United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
(DE#20)
KARI
A. DOOLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Statement
of the Case
On
January 9, 2019, the Petitioner, David Musciotto, a prisoner
currently confined at the Northern State Prison in Newark,
New Jersey, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
district of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
against the Respondent, Erin Nardelli, for a violation of due
process. Pet. (DE#1). Specifically, the Petitioner claims
that a detainer lodged against him by the State of
Connecticut for a probation violation charge prevents him
from participating in early release or rehabilitative
programs available through the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (“NJDOC”). Id. at 6-7. For
relief, he asks that this Court (1) provide him with
“an opportunity to address [the detainer] in a timely
manner, ” (2) “abate [the detainer] so [that he]
may partake of programming intended by the NJDOC for [his]
rehabilitation or transition back to society, ” or (3)
“dissolve the detainer.” Id. at 8.
Because the Petitioner challenges a detainer lodged by the
State of Connecticut, the court (Hillman, U.S.D.J.) sua
sponte transferred the case to this court.[1]
In
response to an order to show cause issued by this Court, the
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on two grounds: (1)
an arrest warrant for a violation of probation charge does
not trigger the protections of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (“IAD”), and (2) to the extent the
Court interprets the Petitioner's claim as a violation of
his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Petitioner
has failed to state such a claim. The Petitioner filed an
amended opposition[2] to the Respondent's motion on August
19, 2019 in which he clarifies that while he “is not
concerned with speedy trial, ” the unnecessary delay
caused by the detainer combined with state officials'
refusal to respond to his letters requesting relief violate
his right to due process. He also argues that the IAD should
be liberally interpreted to apply to all detainers, including
those for violation of probation charges. For the following
reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
This
Court reviews a motion to dismiss a habeas petition according
to the same principles as a motion to dismiss a civil
complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Purdy v.
Bennett, 214 F.Supp.2d 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). To
survive a motion to dismiss, the petition “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
“Where
. . . the [petition] was filed pro se, it must be
construed liberally with ‘special solicitude' and
interpreted to raise the strongest claims that it
suggests.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515
(2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)). Nevertheless, a pro se
petition still must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Mancuso v. Hynes, 379
Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft,
556 U.S. at 678). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court
may “take judicial notice of public records such as
pleadings, orders, judgments, and other documents from prior
litigation, including state court cases.” Lynn v.
McCormick, No. 17-CV-1183 (CS), 2017 WL 6507112, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017) (citing Lou v. Trutex,
Inc., 872 F.Supp.2d 344, 349 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2012));
see also Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993).
Procedural
History
The
Petitioner's prosecution history is not in dispute. On
July 1, 2015, the Petitioner pleaded guilty in the
Connecticut Superior Court to unlawful restraint in the first
degree[3] and carrying a dangerous
weapon.[4] State v. Musciotto, No.
A05D-CR14-0151059-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 1, 2015). The
state court imposed a total effective sentence of five years
of incarceration, execution suspended after eighteen months,
and three years of probation. Id. At the
Petitioner's request, supervision of his probationary
term was transferred to the State of New Jersey pursuant to
Connecticut's Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision.[5] See Pet'r's Attach. 2
(DE#1-3), 14; Pet'r's Attach. 3 (DE#21), 4.
On May
4, 2017, New Jersey authorities arrested the Petitioner and
subsequently charged him with manufacturing or distributing a
controlled substance or intent to do so, in violation of N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5a(1). On March 23, 2018, the New
Jersey Superior Court sentenced him to five years of
incarceration.
Connecticut
authorities subsequently issued an arrest warrant charging
the Petitioner with violating his probation and lodged a
detainer in the NJDOC facility where he was confined.
Pet'r's Attach. 3 at 4. The Petitioner then wrote
letters to both Connecticut and New Jersey officials
complaining that the detainer was preventing him from
receiving minimum security status and/or participating in
rehabilitative programs while serving his New Jersey
sentence, to include the potential for early release to a
halfway house or rehabilitation facility. See
Pet'r's Attach. 2 at 1-17. Accordingly, he sought
immediate transfer to Connecticut under the IAD so he could
address the violation of probation charge. The New Jersey
authorities denied his request on the ground that the IAD
does not apply to detainers based on violation of probation
charges. Pet'r's Attach. 2. at 3; Pet'r's
Attach. 3 at 5. They informed him that “[i]t is
permissible, however, to resolve this matter via [video
conference], should the Court in Connecticut be
amenable.” Pet'r's Attach. 3 at 5. On March 5,
2019, Connecticut authorities responded to the
Petitioner's letters seeking relief, stating that they
are unable to execute the arrest warrant or take custody of
him until he completes his sentence in New Jersey.
Id. at 4. They also informed him that they are
“unable to conduct remote arraignments or hearings from
out of state facilities.” Id. The Petitioner
remains incarcerated in New Jersey.
Discussion
The
Petitioner purports to bring this petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Section 2241 authorizes “[t]he Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any
circuit judge” to grant writs of habeas corpus within
their respective jurisdictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This provision of § 2241
“generally permits federal prisoners to challenge the
execution of a sentence, including the computation of the
sentence and parole decisions, rather than the imposition of
that sentence or the underlying federal conviction . .
.” Blanchard v. New York, No. 9:18-CV-0448
(GTS/CFH), 2018 WL 2324054, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2018)
(citing Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321
F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Jiminian v.
Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001). In this case,
however, the Petitioner is a state prisoner, not a federal
prisoner, and he is challenging a detainer lodged by another
state jurisdiction.
A
prisoner's challenge to a detainer is not a challenge to
the validity or imposition of a state court sentence insofar
as it does not seek to change the fact or duration of a
sentence. Rather, it is more akin to a challenge to the
execution of a sentence. See e.g. Roberts v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation &
Parole, No. 09-0609 (RMB), 2009 WL 1351674, at *2
(D.N.J. May 12, 2009). And challenges to the
execution of a state sentence, of the type presented
here, must be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole,321 F.3d 274,
278 (2d Cir. 2003). In Cook, the petitioner, a state
prisoner, sought to avoid the prohibition against successive
habeas petitions by bringing his petition pursuant to §
2241 relying on cases in which such petitions were permitted
when brought by federal prisoners. The Court of Appeals held
that “because a federal prisoner cannot
challenge the execution of his or her sentence by a
motion under [§] 2255, he or she must resort to a
[§] 2241 petition to do so. A state prisoner, such as
Cook, by contrast, not only may but according to the terms of
[§] 2254 must, bring a challenge to the execution of his
or her sentence … under [§] 2254.”
(emphasis original) Id. at 278; see also, In Re:
Wright,826 F.3d 774, 778 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“Almost every circuit has addressed some version of
the broader question at play here - that is, whether
convicted state prisoners' petitions challenging the
execution of a sentence are to be governed by § 2241 or
§ 2254. The majority view is that § 2241 habeas
petitions from convicted state prisoners challenging the
execution of a sentence are governed by § 2254”)
(collecting cases). Therefore, although filed under §
2241, the Court construes this Petition as one governed by
§ 2254. See Cook, 321 F.3d at 278 (“[I]f
an application that should be brought ...