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United States v. McLaughlin

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

October 25, 2019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
RAYMOND MCLAUGHLIN, Defendant.

          LEAVE-TO-FILE INJUNCTION

          Michael P. Shea United States District Judge

         The Court imposes a Leave-To-File Injunction as to Mr. McLaughlin for the reasons that follow.

         I. Procedural History

         Mr. McLaughlin was convicted in this Court for knowingly and willingly giving a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). The Court sentenced Mr. McLaughlin to thirty months of incarceration and three years of supervised release.

         Mr. McLaughlin has filed numerous patently meritless filings arguing, inter alia, that his conviction should be vacated because it was "acquired as a result of common-law trespass" in that he was the "sole and rightful owner" of his person. See, e.g., ECF 229, 233, 240, 253, 259. On February 19, 2019, the Court issued an Order

explicitly warning Mr. McLaughlin that further frivolous filings in this case may result in sanctions, including an injunction requiring the plaintiff to obtain leave of the Court before filing any additional documents on the docket. See In re Martin Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984) (Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.); see also Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that a district court may impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the judicial process).

(ECF 260.)

         Mr. McLaughlin was undeterred. On April 22, 2019, the Court entered another Order stating that

Mr. McLaughlin filed seven other documents since the Court's 260 order regarding frivolous filings. See ECF Nos. 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, and 270. These documents repeat the same arguments previously denied. See, e.g., ECF No. 269 at 1 ("Raymond McLaughlin is not a person; Raymond McLaughlin is a name... [t]he Fourth Amendment holds that United States has all rights and interest in the name Raymond McLaughlin and the people possess all rights and interest in his person... Whereas, Raymond McLaughlin is a name and not a person, Raymond McLaughlin is not, was never attached to, and cannot be presumed to be attached to my person... you are commanded to immediately ensure that the people and his person are no longer at the above noted location."); ECF No. 270 at 2 ("It is unlawful and a violation of the Fourth Amendment for United States to possess my person... The offense was committed by the title Raymond McLaughlin which exists in the public; and which was properly charged according to the indictment. Consequently, United States, its agents, employees and/or officers only have authority over the title Raymond McLaughlin.").

         The Court further stated:

"[t]he equity power of a court to give injunctive relief against vexatious litigation is an ancient one which has been codified in the All Writs Statute." Matter of Hartford Textile Corp., 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982); see also In re Martin Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984) (Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.); Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that a district court may impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the judicial process).
Because Mr. McLaughlin has continued to file frivolous documents after the Court's notice that such behavior might result in sanctions, see ECF No. 260, Mr. McLaughlin is hereby ordered to show cause as to why the Court should not impose a leave-to-file injunction. Specifically, Mr. McLaughlin shall have 30 days to file a response explaining why the Court should not impose an injunction requiring him to obtain leave of the Court before filing any additional documents on the docket. If Mr. McLaughlin does not respond or his response does not show why sanctions are inappropriate, the Court will issue a leave-to-file sanction. See Viola v. U.S., 481 Fed.Appx. 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[T]he procedure for imposing leave-to-file sanctions involves three stages: (1) the court notifies the litigant that future frivolous filings might result in sanctions; (2) if the litigant continues this behavior, the court orders the litigant to show cause as to why a leave-to-file sanction order should not issue; and (3) if the litigant's response does not show why sanctions are not appropriate, the court issues a sanctions order.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court notes that such an injunction will not prevent the defendant from prosecuting his appeal, which is pending at the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as he has no need to file documents in this Court in order to do so.

(ECF 272.)

         Notwithstanding, Mr. McLaughlin thereafter moved to dismiss the criminal case on the grounds that the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF 279.) The Court denied the motion, ...


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