United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
C. Hall, United States District Judge.
plaintiff, Scott Edwards (“Edwards”),
incarcerated at the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution in
Enfield, Connecticut, has filed a Complaint
(“Compl.”) (Doc. No. 1) pro se under
section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Edwards sought leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). On October 9, 2019, the court
granted Edwards' application. (Doc. No. 7). The Complaint
names Dr. Bahboob Ashraf, Nurse Sheila Baldwin, APRN Linda
Oeser, and Warden Caron as defendants. Edwards alleges that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs. Edwards seeks damages and injunctive relief
from the defendants in their individual and official
capacities. In addition, Edwards has filed a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. No. 9).
section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code, the
court must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any
portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing a
pro se complaint, the court must assume the truth of
the well-pleaded allegations and interpret them liberally to
“raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[
].” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.
2007). Although detailed allegations are not required, the
complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the
defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon
which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief.
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Nevertheless, it is
well-established that “[p]ro se complaints
‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise
the strongest arguments that they suggest.'”
Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se
is a type 2 diabetic with chronic back, leg, and spinal pain.
Compl. ¶ 4. On May 20, 2019, Edwards was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of thirty months. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.
At sentencing, both Edwards and his attorney raised concerns
about continuing to receive epidural cortisone shots to treat
extreme pain in his L3-L4 and L4-L5 vertebrae. Id.
¶ 2. The judge found the concerns credible and included
an order in the Judgment Mittimus that the Department of
Correction ensure that Edwards receive the epidural cortisone
shots in a timely fashion. Id. ¶ 3.
Edwards' hospital records from May 2019 also were
forwarded to the Department of Correction. Id.
Ashraf took x-rays in May 2019, while Edwards was confined at
Corrigan Correctional Institution. Id. ¶ 6. The
x-ray results showed that an MRI was warranted. Id.
The MRI was performed on July 30, 2019. Id. Edwards
considers this an inappropriate delay. Id. ¶ 7.
18, 2019, Edwards was transferred to Carl Robinson
Correctional Institution. Id. ¶ 8. The facility
requires much walking and has an inclined entranceway to the
recreation yard. Id. Edwards is unable to negotiate
the entranceway and does not attend outdoor recreation.
medical condition is aggravated by high blood pressure as
well as impaired kidney functioning caused by overprescribing
ibuprofen. Id. ¶ 9. Outdoor recreation would
help his blood circulation, a necessity for diabetics.
his arrival at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution,
Edwards has submitted about twelve requests to the medical
unit and Dr. Ashraf but has not yet received the
court-ordered relief. Id. ¶ 10. He has been
added to the medical waiting list instead of being treated on
an emergency basis. Id.
contends that Dr. Ashraf waited too long between the x-rays
and MRI, and that the defendants added him to the waiting
list instead of immediately arranging for epidural cortisone
injections as stated in the Mittimus.
Eighth Amendment forbids deliberate indifference to
prisoners' serious medical needs. Spavone v. New York
State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d
Cir. 2013). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, plaintiff must show both that his need
was serious, and that the defendants acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Smith v.
Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 492 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976)).
are both objective and subjective components to the
deliberate indifference standard. Objectively, the alleged
deprivation must be “sufficiently serious.”
Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138. This inquiry
“requires the court to examine how the offending
conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy
has caused or will likely cause the prisoner.” See
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir.
2006). A “sufficiently serious”
deprivation can exist if the plaintiff suffers from an urgent
medical condition that is capable of causing “death,
degeneration, or extreme pain.” Hathaway v.
Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second
Circuit has identified several factors that are “highly
relevant” to the question of whether a medical
condition is sufficiently serious, including “the
existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient
would find important and worthy of ...