United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, [ECF NO. 33]
Hon.
Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge
Before
the Court is Defendant Columbia Dental, P.C.'s
(“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF
No. 33]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Background
Plaintiff
Jennifer Champagne (“Plaintiff”) commenced this
action against Defendant, initially alleging that Defendant
engaged in sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and
retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et. sq. [ECF No. 1.]. On
November 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed her first amended
complaint, eliminating allegations of gender discrimination
and retaliation and pleading additional facts in support of
her sexual harassment claim. [ECF No. 15]. On November 21,
2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, [ECF No. 16], arguing, inter
alia, that the Amended Complaint did not state a claim
for which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF
No. 16-1 at 4-14]. This was so, according to Defendant,
because even though the Amended Complaint alleged that
Defendant's employee dentist Dr. John Stanko, DMD,
“(1) threw items and raised his voice in a profane
manner (without expressing the frequency of such actions);
(2) referred to the plaintiff as his “hot
assistant” and “daytime wife” (without
expressing the frequency of such characterizations); (3)
massaged the plaintiff's shoulders “several
times;” (4) grabbed the plaintiff's hand during,
and in connection with, a dental procedure; and (5) thrust a
drill into the plaintiff's hand during, and in connection
with, a dental procedure, ” none of those actions,
“even when considered in the aggregate, constitutes
sexual harassment.” Id. at 7.
On May
8, 2019, in a Memorandum of Decision denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, the Court disagreed. [ECF No. 28]. After
summarizing the Amended Complaint's factual allegations,
the Court set forth the required legal standard, noting that
Plaintiff's claim was that Defendant “created a
hostile or offensive work environment.” Id. at
8. The Court found that the allegations in the Amended
Complaint “establishe[d] an objectively hostile work
environment, ” id. at 10, for the following
reasons:
Here, Stanko threw and punched items in the office, and
yelled and cursed during the course of Plaintiff's
employment. See [Dkt. 15 at ¶¶ 19-20]. He
also addressed Plaintiff as his “hot assistant”
and his “daytime wife, ” and massaged her
shoulder several times. He engaged in arguably misogynistic
conduct, namely forcefully grabbing her hand to force a tube
into a patient's mouth, and jamming a drill into her
hand, puncturing her glove, and angrily telling her to hold
it in place. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22 & 30.
Plaintiff complained to district manager Ochrim who did not
address or attempt to remedy the issue. Id. at
¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff told Ochrim that because of
Stanko's behavior, she could not go back to work with
him. In response, Ochrim advised Plaintiff that if she did
not work with Stanko then she would not have a job.
Id. ¶ at 29. On another occasion, Plaintiff
complained and Ochrim focused on her parental status
responding, “ok, but it's a job” and
“you do have kids.” Id. at ¶ 43.
Plaintiff mentioned to other employees that because of
Stanko's conduct her “anxiety was through the
roof.” Id. at ¶ 32.
None of these instances taken alone give rise to the
conclusion that Plaintiff's work environment was
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult that was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions
of her employment and create a hostile or offensive work
environment. However, when taken in the aggregate, a
reasonable fact finder could determine that the Plaintiff
subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile and that
her mistreatment was based on her gender.
Id. at 10-11.
The
Court also found that the Amended Complaint's allegations
supported Plaintiff's claim for constructive discharge,
[ECF No. 15 ¶ 45], because the allegations provided
“sufficient evidence that would lead a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that Plaintiff found her work conditions
to be intolerable, ” and because Defendant's
“indifference to Plaintiff's complaints about
Stanko may have contributed to the intolerable nature of
Plaintiff's work conditions.” [ECF No. 28 at 13].
On
August 9, 2019, Defendant filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 33]. Defendant first argues a
procedural violation, namely, that “42 U.S.C. section
2000e-5(e)(1) requires that a petitioner alleging a
discriminatory employment practice must file the charge
thereof with the applicable governmental entity having
jurisdiction over such charge within 300 days after the
commission of such act that is the subject of the
charge.” [ECF No. 33-2 at 1]. Because
Plaintiff undisputedly waited until January 2, 2018 to file
her CHRO/EEOC complaint, the acts of sexual harassment had to
have occurred no earlier than March 24, 2017. Id. at
2. This means, according the Defendant, that only acts of
harassment taking place between March 24 and March 27, 2017,
when Plaintiff left Defendant's employ, should be
considered when ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Id. at 2-8.
Even if
all of the evidence adduced to date is considered, Defendant
argues, it “do[es] not constitute, as a matter of law,
sexual harassment.” Id. at 7-17.
Finally,
Defendant argues that Defendant did not constructively
discharge Plaintiff because “[a] reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position would not have perceived the
plaintiff's working conditions so intolerable as to
compel separation.” Id. at 17-19.
Legal
Standard
Summary
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
proving that no genuine factual disputes exist. See
Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.
2010). “In determining whether that burden has been
met, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and
credit all factual inferences that could be drawn in favor of
the party against whom summary judgment is sought.”
Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Matsushita Electric
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)). This means that “although the court should
review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required
to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000); see Welch-Rubin v.
Sandals Corp., No. 3:03-cv-00481, 2004 WL 2472280, at *4
(D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (“At the summary judgment
stage of the proceeding, [the moving party is] required to
present admissible evidence in support of their allegations;
allegations alone, without evidence to back them up, are not
sufficient.”) (citing Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at
518); Martinez v. Conn. State Library, ...