United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM
OF DECISION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVERSE OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE TO REMAND THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER (ECF
NO. 21) AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER (ECF NO. 35)
Kari
A. Dooley, United States District Judge.
Noreen
Rahni (the “Plaintiff”) brings this
administrative appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
She appeals the decision of Defendant Andrew M. Saul,
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”), denying her application for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to
Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”)
and supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”)
pursuant to Title XVI of the Act. Plaintiff moves to reverse
the Commissioner's decision or, in the alternative, to
remand the case to the agency based on the alleged failure of
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to: (1)
identify all of Plaintiff's medically determinable
impairments; (2) confer proper weight on the opinions of two
of Plaintiff's treating physicians; and (3) determine
properly Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity. The
Commissioner opposes each of these claims of error and moves
for judgment on the pleadings affirming its decision. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse is
DENIED and the Commissioner's Motion to Affirm is
GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
A
person is “disabled” under the Act if that person
is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(a); 1382c(a)(3)(A). A physical or
mental impairment is one “that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” Id. §§
423(d)(3); 1382c(a)(3)(D). In addition, a claimant must
establish that her “physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only
unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering
[her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy . . . .” Id. §§
423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Pursuant
to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, a five-step
sequential evaluation process is used to determine whether a
claimant's condition meets the Act's definition of
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In brief,
the five steps are as follows: (1) the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment” or
combination thereof that “must have lasted or must be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12
months;” (3) if such a severe impairment is identified,
the Commissioner next determines whether the medical evidence
establishes that the claimant's impairment “meets
or equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations; (4) if the claimant does not establish the
“meets or equals” requirement, the Commissioner
must then determine the claimant's residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant
work; (5) if the claimant is unable to perform her past work,
the Commissioner must next determine whether there is other
work in the national economy which the claimant can perform
in light of her RFC and her education, age, and work
experience. Id. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(i)-(v);
404.1509. The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect
to Step One through Step Four, while the Commissioner bears
the burden of proof as to Step Five. McIntyre v.
Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014).
It is
well-settled that a district court will reverse the decision
of the Commissioner only when it is based upon legal error or
when it is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See, e.g., Greek v. Colvin, 802
F.3d 370, 374-75 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive”). “Substantial evidence is more than
a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations marks and citation omitted).
“In determining whether the agency's findings were
supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is
required to examine the entire record, including
contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting
inferences can be drawn.” Selian v. Astrue,
708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under this
standard of review, absent an error of law, a court must
uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence, even if the court might have ruled
differently.” Campbell v. Astrue, 596
F.Supp.2d 446, 448 (D. Conn. 2009). The court must therefore
“defer to the Commissioner's resolution of
conflicting evidence, ” Cage v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012), and can only
reject the Commissioner's findings of fact “if a
reasonable factfinder would have to conclude
otherwise, ” Brault v. Social Sec.
Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated
simply, “[i]f there is substantial evidence to support
the [Commissioner's] determination, it must be
upheld.” Selian, 708 F.3d at 417.
Procedural
History
On
March 28, 2015 and September 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed
applications for DIB and SSI, respectively, pursuant to Title
II and Title XVI of the Act, alleging an onset date of
February 7, 2012. The claims were initially denied on June
10, 2015 and upon reconsideration on September 24, 2015.
Thereafter, a hearing was held before an ALJ on January 25,
2017. On March 22, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision
denying Plaintiff's applications.
In her
decision, the ALJ followed the sequential evaluation process
for assessing disability claims. At Step One, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has not been engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the alleged onset date of February 7, 2012.
(Tr. 78.) At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had
severe impairments consisting of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disorder (“COPD”) and major depressive
disorder and a non-severe medically determinable impairment
consisting of migraines. (Tr. 78.) At Step Three, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination thereof that meets or medically equals the
severity of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P. (Tr. 79-80.) At Step Four, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range
of work at all exertional levels, subject to certain
non-exertional limitations. (Tr. 81.) The ALJ further found
that Plaintiff does not have have the RFC to perform her past
relevant work as a barista/counter attendant, machine
packager, or counter clerk. (Tr. 87-88.) Finally, at Step
Five, the ALJ concluded that there are a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
such as a price marker, collator operator, or mail clerk.
(Tr. 88-89.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
On
March 14, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
request for review, thereby rendering final the ALJ's
decision. (Tr. 5.) This appeal followed.
Discussion
Plaintiff
sets forth three bases upon which the Commissioner's
decision should be reversed. She first asserts that the ALJ
incorrectly determined that Plaintiff's carpel tunnel
syndrome and sciatica are not medically determinable
impairments. She next asserts that the ALJ violated the
“treating physician rule” by assigning
insufficient weight to the opinions of Plaintiff's
treating physicians Drs. Enenge A'Bodjedi and Kirsten
Hohmann. Lastly, Plaintiff submits that the ALJ incorrectly
formulated Plaintiff's RFC. She claims that she should
have been limited to light exertion work and to work
involving no public interaction. These issues are addressed
seriatim.
Whether
Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ's Determination
that Plaintiff's Carpel Tunnel Syndrome and Sciatica Are
Not Medically Determinable Impairments
Pursuant
to the regulations established by the Commissioner, “a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . .
must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities that can be shown by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1521. The impairment must therefore
“be established by objective medical evidence from an
acceptable medical source, ” not the claimant's own
“statement of symptoms” or “a diagnosis or
medical opinion.” Id. § 404.1521. Citing
substantially these same standards, [2] the ALJ found that
Plaintiff's “back pain and carpal tunnel syndrome
are not medically determinable impairments due to a lack of
objective evidence.” (Tr. 78.) Plaintiff asserts that
this finding is error.
Carpel
...