Charles FITCH et al.
v.
Eric FORSTHOEFEL et al.
Argued
September 10, 2019
Appeal
from Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford
Page 877
Peter
J. Royer, Hartford, for the appellants (defendants).
Charles S. Fitch, self-represented, with whom, on the brief,
was MaryAnn Fitch, self-represented, the appellees
(plaintiffs).
Lavine,
Moll and Devlin, Js.
OPINION
MOLL,
J.
[194
Conn.App. 231] The defendants in this declaratory judgment
and quiet title action, Eric Forsthoefel and Sarah Sweeney,
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a
court trial in favor of the plaintiffs, Charles Fitch and
MaryAnn Fitch. The parties dispute relates to the scope of
an ingress and egress easement located on the plaintiffs
property. The defendants claim that (1) the declaratory
judgment rendered by the trial court provided the plaintiffs
with no practical relief and, therefore, did not solve a
justiciable controversy, and (2) the trial court applied the
wrong standard in determining that the defendants had
overburdened the easement. We disagree and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The
trial court found the following facts. The parties own
adjoining parcels of residential property on Sarah Drive in
Avon. The plaintiffs have resided at 45 Sarah Drive for
approximately thirty years. The defendants and their three
children moved to 49 Sarah Drive in June, 2015. Located on
the plaintiffs property, specifically, on a
Page 878
portion of an approximately twelve foot wide driveway, is an
express easement appurtenant in favor of the defendants
property for the purposes of ingress [194 Conn.App. 232] and
egress.[1] The easement is described in relevant
part as follows: "The unrestricted, permanent and
irrevocable right to pass and repass, on foot and with
motorized vehicles and equipment, over, upon and across a
certain portion of [the plaintiffs property] ... for all
uses and purposes necessary, convenient or incidental to the
use of [the easement] as an access way for ingress and egress
to and from [the defendants property] to Sarah Drive
...."[2]
Shortly after the defendants moved into their home, Charles
Fitch informed Sweeney that there was a problem, namely, that
the defendants children were playing on the easement area
and that they were not permitted to do so because the
easement was limited to ingress and egress. The defendants
believed that they could use the easement area without
restriction in a typical way that any family would use a
driveway. Among other activities, MaryAnn Fitch observed the
defendants children playing with scooters, bicycles, and
skateboards on the easement area, which encompasses a curve
and so-called blind spots. As a result of the childrens
activities, the plaintiffs feared for the safety of the
children and had concerns about their own liability should
the children be injured on the easement area.
On July
11, 2016, the plaintiffs commenced this action by way of a
two count complaint against the defendants relating to the
scope and use of the easement. The plaintiffs alleged, inter
alia, that after the defendants had purchased their property,
the defendants allowed their children and guests to occupy
and loiter in the easement area. That conduct, they alleged,
unduly burdened the easement. The first count sought a
declaratory judgment to determine "the existence, proper
[194 Conn.App. 233] location, and the extent of permissible
uses and users of the [e]asement." The second count
sought to quiet title by determining the rights of the
parties under the easement pursuant to General Statutes §
47-31.[3] The matter was tried before the court
on June 29 and October 26, 2017.
On June
22, 2018, the trial court issued its memorandum of decision,
ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on both counts of their
complaint. The court concluded that the "terms of the
[e]asement [were] clear and unequivocal, allowing the owners
of the dominant estate, the defendants, to use the [e]asement
area solely for ingress and egress to the defendants
property and to access the public road beyond." In
addition, the court determined that although there was a
substantial dispute in the evidence regarding the frequency
with ...