United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO COMPEL [DOC. 50,
51]
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR., SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Pro
se plaintiff, Andrew El-Massri, an inmate currently
incarcerated at the Garner Correctional Institution in
Newtown, Connecticut, has filed a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the New Haven
Correctional Center ("NHCC"), where he was
previously confined, and seven of the facility's
employees in their individual and official capacities: Deputy
Warden Marmora, Lieutenant Cacioli, Lieutenant Lewis,
Lieutenant Williams, Officer Hebert, Officer McGivney, and
Nurse Goode (herein collectively "Defendants"). In
brief, El-Massri's claims stem from Defendants'
alleged use of physical force and Oleoresin Capsaicin
("OC") spray upon him following an altercation he
had with another inmate on November 26, 2015, at NHCC, where
he was then confined as a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants wrongfully refused to allow him to
shower for three days thereafter, thereby preventing him from
decontaminating himself from the OC spray. He claims that
this failure to allow him to shower constituted an
unconstitutional condition of confinement and deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs.
After
reviewing El-Massri's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, the Court issued an "Initial Review Order"
which permitted El-Massri's Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim to proceed against Williams, Cacioli,
Lewis, Hebert, Goode, and McGivney, and a Connecticut common
law civil assault claim to proceed against Williams, Cacioli,
Lewis, and Hebert. El-Massri v. New Haven Corr.
Ctr., No. 3:18-CV-1249 (CSH), 2018 WL 4604308, at *11
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2018). Additionally, the Court allowed
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs to proceed against all
individual defendants and a supervisory liability claim to
proceed against Marmora.[1] Id.
Thereafter,
El-Massri moved to amend his Complaint, and the Court granted
that motion in part and denied it in part. El-Massri v.
New Haven Corr. Ctr., No. 3:18-CV-1249 (CSH), 2019 WL
3491639, at *14 (D. Conn. July 31, 2019). In its Ruling, the
Court delineated the plausible claims that may proceed in the
Amended Complaint:
(a) Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against
Williams, Cacioli, Lewis, and Hebert (along with failure to
intervene to prevent such force against Goode and
McGivney);[2]
(b) Connecticut common law civil assault claim against
Williams, Cacioli, Lewis, and Hebert;
(c) Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
against all individual defendants (Williams, Cacioli, Lewis,
Hebert, Goode, McGivney, and Marmora) regarding failure to
permit El-Massri to shower for three days;
(d) Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs against all individual defendants (Williams,
Cacioli, Lewis, Hebert, Goode, McGivney, and Marmora) for
failure to permit El-Massri to shower for three days; and
(e) failure to supervise or train against Marmora.
Id. All claims regarding an alleged violation of DOC
Administrative Directives were dismissed, as were all claims
against five other individuals Plaintiff had requested to add
as defendants. Id. Subsequently, the Defendants
filed their answer to the amended complaint. See
Doc. 78.
On June
21, 2019, El-Massri filed two motions to compel discovery and
supporting memoranda. See Doc. 50
("Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Disclosure");
Doc. 50-1 ("Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Disclosure of
Documents"); Doc. 51 ("Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery"); Doc. 51-1 ("Memorandum of Law
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery
Documents"). In these motions, he seeks to compel
disclosure of "unredact[ed] training records for all
individual defendants," "any records of misconduct
within the [Department of Correction] prior to the incident
and up to [the] present da[y]," "[a] copy of all
in-service training [records] of each individual defendant[]
. . . for any state and federal statutes and regulations that
must be adhered to in the discharge of official duties as
state employees," and "[a] copy of all pre-service
training [records] at Maloney CTSD [Center for Training and
Staff Development] for all individual defendants for any
state and federal statutes and regulations that must be
adhered to in the discharge of official duties as state
employee[s]." Doc. 50-1, at 8; Doc. 51-1, at 3. The
Defendants have objected to both motions on the grounds that
the requests are overly broad and seek information that is
not relevant to the claims stated in the amended complaint.
Doc. 55 ("Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel Discovery"); Doc. 56
("Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery"). The Court resolves both motions in
this Ruling.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard for Motion to Compel
"Where
a party 'fails to produce documents . . . as
requested,' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits
'[the] party seeking discovery . . . [to] move for an
order compelling an answer, designation, production or
inspection.'" In re Aggrenox Antitrust
Litig., No. 3:14-CV-572 (SRU), 2017 WL 5885664, at *1
(D. Conn. Nov. 29, 2017) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B)).
See also Scott v. Arex, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 39, 40 (D.
Conn. 1989) (Where documents "discoverable within the
contemplation of Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P., . . . are not
produced," Rule 37 "permit[s] the party desiring
discovery to seek a court order."). "Because
'the Federal Rules . . . are to be construed liberally in
favor of discovery,' McCulloch v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 223 F.R.D. 26, 30 (D. Conn. 2004),
'the party resisting discovery bears the burden of
showing why discovery should be denied,' Cole v.
Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79, 80
(D. Conn. 2009) (Smith, J.)." In re
Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 5885664, at *1.
All
"[m]otions relative to discovery," including
motions to compel, "are addressed to the discretion of
the [district] court." Soobzokov v. CBS,
Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 642 F.2d 28, 30 (2d
Cir. 1981). "Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad
discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the
sequence of discovery." Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). The discovery orders "will
only be reversed if [the district court's] decision
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Daval Steel
Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1365 (2d Cir.
1991) ...