United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
MICHAEL P. SHEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
plaintiff, Justin Bohn, is incarcerated at the Osborn
Correctional Institution (“Osborn”) in Somers,
Connecticut. He has filed a civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Captain Perez, Counselor
Supervisor Long, Director of Classification Karl Lewis,
Classification Officer Miaga, Deputy Warden Orteo Negron, and
Parole Members Carleton Giles, Michelle Roman, Carmen Sierra,
Nancy Turner, and Pamela Richards. For the reasons set forth
below, the court will dismiss the complaint in part.
Standard of Review
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court must review prisoner
civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A
complaint that includes only “‘labels and
conclusions,' ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action' or ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement, '” does not meet the facial
plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
Although courts have an obligation to interpret “a
pro se complaint liberally, ” the complaint
must still include sufficient factual allegations to meet the
standard of facial plausibility. See Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations
February 18, 2011, Naugatuck police officers arrested the
plaintiff on charges of unlawful restraint in the first
degree and sexual assault in the first degree. See
Compl. at 3 ¶ 13. These charges arose from two incidents
involving the same victim that occurred on the same day,
February 11, 2011, in Naugatuck, Connecticut. Id.
Prior to trial, the State of Connecticut dropped the sexual
assault charge against the plaintiff. Id. The
plaintiff then pled guilty to one count of unlawful restraint
in the first degree and a judge sentenced him to three years
of imprisonment, execution suspended, and three years of
police officers also arrested the plaintiff on a charge of
assault in the second degree arising from an incident that
occurred on February 12, 2011 in Plainville, Connecticut.
Id. The plaintiff pled guilty to the charge and a
judge sentenced him to five years of imprisonment, execution
suspended after three and one-half years, and followed by
three years of probation. Id. Department of Correction
officials subsequently discharged the plaintiff from his term
of imprisonment. Id. at 4 ¶ 14.
January 31, 2017, Ansonia police officers arrested the
plaintiff on charges of kidnapping in the second degree,
assault in the second degree, and failure to appear.
Id. On August 29, 2018, a judge sentenced the
plaintiff to twelve years of imprisonment, execution
suspended after six years, and followed by five years of
the plaintiff arrived at MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution, a counselor informed him that classification
officials had assigned him a sex offender treatment needs
score of 3 based on information in the police report
regarding his arrest in February 2011 for sexual assault in
the first degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree.
Id. ¶ 15. The plaintiff did not receive a
hearing in connection with the decision to assign him a sex
offender treatment needs score of 3. Id. The
plaintiff wrote to Captain Perez about his score and the fact
that the score had been assigned to him without a hearing.
Id. ¶ 17. Captain Perez did not respond to the
plaintiff's request. Id.
February 15, 2019, the plaintiff attended a Parole Board
Jurisprudence Hearing. Id. ¶ 18. Parole Board
Members Roman, Sierra, Richards, and Turner denied him
release on parole based on information in the February 2011
police report regarding the circumstances that resulted in
his arrest on the charge of sexual assault in the first
degree and his arrest and conviction on the charge of
unlawful restraint in the first degree as well as the fact
that the Department of Correction had labeled him a sex
offender. Id. at 4-5 ¶ 18.
the plaintiff's transfer to Osborn, he wrote to Counselor
Long indicating that his sex offender treatment needs score
was incorrect. Id. ¶ 21. Counselor Long did not
schedule a classification hearing to address the
plaintiff's score. Id. On February 26, 2019, the
plaintiff filed a grievance. Id. ¶ 22. On March
25, 2019, a prison official denied the grievance.
plaintiff contends that a sex offender treatment needs score
of 3 is assigned to an inmate who has a current conviction or
pending charge for a sexual offense or has a known history of
sexual offenses. Id. ¶ 25. The plaintiff
alleges that he is not currently confined for a conviction
for a sexual offense and has no history of sexual offense
plaintiff wrote to Director of Classification Lewis and
Classification Officer Miaga in an attempt to resolve the
issue regarding his sex offender treatment needs score and
classification as a sex offender. Id. at 10 ¶
42. Neither defendant responded to the plaintiff's
plaintiff contends that the defendants violated his Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by assigning him a sex
offender treatment needs score of 3 and falsely labeling him
as a sex offender, tarnishing his reputation, denying him due
process, and imposing an atypical and significant hardship on
him. He seeks declaratory relief and compensatory and
plaintiff sues the defendants in their individual and
official capacities. Claims against state employees in their
official capacities for monetary damages are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159 (1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979). Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks
punitive and compensatory damages from the defendants in
their official capacities, the claims are dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
preliminary statement, the plaintiff asks the court to
declare that the acts or omissions of the defendants were
unconstitutional. Compl. ¶ 3. In the relief section of
the complaint, the plaintiff states that the defendants have
clearly violated his state and federal constitutional rights.
Compl. at 10.
relief serves to “settle legal rights and remove
uncertainty and insecurity from legal relationships without
awaiting a violation of the rights or a disturbance of the
relationships.” Colabella v. American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, No. 10-cv-2291(KAM)(ALC),
2011 WL 4532132, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (citations
omitted). Thus, it operates in a prospective manner to allow
parties to resolve claims before either side suffers
significant harm. See In re Combustion Equip. Assoc.
Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme
Court held that an exception to the Eleventh Amendment's
grant of sovereign immunity from suit existed to permit a
plaintiff to sue a state official acting in his or her
official capacity for prospective injunctive relief for
continuing violations of federal law. Id. at 155-56.
The exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, however,
“does not permit judgments against state officers
declaring that they violated federal law in the
past.” See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.
v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)