United States District Court, D. Connecticut
HOWARD W. COSBY, Plaintiff,
v.
TAWANA, et al., Defendants.
RULING AND ORDER
MICHAEL P. SHEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The
plaintiff, Howard W. Cosby, has filed a motion (ECF No. 32)
seeking “emergency intervention and restraining
order” in which he seeks orders that he be transferred
to the medical unit at Osborn Correctional Institution or
another adequate medical facility; sent to the University of
Connecticut Health Center for emergency/adequate medical care
including x-rays, nerve testing, diagnosis, and physical
therapy; and kept separate and in a different correctional
facility from all defendants in this case for the duration of
his sentence. The defendants have filed an objection to the
motion (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff moved for an extension of time
(ECF No. 44) to respond to the defendants' objection, and
the Court granted an extension until August 23, 2019 (ECF No.
51). The Plaintiff has not filed any response, despite filing
other items on the docket since that time.
I.
Legal Standard
The
same standard is used to evaluate requests for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Gilmore v.
Schenectady Cty. Sheriffs, 2018 WL 794579, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2018) (citing Local 1814, Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York
Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228
(2d Cir. 1992)). Interim injunctive relief “is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” Grand River Enterprise Six
Nations Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted). To prevail, the plaintiff must
demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726,
2736 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Second Circuit considers a showing of irreparable harm
the most important requirement for an award of preliminary
injunctive relief. NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 70
F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1995).
“[T]he
court's task when granting a preliminary injunction is
generally to restore, and preserve, the status quo ante,
i.e., the situation that existed between the parties
immediately prior to the events that precipitated the
dispute.” Asa v. Pictometry Intern. Corp., 757
F.Supp.2d 238, 243 (W.D.N.Y. 2010); Constitution State
Challenge, Inc. v. Nyemchek, 2001 WL 640417, at *9 (D.
Conn. June 1, 2001) (noting that preliminary injunctive
relief was not needed to preserve status quo);
Transamerica Rental Finance Corp. v. Rental Experts,
790 F.Supp. 378, 381 (D. Conn. 1992) (“It is well
established in this Circuit that the purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo between two
parties.”).
Where
the plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction, i.e., an
injunction seeking to order the defendants to perform
positive acts, he must meet a higher standard. Cacchillo
v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citing Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2010)). A mandatory preliminary injunction “should
issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is
entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very
serious damage will result from the denial of preliminary
relief.” Id. (citing Citigroup Global
Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban
Entertainment Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995)
(plaintiff seeking mandatory injunction must make
“clear” or “substantial” showing of
likelihood of success on the merits of his claim).
The
district court has wide discretion in determining whether to
grant preliminary injunctive relief. Moore v.
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506,
511 (2d Cir. 2005). “In the prison context, a request
for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great
caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the
management of state prisons.” Fisher v. Goord,
981 F.Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846-47 (1994) (other citations
omitted).
Because
the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of his claims in the complaint to obtain preliminary
injunctive relief, the injunctive relief requested must
relate to those claims. See, e.g., De Beers Consol. Mines
Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)
(preliminary injunction appropriate to grant intermediate
relief of “the same character as that which may be
granted finally, ” but inappropriate where the
injunction “deals with a matter lying wholly outside of
the issues in the suit”); Torres v. UConn
Health, 2017 WL 3713521, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2017)
(preliminary injunctive relief not warranted because claim in
motion was unrelated to underlying claims in complaint).
II.
Background
This
action concerns the plaintiff's confinement in
restrictive housing at MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution (“MacDougall”) from December 18, 2018
through January 3, 2019. The remaining claims are ADA and RA
claims for injunctive relief and compensatory damages, Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claims
relating to two falls, an Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim, claims for use of excessive force and
failure to intervene, and retaliation claims. The defendants
all work at MacDougall.
The
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in response to incidents
occurring at MacDougall between June 30, 2019 and July 3,
2019, the date of the motion. The plaintiff alleges that,
since he filed this case, custody and medical staff have
retaliated against him through acts of medical neglect,
verbal abuse, and physical violence. ECF No. 32, ¶ 1.
Staff has been taking his legal work, refusing to send out
his legal work, and not returning documents submitted for
electronic filing. Id., ¶ 2. The plaintiff
received five disciplinary reports since June 30, 2019,
resulting in his return to restrictive housing. Id.,
¶ 3.
The
plaintiff also alleges that medical and custody staff refuse
to provide his mobility aids in restrictive housing. These
aids include orthopedic shoes, knee braces, a back binder,
compression socks, adult diapers, a urinal, a wheelchair, and
a handicap-accessible cell. Id., ¶ 4. Custody
staff, with the approval of medical staff, have applied full
metal restraints including two pairs of handcuffs at the same
time. The handcuffs cut circulation in his hands causing
numbness in the top of his hands. Id., ¶ 5.
The
plaintiff injured a toe on his disabled left foot.
Id., ¶ 7. Housing unit officers forced him to
pull himself from restricted housing to the medical unit.
During this trip, his left foot was injured further.
Id., ¶ 8. Officers called him a rapist and
harassed him. Id., ¶¶ 8-10, 13. He has
been denied his medication and access to his legal property.
Id., ¶¶ 11-12.
In
response, the defendants state, inter alia, that the
plaintiff has been transferred to Corrigan-Radgowski
Correctional Institution (“Corrigan”), where he
has received ...