United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVERSE THE
DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION
FOR REMAND FOR A HEARING, AND ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR AN ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER
Robert
M. Spector United States Magistrate Judge.
This
action, filed under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeks review of a final decision by
the Commissioner of Social Security [“SSA”]
denying the plaintiff disability insurance benefits
[“SSDI”] and Supplemental Security Income
benefits [“SSI”].
I.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
On July
31, 2015, the plaintiff filed an application for SSI and
SSDI, claiming that he has been disabled since November 17,
2014, due to diabetes, asthma, high cholesterol, and a back
problem. (Certified Transcript of Administrative Proceedings,
dated November 10, 2018 [“Tr.”] 191-206;
see Tr. 58). The plaintiff's applications were
denied initially and upon reconsideration (Tr. 99-102,
111-28, 146-49; see Tr. 58-97), and on September 29,
2017, a hearing was held before ALJ Deirdre Horton, at which
the plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Tr. 34-57).
On July 11, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
denying the plaintiff's claim for benefits. (Tr. 17-29).
On August 9, 2018, the Appeals Council denied the request,
thereby rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision
of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5).
On
September 28, 2018, the plaintiff filed his complaint in this
pending action (Doc. No. 1), and on December 27, 2019, the
parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States
Magistrate Judge. (Doc. No. 16). This case was transferred
accordingly. On February 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed his
Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc. No.
17), with a brief (Doc. No. 17-1 [“Pl.'s
Mem.”]), exhibits (Doc. Nos. 17-2, 17-3), and Statement
of Material Facts (Doc. 17-4) in support. On May 20, 2019,
the defendant filed his Motion to Affirm (Doc. No. 20), with
a brief in support (Doc. No. 20-1 [“Def.'s
Mem.”]).
For the
reasons stated below, the plaintiff's Motion to Reverse
the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc. No. 17) is
denied, and the defendant's Motion to Affirm
(Doc. No. 20) is granted.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the
date of the hearing, the plaintiff was sixty-two years old,
living alone in an apartment. (Tr. 38). The plaintiff
completed his General Equivalency Diploma [“GED”]
¶ 1971. (Tr. 230). He is a veteran; he received medical
care through the Veteran's Administration at the
Veteran's Medical Center in West Haven, Connecticut
[“VA”]. (Tr. 40-41; see also Tr. 259,
268). The plaintiff suffered from asthma; he smoked “at
least a pack a day[, ]” and he had
“constant” back pain that he described as
“throbbing” and, at times, “sharp[]”
but “not as severe[, ]” and “not as bad[
]” as the pain he had when he was bending. (Tr. 41,
51-52; see Tr. 928 (smoked one pack a day since age
17; “not interested in cutting back right now”)).
At the
time of the hearing, the plaintiff was working part-time,
four hours a day, doing janitorial work through a job
training program for people age 55 and older. (Tr. 43,
45-46). He reported that he had that job since November 2014
(Tr. 44); his employer knew he had back problems, so he
allowed him to stop and rest every hour or so. (Tr. 44).
Prior to working as a janitor, he worked at Walmart and for a
company called United Furniture, both full-time, performing
maintenance and janitorial work. (Tr. 46, 49-50). The
plaintiff testified that, at the time of the hearing, he
could no longer do that work because it involved too much
bending. (Tr. 51). Additionally, the plaintiff worked as a
tractor trailer driver, driving “all over the United
States and Canada[, ]” but lost his license after
receiving “too many” speeding tickets because his
boss “wouldn't fix the speedometer.” (Tr. 39,
47, 51; see Tr. 239). When he was not working, the
plaintiff “mostly [sat] and watch[ed] TV[, ]” he
cooked his own meals, mostly in the microwave, and he cleaned
his apartment. (Tr. 45; see Tr. 240).
A
vocational expert testified by telephone that the
plaintiff's past work as a tractor trailer driver was
“medium” work, his work as a janitor was
“heavy” work, and his work as a cleaner, which is
usually classified as “heavy” work, was performed
at a level “less than light.” (Tr. 54 (vocational
expert's testimony that the plaintiff's description
of his janitorial work is “actually . . .-well, less
than light” as he was lifting less than ten pounds,
“but [janitorial work is] classified as heavy.”);
see Tr. 27 (ALJ recited: “As he currently
works, the janitorial job may, per the vocational testimony,
sometimes be less than light.”)). The vocational expert
testified that a person limited to medium work but with the
ability to frequently climb ramps and stairs, occasionally
climb ladders and scaffolds, frequently balance, stoop, kneel
or crouch, occasionally crawl, and avoid concentrated
exposures to temperature extremes, humidity, vibrations and
respiratory irritants, could perform jobs as a laundry
worker, dishwasher, and lumber sorter. (Tr. 54-55).
III.
THE ALJ'S DECISION
Following
the five-step evaluation process, [2] the ALJ found that the
plaintiff meets the insured status requirements through March
31, 2020 (Tr. 22), and that the plaintiff did not engage in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of
November 17, 2014. (Tr. 22-23, citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1571 et seq. and 416.971 et seq.).
At step
two, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: mild osteoarthritis in his lumbar spine;
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases [“COPD”],
and obesity. (Tr. 23-24, citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). The ALJ concluded at step three
that the plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and
416.926. (Tr. 26-27). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to
perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), with the ability to frequently
climb ramps and stairs; occasionally climb ladders, ropes and
scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel and crouch; and,
occasionally crawl. (Tr. 25). Additionally, the ALJ found
that the plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure to
temperature extremes, humidity, vibration, respiratory
irritants such as dusts, fumes, gases and odors, and he must
avoid hazardous machinery defined as fast moving parts and
unprotected heights. (Tr. 25). At step four, the ALJ
concluded that the plaintiff was unable to perform any past
relevant work, and at step five, the ALJ found that the
plaintiff could perform work as a “[l]aundry worker[,
]” “[d]ishwasher, ” and “[l]umb[e]r
sorter, ” which jobs exist in substantial numbers and
“match the [plaintiff's] individual profile.”
(Tr. 28). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff
was not under a disability at any time from November 17,
2014, through July 11, 2017, the date of the decision. (Tr.
29, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and
416.920(f)).
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
scope of review of a Social Security disability determination
involves two levels of inquiry. First, the court must decide
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles
in making the determination. Second, the court must decide
whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The court may “set aside
the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not
disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal
error.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127
(2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks & citation
omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a
“mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); see Yancey
v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). “The substantial evidence rule also applies
to inferences and conclusions that are drawn from findings of
fact.” Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23 F.Supp.2d 179,
189 (D. Conn. 1998) (citing Rodriguez v. Califano,
431 F.Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). However, the court may
not decide facts, reweigh evidence, or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Dotson v.
Shalala, 1 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted). Instead, the court must scrutinize the entire
record to determine the reasonableness of the ...