IN RE ANTHONY L. et al.[*]
September 5, 2019.
from the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown, where the
respondent father was defaulted for failure to appear;
thereafter, the matters were tried to the court, Hon.
Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, with whom was James P.
Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent
ORoark, assistant attorney general, with whom were Benjamin
Zivyon, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief,
William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee
Christopher DeMatteo, for the minor children.
Prescott and Bear, Js.
Conn.App. 112] The respondent mother appeals from the
judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating her parental rights with
respect to each of the three oldest of her four minor
children on the grounds that the respondent failed to achieve
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). On appeal,
the respondent claims that her and her childrens substantive
due process rights were violated as a result of the trial
courts analysis of whether termination of her [194 Conn.App.
113] parental rights was in the childrens best interests.
Specifically, the respondent
claims that the courts failure to conduct a factual inquiry
into the petitioners three permanency plans, which called
for the termination of her parental rights and
adoption, in its best interest analysis denied
her substantive due process of law. She claims that, because
adoption was not going to occur immediately, due process
required the court to determine whether the permanency plans
secured a more permanent and stable life for each of the
children compared to that which she could provide if she were
given time to rehabilitate herself.
record, however, contains insufficient evidence in support of
such a claim because it was not raised and pursued by the
respondent during trial. Neither the petitioner nor the court
were aware, during trial, that it would be asserted as a
claim on appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
herein, we decline to review the respondents unpreserved
claim and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial
respondent failed to raise her substantive due process claim
in the trial court and, accordingly, she seeks review by this
court pursuant to [194 Conn.App. 114] State v.
Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d
1188 (2015). [A] [respondent] can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if
all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2)
the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the
violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation ... exists and ... deprived the
[respondent] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the [petitioner] has failed to demonstrate
harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, the [respondents] claim will fail. The appellate
tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the [respondents]
claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in
the particular circumstances. (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted.) Id., at 239-40, 567 A.2d 823. In
this case, we focus on the first prong of Golding
assessing whether the first prong of Golding has
been satisfied, it is well recognized that "[t]he
[respondent] bears the responsibility for providing a ...