United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER ON FIRST STEP ACT MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OR RESENTENCING
VICTOR
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Lyle
Jones (“Defendant”) moves for his immediate
release or resentencing under Section 404 of the
recently-enacted First Step Act. See First Step Act
Motion for Immediate Release or Resentencing, dated May 29,
2019 (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 2508; see
also Memorandum in Support of Def.'s Mot., dated
July 3, 2019 (“Def.'s Mem.”), ECF No. 2527.
Mr. Jones is currently serving three concurrent life
sentences. He has most recently been incarcerated at Gilmer
Federal Correctional Institution in Glenville, West Virginia.
See Def.'s Mem. at 9, 26.
The
United States of America (the “Government”) has
opposed Mr. Jones's motion. Government's Opposition
to Def.'s Mot., dated Aug. 9, 2019 (“Gov't
Opp.”), ECF No. 2552.
On
September 4, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the motion.
Minute Entry, dated Sept. 4, 2019, ECF No. 2572.
For the
reasons explained below, the Court (1)
GRANTS the motion; (2)
ORDERS that Mr. Jones's sentence of
incarceration be REDUCED to TIME
SERVED; (3) IMPOSES a term of
supervised release of FIVE (5) YEARS.
The
Bureau of Prisons is authorized to delay execution of this
Order for up to ten (10) days after its issuance so that the
Bureau may make necessary arrangements related to Mr.
Jones's release. The Bureau of Prisons is directed to
proceed as expeditiously as possible so as to avoid any
unnecessary delay.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For
nearly the last twenty years, Mr. Jones has been in prison
for his role in “an extensive drug trafficking
enterprise in Bridgeport, Connecticut, ” in the P.T.
Barnum Housing Project in the late 1990s. United States
v. Jones, 294 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary
order); see also United States v. Luke Jones, 482
F.3d 60, 63-66 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing evidence as to the
conspiracy introduced at trial against Mr. Jones's uncle,
Luke Jones, in light most favorable to the Government);
Lyle Jones v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-601 (EBB),
2014 WL 6871198, at *4-5 (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2014) (detailing
evidence as to the enterprise introduced at trial against Mr.
Jones).
On
November 16, 1999, a federal grand jury returned a sealed,
multi-count indictment against Luke Jones, Lonnie Jones, and
Lance T. Jones. Sealed Indictment, dated Nov. 16, 1999, ECF
No. 1.
On
February 3, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a superseding
indictment against the three originally-named defendants,
Lyle Jones, and ten other alleged members of the drug
trafficking enterprise. Superseding Indictment, dated Feb. 3,
2000, ECF No. 36. The superseding indictment charged Lyle
Jones with knowingly and intentionally conspiring to possess
with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, cocaine,
and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 846, from January 1997 to December 1999 (Count
One). Id.
On
March 9, 2000, Mr. Jones appeared before U.S Magistrate Judge
Holly B. Fitzsimmons for his arraignment on the superseding
indictment and pleaded not guilty to the drug conspiracy
charge. See Docket Entry, dated Mar. 9, 2000, ECF
No. 88.
On
November 7, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a second
superseding indictment against Mr. Jones and the other
alleged members of the drug trafficking enterprise. Second
Superseding Indictment, dated Nov. 7, 2000, ECF No. 455; On
January 5, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a third
superseding indictment against Mr. Jones and other alleged
members of the drug trafficking enterprise. Third Superseding
Indictment, dated Jan. 5, 2001, ECF No. 538. This indictment
also charged Mr. Jones with violent crimes in aid of
racketeering activity, including: (1) conspiracy to murder
Lawson Day, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes
§§ 53a-48(a) (conspiracy) and 53a-54a (murder), and
18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (attempting or conspiring to
commit murder), id. at Count Five; (2) attempted
murder of Lawson Day, in violation of Connecticut General
Statutes §§ 53a-49(a) (attempt) and 53a-54a
(murder), 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (attempting or
conspiring to commit murder or kidnapping), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (aiding and abetting commission of offense against
United States punishable as principal), id. at Count
Six; and (3) knowingly using and carrying a firearm during
and in relation to conspiracy to commit murder and attempted
murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting commission of offense
against United States punishable as principal), id.
at Count Seven.
On
January 12, 2001, Mr. Jones appeared before U.S. Magistrate
Judge Fitzsimmons to be arraigned again and pleaded not
guilty to Counts One, Five, Six, and Seven in the third
superseding indictment. See Minute Entry, dated Jan.
12, 2001, ECF No. 543.
On
April 19, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a fourth
superseding indictment against Mr. Jones and other alleged
members of the drug trafficking enterprise. Fourth
Superseding Indictment, dated Apr. 19, 2001, ECF No. 694.
This indictment charged Mr. Jones with the following
racketeering acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c):
(1) conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine
base in the “Middle Court” area of the P.T.
Barnum Housing Project, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846, id. at Count One,
Racketeering Act 1-A, ¶¶ 14-15; (2) conspiracy to
murder members and associates of a rival gang known as
“the Foundation, ” in violation of Connecticut
General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a) (conspiracy) and
53a-54a (murder), id. at Count One, Racketeering Act
4, ¶ 21; and (3) attempted murder and conspiracy to
murder Lawson Day, in violation of Connecticut General
Statutes §§ 53a-48(a) (conspiracy), 53a-49(a)
(attempt), and 53a-54a (murder), id. at Count One,
Racketeering Acts 5, 5-A, and 5-B, ¶¶ 22-24.
The
Fourth Superseding Indictment also charged him with the
following crimes: (1) RICO conspiracy to conduct and
participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the
affairs of the Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d),
id. at Count Two; (2) knowingly and intentionally
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, from January 1997
to February 24, 2000, id. at Count Three; (3)
conspiracy to murder Lawson Day, in violation of Connecticut
General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a) (conspiracy) and
53a-54a (murder), and 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (attempting
or conspiring to commit murder), id. at Count Ten;
(4) attempted murder of Lawson Day, in violation of
Connecticut General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a) (attempt)
and 53a-54a (murder), 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (attempting
or conspiring to commit murder or kidnapping), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (aiding and abetting commission of offense against
United States punishable as principal), id. at Count
Eleven; (5) and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during
and in relation to the attempted murder of Lawson Day, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §
2 (aiding and abetting commission of offense against United
States punishable as principal), id. at Count
Twelve.
On May
16, 2001, Mr. Jones appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge
Fitzsimmons for another arraignment and pleaded not guilty to
Counts One, Two, Three, Ten, Eleven, and Twelve of the fourth
superseding indictment.
On
December 20, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a fifth
superseding indictment against Mr. Jones and other alleged
members of the drug trafficking enterprise. Fifth Superseding
Indictment, dated Dec. 20, 2001, ECF No. 813. This indictment
charged Mr. Jones with the following racketeering acts, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c): (1) conspiracy to
distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base in the
“Middle Court” area of the P.T. Barnum Housing
Project, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846, id. at Count One, Racketeering Act 1-C, ¶
24; (2) conspiracy to murder members and associates of a
rival gang known as “the Foundation, ” in
violation of Connecticut General Statutes §§
53a-48(a) (conspiracy) and 53a-54a (murder), id. at
Count One, Racketeering Act 9, ¶ 41; (3) attempted
murder and conspiracy to murder Lawson Day, in violation of
Connecticut General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a)
(conspiracy), 53a-49(a) (attempt), and 53a-54a (murder),
id. at Count One, Racketeering Acts 10, 10-A, and
10-B, ¶¶ 42-44; and (4) obstruction/tampering with
a witness, Person #3, on May 17, 2001, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), id. at Count One,
Racketeering Act 15, ¶ 51.
It also
charged him with the following crimes: (1) RICO conspiracy to
conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the
conduct of the affairs of the Enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(d), id. at Count Two; (2) knowingly and
intentionally conspiring to possess with intent to distribute
and to distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, from
January 1997 to February 24, 2000, id. at Count
Five; (3) conspiracy to murder Lawson Day, in violation of
Connecticut General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a)
(conspiracy) and 53a-54a (murder), and 18 U.S.C. §
1959(a)(5) (attempting or conspiring to commit murder),
id. at Count Eighteen; (4) attempted murder of
Lawson Day, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes
§§ 53a-49(a) (attempt) and 53a-54a (murder), 18
U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (attempting or conspiring to commit
murder or kidnapping), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and
abetting commission of offense against United States
punishable as principal), id. at Count Nineteen; (5)
and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in
relation to the attempted murder of Lawson Day, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding
and abetting commission of offense against United States
punishable as principal), id. at Count Twenty; and
(6) knowingly attempting to intimidate, threaten, and use
physical force against Person #3 with intent to cause and
induce them to withhold testimony from the grand jury and the
court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) and
(i), id. at Count Twenty-Nine.
On
January 25, 2002, Mr. Jones appeared before U.S. Magistrate
Judge Fitzsimmons for another arraignment and pleaded not
guilty to Counts One, Two, Five, Eighteen, Nineteen, Twenty,
and Twenty-Nine of the fifth superseding indictment.
From
February 24, 2000 until his trial, Mr. Jones
remained in pre-trial detention.
On
October 10, 2002, United States District Judge Alan H. Nevas
granted the Government's motion to dismiss Count
Twenty-Nine and Racketeering Act 15, charging Mr. Jones with
obstruction/tampering with a witness. See Docket
Entries, dated Oct. 10, 2002.
On
November 20, 2002, after a twenty-day jury trial, Judge Nevas
declared a mistrial. See Docket Entry, dated Nov.
20, 2002, ECF No. 1259.
On
December 3, 2002, Mr. Jones's case was transferred to
United States District Judge Peter C. Dorsey. Order of
Transfer, dated Dec. 3, 2002, ECF No. 1263.
On
April 24, 2003, after a thirty-day jury trial spanning seven
weeks before Judge Dorsey, a jury convicted Mr. Jones of
Count One (RICO Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)),
finding that the Government had proven his involvement in
Racketeering Act 1-C, the Middle Court drug conspiracy, and
Racketeering Act 9, conspiracy to murder Foundation members
and associates. The jury did not reach agreement, however, as
to whether the Government had proven Racketeering Acts 10-A
(conspiracy to murder Lawson Day) and 10-B (attempted murder
of Lawson Day). See Verdict Form, filed Apr. 24,
2003, ECF No. 1408, at 1-4.
The
jury also convicted Mr. Jones of Count Two (RICO Conspiracy,
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) and Count Five (conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and
cocaine base). Id. at 5-6. With respect to quantity,
the jury found that Mr. Jones's agreement to possess with
intent to distribute involved 1, 000 grams or more of heroin
and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, but only a mixture or
substance containing a “detectable amount” of
cocaine. Id. at 6-7.
The
jury did not reach agreement as to Mr. Jones's guilt for
Counts Eighteen (conspiracy to murder Lawson Day) and
Nineteen (attempted murder of Lawson Day). Id. at
21-22. The jury acquitted Mr. Jones of Count Twenty (use of a
firearm in relation to the attempted murder of Lawson Day).
Id. at 22. Judge Dorsey declared a mistrial as to
Mr. Jones for Counts Eighteen and Nineteen. Docket Entry,
dated Apr. 24, 2003.
On
September 3, 2003, under the then-mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines, Judge Dorsey sentenced Mr. Jones to (1) life
imprisonment without parole on Count One (RICO Conspiracy in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), for the racketeering
acts of the Middle Court drug conspiracy and the conspiracy
to murder Foundation members and associates); (2) life
imprisonment without parole on Count Two (RICO Conspiracy in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), for participating,
directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the
Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity); and
(3) life imprisonment without parole on Count Five
(conspiracy to distribute and distribution of more than 1,
000 grams of heroin and 50 grams of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and
846. Judgment, dated Sept. 3, 2003, ECF No. 1491; see
also Transcript of Proceedings, filed Oct. 10, 2003
(“Sentencing Tr.”), ECF No. 1517, at 23:2-19. All
three sentences were to run concurrently with one another.
See id. Judge Dorsey also assessed a $300 special
assessment and ordered Mr. Jones ineligible for benefits in
accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 862. Sentencing Tr.
23:20-24:4.
In
imposing this sentence, Judge Dorsey said the following to
Mr. Jones:
Life is a long sentence, ‘'m fully aware of that,
and I am not entirely content and at ease with a dead end
sentence that you face, but as I said to Mr. Leonard Jones,
if you in some way can establish through your conduct, in the
meantime, your eligibility under a possibility of some kind
of other relief in the form of a pardon or commutation of
your sentence, you have the power to qualify yourself in that
respect by virtue of your conduct in the meantime.
Whether you do that or not is up to you, but I just point
that out as something that you might keep in mind. That
doesn't give you any guarantees 'cause I don't
make the decision, but on the other hand, it is not something
that is beyond the realm of possibilities, and if you want a
copy of the regulation, Mr. Bashir, that that is discussed
in, Mr. Lopez has a copy of it and he can make it available
to you.
Sentencing Tr. at 26:4-21.
Mr.
Jones subsequently appealed, challenging the sufficiency of
evidence underlying his conviction on the murder conspiracy
charge. On October 20, 2008, the Second Circuit rejected his
challenges, affirming the judgment of conviction. See
United States v. Jones, 296 Fed.Appx. 179, 181-82 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he jury's finding that Lyle Jones
and Nunley conspired to murder members of a rival gang known
as the “Foundation” in an effort to protect the
Jones organization's narcotics distribution business is
also supported by the evidence presented at trial.”).
The Second Circuit also rejected his arguments challenging
the “methodology set forth in the pre-sentence report
(“PSR”) and adopted by the District Court for
determining the quantities of crack and heroin distributed by
the Jones organization, ” finding that because those
arguments were not raised in the District Court, they were
effectively waived. Id. at 183.
But
because Mr. Jones's sentence was imposed under the
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines before the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), the Second Circuit remanded his case back to
Judge Dorsey for consideration of whether they should be
resentenced, consistent with its decision in United
States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 184.
On
April 13, 2009, Judge Dorsey ordered the Government and Mr.
Jones to show cause “as to whether this Court should
impose new sentences pursuant to Crosby and as to
whether a hearing for re-sentencing should be held” in
Mr. Jones's presence. Order to Show Cause, dated Apr. 13,
2009, ECF No. 2287.
On June
2, 2009, Mr. Jones filed a memorandum in response to the
Order to Show Cause, arguing that he should be re-sentenced
under Booker and Crosby. See
Memorandum in Support of Re-Sentencing, dated June 2, 2009,
ECF No. 2296. Mr. Jones argued that his life sentence was
imposed “largely because of a PSR guesstimate that he
was responsible for 140.4 kilograms of cocaine base that
purportedly were distributed between 1996 and 1999, ”
id. at 7, and that multiple factors-including the
fact that many of his co-conspirators had received
post-Booker sentence reductions-weighed in favor of
re-sentencing, see Id. at 8-25. He also requested
the opportunity to address the Court personally at a
re-sentencing so he could “demonstrate that he fully
has accepted responsibility for his involvement in the
conspiracy, and that he continues to work diligently to make
something positive of his life.” Id. at 25-26.
On June
17, 2009, the Government filed a memorandum opposing
re-sentencing. See Government's Memorandum in
Aid of Post-Crosby Proceedings on Remand, dated June
17, 2009, ECF No. 2301, at 8-9 (“In light of the
district court's careful consideration of all of the
applicable sentencing issues raised by the defendant, and its
having presided over a seven-week trial and reviewed the
record evidence in its determination that the Guidelines were
appropriately calculated at life - including the
consideration that even without several of the adjustments
the defendant's Guidelines did not change - there is
simply no compelling reason to revisit the Court's
sentence with a resentencing. The record is devoid of any
express comment or suggestion by the Court that it was
somehow constrained by the Guidelines, or that it would have
reached different conclusions or arrived at a different
sentence if the Court were not constrained by the
then-mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines.”).
On
August 11, 2009, Judge Dorsey issued a short order declining
to re-sentence Mr. Jones:
Defendant's motion for re-sentencing is denied.
Though the sentencing guidelines are now required to be
considered and are not mandatory as at the time of the
original sentencing, upon full review of the record of this
case and the pending motion, the factors in the record as
rated at the original sentencing remain to be considered now
and after consideration there is no basis found from imposing
any different sentence even though the guidelines are now
only advisory. Accordingly the sentence originally imposed
will not be reduced.
Order
re: Reduction of Sentence re: Crack Cocaine Offense, dated
Aug. 11, 2009, ECF No.
On
August 19, 2009, Mr. Jones appealed Judge Dorsey's
refusal to re-sentence him. Notice of Appeal, dated Aug. 19,
2001, ECF No. 2310.
On
November 30, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed his sentence,
rejecting Mr. Jones's various arguments that Judge
Dorsey's decision was procedurally or substantively
unreasonable:
Jones first claims that the district court erred on remand in
failing to resolve objections raised at his original
sentencing hearing to certain aspects of his Presentence
Report. Specifically, he objected to (1) the two-level
increase in his offense level for Obstruction of Justice
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; (2) the two-level increase
in his offense level for the “Use of a Minor”
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) & (B) and
§ 3B1.4; (3) the three criminal history points added
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) and 4A1.1(e) because he
committed the charged offense while on parole and within two
years of release from a previous term of incarceration; and
(4) the three criminal history points added for a 1995 state
narcotics conviction that he argued should have been
considered part of the conduct of conviction. While these
objections were raised at the original sentencing hearing,
the district court's failure to resolve them was not
challenged on appeal. As a result, Jones is precluded by the
law of the case doctrine from raising them now.
The district judge, having presided over the original
sentencing in this case, was well aware of the “nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1). He indicated that he was aware that the
Guidelines were now advisory and that he had fully reviewed
the record and the parties' submissions in deciding that
there was no reason presented to impose a different sentence
in this case. As the district judge said in explaining his
decision not to resentence, “the factors in the record
as rated at the original sentencing remain to be considered
now and after consideration there is no basis found [for]
imposing any different sentence.”
Moreover, we find no indication that the district court
inadequately considered any of Jones's arguments for
resentencing. While Jones argues that a single comment in the
government's submission to the district court may have
misled the court into believing it could not take into
account his age upon release in assessing his risk of
recidivism, there is no evidence in the record that the
district court was misled. Jones's argument that a lower
sentence was necessary to avoid sentencing disparities among
his co-defendants both need not be considered by the district
court, and was undermined in any case here by the affirmation
of life sentences for others of his co-conspirators.
Jones attempts to recast as an argument grounded in ยง
3553(a)'s sentencing factors the claim that the time he
spent incarcerated while the conspiracy was ongoing warranted
a reduction in the drug quantity attributed to him, a
mitigating role adjustment or a downward departure. Even so
construed, however, the record is clear that the district
court was fully aware of both Jones's role in the
conspiracy and his ...