good cause,
including, inter alia, “when amendment would
be futile.” Omotosho v. Freeman Inv. &
Loan, 136 F.Supp.3d 235, 252 (D. Conn. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).[1] Even affording pro se
plaintiffs special consideration in construing their
pleadings, the Court should deny leave to amend as futile
where “the subject matter jurisdiction deficiencies . .
. are substantive and cannot be cured.” Pudlin v.
Office for (Not of) Civil Rights of the United States
Dep't of Educ., 186 F.Supp.3d 288, 295 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
Allegations
In the
FAC (ECF No. 10), Villano alleges that the Defendants
violated Villano's civil rights by: (1) denying him
representation by a public defender and dismissing his
privately retained attorneys in various criminal or motor
vehicle cases brought against Villano in state court; (2)
setting inordinately high bonds to assure his appearance in
those cases; and (3) coordinating “to deprive [Villano]
of [his] rights and to cause [Villano] to accept a plea deal
against [his] interests.” FAC at 3. Villano also
alleges that Defendants violated his right to bear arms by
ordering the surrender of his weapon and firearms permits in
connection with a protective order entered against him, which
he asserts was premised on fraudulent grounds and entered
without a fair hearing. The FAC seeks injunctive relief in
the form of an order from this Court directing the Defendants
to appoint a public defender for Villano and to reinstate his
private attorneys in his state court actions, as well as
money damages.
In the
SAC (ECF No. 17), Villano repeats the FAC's core
contentions while additionally alleging that he has been
unlawfully placed on home detention based upon false
accusations leveled against him by the State. The SAC
proposes to name the Office of the Chief State's Attorney
as well as various individuals as additional defendants. It
reiterates Villano's request for an order that he be
appointed a public defender in his pending criminal cases and
further seeks an order vacating an order of house
imprisonment, as well as fifty billion dollars in damages.
Discussion
Motion
to Dismiss
Defendants
principally assert that the Eleventh Amendment presents a
jurisdictional bar to Villano's claims. The Eleventh
Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
“The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as also
barring suits in federal court against a state brought by
that state's own citizens.” Mary Jo C. v. New
York State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151 (2d
Cir. 2013). This immunity extends not only to the State
itself but “to state agents and state instrumentalities
that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Woods v.
Rondout Valley Centr. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d
232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit “applies
regardless of the nature of the relief sought, ” except
in circumstances “where the state has consented to be
sued or Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Lee v. Dep't of Children
and Families, 939 F.Supp.2d 160, 165 (D. Conn. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Congress did not abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity when enacting Title 42,
U.S.C. § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
345 (1979). Nor has the State of Connecticut waived such
immunity. Where “there is no suggestion of
congressional abrogation or state acquiescence, ” the
Court must determine whether the agency or instrumentality at
issue “is, constructively, ‘one of the United
States.'” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d
355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XI).
It is
well-established that a State's judicial system
constitutes an arm of the State. See Id. at 368
(holding that “the New York State Unified Court System
is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State' . . . and
is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity”
(internal citation omitted)); see also Posr v. Court
Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999)
(same, with respect to the New York State Office of Court
Administration); Swinton v. State of Connecticut Judicial
Branch, No. 3:15-cv-01695 (SRU), 2016 WL 4257326, at *2
(D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2016) (same, as applied to the Connecticut
Judicial Branch); Bernstein v. New York, 591
F.Supp.2d 448, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same, with respect to,
inter alia, the Florida Supreme Court, the New York
State Supreme Court Appellate Divisions, and other judicial
committees and administrative offices). So too is the
Division of Public Defender Services, a state agency
established pursuant to statute, an arm of the State. See
Cooper v. State of Connecticut Pub. Def.'s Office,
No. 3:03-cv-2259 (DJS), 2005 WL 589323, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar.
11, 2005) (holding that plaintiff's “claim against
the State of Connecticut Office of the Public Defender must
be dismissed because it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”). Accordingly,
the Eleventh Amendment presents a complete jurisdictional bar
to suit against both Defendants.
Even if
the Eleventh Amendment did not foreclose this Court's
exercise of jurisdiction, the Younger abstention
doctrine would. This doctrine “preclude[s] federal
intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions.”
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78
(2013). “Federal courts must abstain where a party
seeks to enjoin an ongoing, parallel state criminal
proceeding, to preserve the ‘longstanding public policy
against federal court interference with state court
proceedings' based on principles of federalism and
comity.” Disability Rights New York v. New
York, 916 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971)).
Villano asks this Court to order the state court to appoint a
public defender in his state criminal proceedings. He
similarly seeks an order from this Court, directing the state
court to reinstate his private attorneys in the matters
pending in the state criminal courts. The Court can think of
no clearer circumstance which would implicate the
Younger abstention doctrine. The relief Villano
seeks is designed to “interfere with [Villano's]
pending ...