United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RUF R. DIAZ, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security[1], Defendant.
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is
an administrative appeal following the denial of the
plaintiff, Ruf. R. Diaz's, application for Title II
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). It is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).[2] Plaintiff now
moves for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), or in the alternative, an order
remanding this case for a rehearing. [Doc. #13]. The
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming his
decision. [Doc. #19]. After careful consideration of the
arguments raised by both parties, and thorough review of the
administrative record, the Court denies Plaintiff's
motion to reverse/remand and grants the Commissioner's
motion to affirm.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will meet this definition if his or
her impairments are of such severity that the claimant cannot
perform pervious work and also cannot, considering the
claimant's age, education, and work experience,
“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner must follow a sequential evaluation process for
assessing disability claims. The five steps of this process
are as follows: (1) the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe
impairment, ” the Commissioner must ask whether, based
solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which “meets or equals” an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the Listings). If
so, and it meets the durational requirements, the
Commissioner will consider the claimant disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; (4) if not, the Commissioner then asks
whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or
she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or
her past work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform
his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work in the national economy which the
claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520; 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof on
the first four steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden
of proof on the final step. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014).
“A
district court reviewing a final . . . decision [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v.
Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly, the district court may not make a de
novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in
reviewing a denial of disability benefits. Id.;
Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court's
function is to first ascertain whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal principles in reaching his
conclusion, and then whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d
983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, absent legal error, a
decision of the Commissioner cannot be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Berry v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be
“more than a scintilla or touch of proof here and there
in the record.” Id. If the Commissioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, that decision
will be sustained, even where there may also be substantial
evidence to support the plaintiff's contrary position.
Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1982).
I.
BACKGROUND
a.
Facts
Plaintiff
filed her DIB application on October 3, 2014, alleging an
onset of disability as of May 30, 2010. Her claim was denied
at both the initial and reconsideration levels. Thereafter,
Plaintiff requested a hearing. On June 1, 2018, a hearing was
held before Administrative Law Judge Eskunder Boyd
(“the ALJ”). Plaintiff, who was represented by
counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”),
testified at the hearing. On June 11, 2018, the ALJ issued a
decision denying Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff timely
requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals
Council. On December 21, 2018, the Appeals Council denied
review, making the ALJ's decision the final determination
of the Commissioner. This action followed.
Plaintiff
was fifty years old and eleven months on the alleged onset of
disability date. (R. 145). She completed vocational school as
a secretarial assistant. (R. 107). Plaintiff has past
employment as a medical secretary. (R. 31). Plaintiff's
complete medical history is set forth in the Statement of
Facts filed by the parties. [Doc. ##15; 19-2]. The Court
adopts these statements and incorporates them by reference
herein.
b.
TheALJ'sDecision
The ALJ
followed the sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act.
At Step
One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 30, 2010. (R. 27). At
Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: multilevel cervical degenerative disc disease
and L5-S1 herniation. (R. 27). At Step Three, the ALJ found
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments. (R. 29). Next, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff retains the following residual
functional capacity[3]:
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a)
except: requires a sit/stand option wherein she can sit for
30 minutes, alternate to standing position for 5 minutes,
then resume sitting; can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; can occasionally climb stairs and ramps, balance,
stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; no overhead ...