United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Stefan
R. Underhill, United States District Judge
On
April 10, 2017, the plaintiff, Jason Boudreau, a federal
inmate currently confined at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention
Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island, filed a civil rights
complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the town of Branford, Connecticut, the Branford
Police Department (“BPD”), five members of the
BPD, and four members of the United States Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) for using excessive
force during his arrest, in violation of his Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable seizures. All claims against
the town of Branford, the BPD, and all BPD officers have
since been dismissed. Initial Review Order, Doc. No. 19, at
13; Stipulation of Dismissal, Doc. No. 39; Ruling on Mot. to
Dismiss, Doc. No. 50. The only remaining claim in this case
is a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force against three
of the four DHS officers, Doug Smith, David Riccio, and
Brendan Cullen, [1] based on their failure to intervene when
BPD officers permitted a police canine named
“Joker” to approach Boudreau while he was
handcuffed and detained, after which Joker bit Boudreau on
the leg. See Ruling on Mot. to Dismiss at 15.
The
following motions, among others, are currently pending:
Motions to Serve Additional Interrogatories on Cullen and
RiccIo, Doc. Nos. 79, 92;
Motions to Strike the Defendants' Qualified Immunity
Defense, Doc. Nos. 80, 89; Motions for Default Judgment
Against the Defendants, Doc. Nos. 81, 90;
Motion to Delay Ruling on the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 83;
Motion to Strike the Declaration of Jay Kaufman, Doc. No. 84;
Motion to Strike Cullen's Declaration in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 85;
Motion to Strike Smith's Declaration in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 86;
Motion to Strike Riccio's Declaration in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 87;
Cullen's Motion for Protective Order with respect to
Boudreau's Second Request for Admissions, Doc. No. 88;
Motion to Compel Riccio to Answer Interrogatories, Doc. No.
95;
Motion to File Oversized Response to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 97;
Motion to Seal Medical Records, Doc. No. 99;
Motion to Compel Production of Police Body Camera Video, Doc.
No. 100; Motion to Compel Defense Counsel to Communicate with
Boudreau, Doc. No. 101;
Motion for Clarification of the Court's August 22, 2019
Order, Doc. No. 103;
Motion to Compel Defendant Brendan Cullen to Answer
Interrogatories, Doc. No. 104;
Motion to Extend Discovery and to Supplement Opposition to
Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 107; and
Motion to Serve Subpoena by Alternative Service, Doc. No.
108.
I have
categorized these pending motions as follows: Cullen's
Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 88), Motions to Compel
Answers to Interrogatories (Doc. Nos. 79, 92, 95, 104),
Motions for Default Judgment (Doc. Nos. 81, 90), Motion to
Compel Production of Evidence (Doc. Nos. 100, 108), Motion to
Compel Defense Counsel to Communicate (Doc. No. 101), Motion
for Clarification of the Court's August 22, 2019 Order
(Doc. No. 103), and Motions Regarding the Pending Summary
Judgment Motion (Doc. Nos. 80, 83-87, 89, 97, 99, 107). I
hereby issue the following rulings on those motions.
I.
Cullen's Motion for Protective Order with Respect to
Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Admissions
(“Mot. for Protective Order”) (Doc. No. 88)
On May
22, 2019, Cullen filed a motion seeking a protective order
with respect to 105 Requests for Admissions Boudreau served
on him on May 6, 2019. I previously granted Cullen's
request for a protective order with respect to Boudreau's
first set of Requests for Admissions, which he served in
October 2018. See Ruling on Mots. for Protective
Order, Doc. No. 76. Specifically, I ruled that the initial
requests were vague, sought irrelevant information, or sought
opinions or conclusions as opposed to admissions of fact, and
therefore, good cause existed to protect Cullen from the
undue burden of responding to those requests. Id. at
3-4. In granting the protective order, I permitted Boudreau
the opportunity to resubmit his requests on the condition
that they “be concise and seek only factual information
limited to the sole remaining excessive force claim in this
case.” Id. at 4.
Sometime
on or shortly after the day I issued my ruling on the initial
set of requests, [2]Boudreau served a second set of requests on
Cullen. Pl.'s Second Req. for Admis., Doc. No. 88- 1.
Cullen has now filed his second motion for a protective
order, contending that the sixty new requests continue to
seek information that is irrelevant, opinion-based, or
pertaining to other individuals in the case. Mot. for
Protective Order at 2. Thus, Cullen argues that Boudreau has
failed to comply with my previous instructions regarding the
refiling of his request for admissions. Id. Boudreau
counters that the information sought-including Cullen's
statements about what other officers were doing at the time
of the incident-is relevant and that Cullen failed to confer
with him prior to seeking a protective order. Pl.'s Resp.
to Cullen's Mot. for Protective Order, Doc. No. 94, at
1-2.
I rely
on the same standard for protective orders and requests for
admissions as stated in my previous ruling:
“Because the liberality of pretrial discovery has a
significant potential for abuse, courts may issue protective
orders which restrict permissible discovery if it would
unduly annoy or burden the other party.” Joseph L.
v. Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families, 225
F.R.D. 400, 401 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing Seattle Times Co.
v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984)). I have broad
discretion regarding whether to issue a protective order.
Id. (citing Dove v. Atl. Capital Corp., 963
F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992)). Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for a protective
order “must include a certification that the movant has
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without
court action.” If good cause is shown, I may
“issue an order to protect a party . . . from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c); see also Qube
Films Ltd. v. Padell, 2015 WL 109628, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 5, 2015) (moving party bears burden of establishing good
cause for protective order). “Good cause is established
when [the moving] party is able to show that a clearly
defined, specific and serious injury will occur in the
absence of such an order.” Qube Films Ltd.,
2015 WL 109628, at *2 (internal quotations omitted).
Requests for Admissions are not discovery tools in the
traditional sense. Brodeur v. McNamee, 2005 WL
1774033, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2005). “While
discovery mechanisms such as requests for document
production, interrogatories, and depositions typically seek
to uncover information for use in pursuing or defending
against a litigated claim, requests for admissions serve the
distinctly different purpose of assisting the parties and the
court to narrow the factual issues to be presented for
determination in connection with such a claim, either on
motion or at trial.” Id. The party requesting
the admission “bears the burden of setting forth its
requests simply, directly, not vaguely or ambiguously, and in
such a manner that they can be answered with a simple admit
or deny without explanation, and in certain instances, permit
a qualification or explanation for purposes for
clarification.” Dash v. Seagate Technology (US)
Holdings, Inc., 2015 WL 4257329, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. July
14, 2015) (quoting Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc.,
212 F.R.D. 73, 77 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)).
Ruling on Mots. for Protective Order at 2-3.
Cullen
has not indicated whether he has attempted to confer with
Boudreau regarding his responses to the second set of
requests prior to seeking a protective order. However, the
deadline for discovery has already been extended several
times in this case, the case has been pending for more than
two years, and, based on my review of the second set of
requests, Boudreau has failed to comply with my instructions
with respect to proper requests for admissions. In the
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