Argued
April 22, 2019
Appeal
from Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Prats and
Williams, JJ.
Page 164
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 165
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 166
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 167
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 168
Kevin
Lynch, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Melissa
L. Streeto, senior assistant states attorney, with whom, on
the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, states attorney, and Michael
Weber, senior assistant states attorney, for the appellee
(the state).
Lavine,
Keller and Elgo, Js.
OPINION
ELGO,
J.
Page 169
[193
Conn.App. 640] The self-represented defendant, Kevin Lynch,
appeals from the judgments of conviction rendered by the
trial court following the denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas. On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court improperly (1) failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, (2) denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and (3) failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to terminating his
participation in the pretrial alcohol education program
(program). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The
record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural
history. On October 7, 2016, pursuant to a global plea
agreement that encompassed all of the defendants cases and
was reached in accordance with State v. Garvin, 242
Conn. 296, 699 A.2d 921 (1997),[1] the defendant entered
guilty pleas to three counts of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor as a first
offender in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a, two
counts of failure to appear in the second degree in violation
of General Statues § 53a-173, and to one count each of risk
of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes §
53-21, and criminal trespass in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-107. In accordance with the
Garvin agreement, the court, Prats, J.,
agreed to sentence the defendant to a total effective
sentence of four years of incarceration, execution suspended,
with three years of probation. Pursuant to that agreement,
the defendants conviction of risk of injury to a child would
be vacated. [193 Conn.App. 641] The court, however, also
advised the defendant that he remained subject to a possible
sentence of up to fourteen and one-half years of
incarceration if he violated the terms of the Garvin
agreement by failing to comply with an inpatient alcohol
treatment program, by being arrested with probable cause on
any new charges prior to his sentencing, or by failing to
appear at the sentencing hearing.
The
sentencing hearing was held on February 15, 2018. At that
time, the state indicated that the defendant had complied
with the conditions of the Garvin agreement and,
therefore, the state was prepared to enter a nolle prosequi
as to the defendants conviction of risk of injury to a
child, once the court vacated that conviction. The court,
Williams, J., then asked the clerk to verify before
they proceeded that the program in one of the defendants
cases was previously terminated.[2] The clerk responded that
he had no record of that in the courts file. In response,
the state argued that the "agreed disposition and the
fact that the plea was entered ... more than implies the fact
that [the program] was supposed to be terminated ...."
Defense
counsel responded that he believed that a notice of
successful completion of the program was filed with the court
by the bail commissioner. He also stated that the program had
not been terminated and that "there is a valid argument
Page 170
to be made in that file that the [successful completion of
the program] should be acknowledged by the court ... [a]nd
that matter should be dismissed ...." The court then
asked defense counsel if this issue was raised at the time of
the Garvin plea. Defense counsel answered: "No,
it was not [raised], because in all candor to this court, I
did not [193 Conn.App. 642] comprehend the procedural history
of [the defendants] several cases .... At that point in
time, my primary focus was to persuade the court ... to allow
for inpatient treatment for [the defendant]."
Defense counsel went on to explain: "But, I also didnt
understand at that time ... that [the defendant] was under
[the influence of] about four psychotropic medications
administered by the Department of Correction. And what I also
didnt take up with the court or with the state is the
history of this particular file and the fact that the
[program] had been granted by the court. I believe Judge
Suarez had granted the [program] with full knowledge with the
preexisting matter then still at GA 10 in New London. Also,
there was a family violence education program granted in this
courthouse at about the same time in a different but
companion matter. And there was ... in that case a successful
completion of the family violence education program, as well.
And only since long after October 6 have I become aware and
better understood the procedural history here. And then,
while ... I have learned only in the past week that there ...
was an absolute defense to the New London failure to appear,
to which he [pleaded] guilty on October 7, 2016, which I had
no understanding about it at all. And ... there is a
substantial defense to [the failure to appear charge], Your
Honor. So ... the combination of those ... factored in the
new information, is why I would respectfully pray the court
to allow me to fulfill my obligations to [the defendant] ...
by allowing me three or four days to file motions and a brief
on this issue of [the program]. The last case of the
operating under the influence occurred after the one year
dismissal date of the [program], as I recall, Your Honor. And
the [program] had not been dismissed on the scheduled date
only because ... documentation from [Connecticut Valley
Hospital] had not been received by the bail commissioner. So
what Im saying [193 Conn.App. 643] in good faith, to the
court and to the state, is that there is a substantial amount
of information that I respectfully suggest calls into
question the validity of the pleas, to the failures to
appear, as well as the plea to the file that weve just
confirmed the [program] had not been terminated in, at the
time of the plea."
The
court responded by asking defense counsel if he wanted the
court to not honor the plea agreement. The court also pointed
out that the plea agreement was entered in 2016, that it
involved matters dating back to 2014, and that the court had
granted multiple continuances in this matter. While defense
counsel and the defendant conferred, the court stated that
the clerk had discovered that "on [program] progress
reports ... the defendant, apparently, did not complete the
fifteen sessions for which he was referred. However, he
completed detox and residential treatment."
Subsequently, the following colloquy occurred:
"[Defense Counsel]: I would ask Your Honor for simply
four days to file—
"The Court: Well, thats denied.... I said back in
January that today was the day for sentencing. I made that
clear. On January 11, I made that abundantly clear. This is
it. This is the sentencing day. And now Im hearing an oral
motion to, I guess, delay sentencing. Im hearing an oral
motion to not honor ...