United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
William I. Garfinkel United States Magistrate Judge.
This is
an administrative appeal following the denial of the
plaintiff, Kathleen Marie Benoit's, application for Title
II disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). It is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).[2] Plaintiff now
moves for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), or in the alternative, an order
remanding this case for a rehearing. [Doc. #11]. The
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming his
decision. [Doc. #12]. After careful consideration of the
arguments raised by both parties, and thorough review of the
administrative record, the Court grants Plaintiff's
motion to reverse/remand and denies the Commissioner's
motion to affirm.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will meet this definition if his or
her impairments are of such severity that the claimant cannot
perform pervious work and also cannot, considering the
claimant's age, education, and work experience,
“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner must follow a sequential evaluation process for
assessing disability claims. The five steps of this process
are as follows: (1) the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe
impairment, ” the Commissioner must ask whether, based
solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which “meets or equals” an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the Listings). If
so, and it meets the durational requirements, the
Commissioner will consider the claimant disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; (4) if not, the Commissioner then asks
whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or
she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or
her past work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform
his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work in the national economy which the
claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520; 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof on
the first four steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden
of proof on the final step. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014).
“A
district court reviewing a final . . . decision [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v.
Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive….” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly, the district court may not make a de
novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in
reviewing a denial of disability benefits. Id.;
Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court's
function is to first ascertain whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal principles in reaching his
conclusion, and then whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d
983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, absent legal error, a
decision of the Commissioner cannot be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Berry v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be
“more than a scintilla or touch of proof here and there
in the record.” Id. If the Commissioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, that decision
will be sustained, even where there may also be substantial
evidence to support the plaintiff's contrary position.
Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1982).
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Facts
Plaintiff
filed her DIB application on December 14, 2014, alleging an
onset of disability as of April 13, 2015. Her claim was
denied at both the initial and reconsideration levels.
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing. On December 4,
2017, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Merrill (“the ALJ”). Plaintiff, who was
represented by counsel, and a vocational expert
(“VE”), testified at the hearing. On February 14,
2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's
claims. Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ's
decision by the Appeals Council. On January 24, 2019, the
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision
the final determination of the Commissioner. This action
followed.
Plaintiff
was fifty-one years old and six months on the alleged onset
of disability date. (R. 299). She completed college with a
degree in international development. (R. 285). Plaintiff has
past employment as a legislative assistant, fundraising
assistant for a hospital, and as a philanthropy assistant and
coordinator for a non-profit. (R. 285). Plaintiff's
complete medical history is set forth in the Statement of
Facts filed by the parties. [Doc. ##11-1; 12-1]. The Court
adopts these statements and incorporates them by reference
herein.
B.
The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ
followed the sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act.
At Step
One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since April 13, 2015. (R. 17).
At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: degenerative spondylolisthesis (lumbar spine);
s/p bilateral knee replacements; and osteoarthritis. (R. 17).
At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments. (R. 24). Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
retains the following residual functional
capacity[3]:
to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 4041567(b)
except she is able to lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds
occasionally and up to 10 pounds frequently; to stand and/or
walk for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and to sit for
up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She is able to climb
stairs and ramps frequently and to ladders, ropes and
scaffolds occasionally. She is able to frequently balance and
perform stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling
occasionally. She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme
cold, vibration, and hazards, including unprotected heights
and hazardous machinery.
(R. 25).
At Step
Four, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured,
Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work an
administrative assistant and/or fundraiser.[4] (R. 30). The ALJ
did not proceed to Step Five. Accordingly, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff was not disabled from April 13, 2015, her
alleged onset date, through February 14, 2018, the date of
the ALJ's decision. (R. 31).
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
raises several arguments in support of her Motion to Reverse,
...