United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER RE AMENDED COMPLAINT
R. Underhill United States District Judge.
Manson, currently confined at Osborn Correctional Institution
in Somers, Connecticut, filed an amended complaint pro
se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Health Services
Administrator Richard Furey and Dr. Cary R. Freston
(collectively, “Defendants”), asserting
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights for failure to
treat a serious medical need. See Am. Compl., Doc. No.
12, at ¶¶ 6-7. Manson seeks damages and medical
care from a specialist, as well as attorneys' fees.
Id. at ¶ 6.
section 1915A of Title 28 of the United States Code, I must
review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Although
detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must
include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice
of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based.
See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007). In addition, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face, ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, and
conclusory allegations will not suffice, Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nevertheless, it is
well-established that “[p]ro se
complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted
to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d
399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90,
101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude
afforded to pro se litigants).
suffers from a “[h]elicobacter pylori AG”
infection, which causes him “extreme” pain,
interferes with his sleep, limits his movements including
recreation and work performance, and has resulted in
“severe” weight loss. Am. Compl., Doc. No. 12, at
6, at ¶ 5. Manson submitted several requests to Furey
and Freston, complaining that he was experiencing severe pain
as a result of his infection. Id. at ¶ 1.
though both Furey and Freston were “made aware”
of his condition through “verbal and written
communication, ” they denied Mason “meaningful
treatment, follow up care, and information about [his]
illness.” Id. at ¶¶ 2, 7. Manson
thereafter submitted a number of additional formal requests
through his counselor, John Kay, but still did not receive a
response. Id. at ¶ 3. A request to the deputy
warden was referred to Furey, who again did not respond.
Id. at ¶ 4.
February 14, 2019, Manson filed a Health Services
Review/Grievance, claiming that Furey and Freston failed to
treat his condition. Id. at ¶ 6. After
submitting the formal request, Manson received a document
from medical records personnel stating that he “had
been cured, ” even though Mason had yet to be treated.
Id. at ¶ 8.
a medical staff member who concealed her identity informed
Manson that the infection can spread to other parts of the
body, and can lead to cancer and even death. Id. at
¶ 9. The defendants did not warn Manson of such
asserts a claim for deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs under the Eighth Amendment as a result of
Defendants' failure to provide information about or
treatment for his helicobacter pylori AG infection.
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs exists when
an official “knows that [an] inmate faces a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”
Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 137-38 (2d Cir.
1998) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
deliberate indifference standard “embodies both an
objective and a subjective prong.”
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be
“sufficiently serious, ” meaning that the
condition must be “one that may produce death,
degeneration, or extreme pain.” See Hathaway v.
Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Subjectively, the defendants must
have been “actually aware of a substantial risk”
that Manson would suffer serious harm as a result of their
conduct. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263,
280-81 (2d Cir. 2006).
instant case, with respect to the objective prong, Manson
alleges that his helicobacter pylori AG infection caused him
“extreme” pain, “severe” weight loss,
and interfered with his sleep as well as his ability to
exercise and work. Am. Compl., Doc. No. 12, at ¶ 5.
Mason further alleges that the condition can lead to cancer
and death. Id. at ¶ 9. Although courts have
determined that an H. pylori infection is not a serious
medical need, I will assume that Manson's condition is
sufficiently serious for purposes of this ruling. See
Robinson v. Edwards, 2016 WL 1889900, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
July 5, 2006) (noting that courts generally reject Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims based on H. pylori
respect to the subjective prong, Manson alleges that he
submitted multiple requests to Furey and Freston, complaining
of his severe pain stemming from his infection, but
nonetheless did not receive treatment. Am. Compl., Doc. No.
12, at ¶ 5.
foregoing reasons, I conclude that Manson's complaint was
not frivolous nor malicious, nor did it fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. I will ...