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Bilbao v. Goodwin

Supreme Court of Connecticut

November 5, 2019

JESSICA BILBAO
v.
TIMOTHY R. GOODWIN

         Argued April 30, 2019

Page 978

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Page 979

         

          Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Nastri, J.

         COUNSEL:

          Joseph P. Secola, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy R. Goodwin, self-represented, for the appellant (defendant).

          Scott T. Garosshen, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque and, on the brief, Michael S. Taylor, for the appellee (plaintiff).

          Leslie I. Jennings-Lax and Louise T. Truax filed a brief for the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers as amicus curiae.

          Rita Louise Lowery Gitchell, pro hac vice, Philip S. Walker and Joanne F. Davis filed a brief for the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists as amicus curiae.

          Judges: Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js. In this opinion the other justices concurred.

          OPINION

Page 980

          [333 Conn. 601] D'AURIA, J.

          In this appeal, we are called on to determine how pre-embryos created through in vitro fertilization should be distributed upon the divorce of their progenitors. The plaintiff, Jessica Bilbao, and the defendant, Timothy R. Goodwin, were married and underwent in vitro fertilization in an effort to have children. Several pre-embryos resulting from that treatment were [333 Conn. 602] stored for implantation in the future.[1] As part of a storage agreement with the fertility clinic, the parties unequivocally stated that they wanted the pre-embryos discarded if they ever divorced. Their marriage has since been dissolved, and the plaintiff now seeks to have the pre-embryos discarded in accordance with the storage agreement. The defendant argues that the agreement is unenforceable, however, and wants the pre-embryos preserved or donated. The

Page 981

trial court concluded that the storage agreement was unenforceable but awarded the pre-embryos to the plaintiff. We conclude that the storage agreement is enforceable and, therefore, reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as the court determined that the agreement was not enforceable.

          The record reveals the following undisputed facts as found by the trial court and contained in exhibits submitted by the parties. The parties were married in 2011. Soon after, they began efforts to have a child through in vitro fertilization with the assistance of the [333 Conn. 603] University of Connecticut School of Medicine's Center for Advanced Reproductive Services (center). The treatment produced several pre-embryos, one of which was transferred to the plaintiff's uterus and resulted in the birth of a child. The center cryopreserved the remaining pre-embryos.[2]

          Originally, the parties had planned to have another child using the remaining pre-embryos. But, together, they also planned for certain contingencies by entering into a storage agreement with the center: a four page form entitled " Consent for Cryopreservation and Storage of Embryos" that provided for the disposition of the pre-embryos upon death or divorce. Specifically, the agreement offered four checkbox options relative to divorce: leave the pre-embryos to the female party, to the male party, to a third-party designee of their choice, or have them " discarded according to American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethical Guidelines." The parties opted to have the pre-embryos discarded, which they manifested by checking the appropriate box, initialing that selection, and signing the agreement in full on the next page. The parties also acknowledged in the agreement that they had discussed the agreement with a physician, and the agreement provided that the parties could modify their selection through written consent signed by both of them.

         [333 Conn. 604] In September, 2016, the plaintiff filed this action for dissolution of marriage. With the assistance of counsel, the parties reached a settlement agreement that resolved all of their disputes except for the allocation of debt from a home loan and the disposition of the pre-embryos. The debt allocation is not part of this appeal. Regarding the pre-embryos, the plaintiff asked the trial court to order that they be discarded in accordance with the storage agreement. The defendant wanted the pre-embryos preserved so that the parties could try to have additional children in the event they reconciled or, alternatively, wanted the pre-embryos to be put up for adoption.[3]

Page 982

          The record also reveals the following procedural history. Although the parties each had counsel in drafting the settlement agreement, they represented themselves in this matter before the trial court. To resolve the disputes regarding the debt allocation and pre-embryos, the trial court held a brief proceeding at which both parties testified. The plaintiff submitted the settlement agreement and storage agreement as exhibits, but neither party filed a substantive motion, submitted a brief, or argued legal matters to the court.

          The trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it incorporated the settlement agreement and resolved the debt dispute. Regarding the pre-embryos, it determined that the storage agreement was not enforceable. In the absence of an enforceable agreement, the court proceeded as if the pre-embryos were " property" subject to distribution under General Statutes § 46b-81,[4] [333 Conn. 605] concluded that the plaintiff's interest in the pre-embryos outweighed the defendant's interest and, therefore, awarded them to her.

          The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment awarding the pre-embryos to the plaintiff. The appeal was then transferred to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c); Practice Book § 65-1.

          On appeal, the defendant appears to make two claims of error, both of which presuppose that the trial court correctly determined that the parties lacked an enforceable agreement. The defendant agrees with this portion of the trial court's analysis but disagrees with the trial court's determination that the plaintiff's interest in the pre-embryos outweighed his interest. Specifically, both of the defendant's claims are rooted in his factual premise that a pre-embryo is a human being. First, he claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that a preembryo is " property" subject to distribution under § 46b-81. Specifically, he argues that a [333 Conn. 606] pre-embryo is human life and, as such, must be awarded to the party seeking to preserve it. Second, he claims ...


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