Argued: February 7, 2019
Samuel
Irvin appeals from an order entered in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Preska,
J.), denying Irvin's motion under Federal Rule
of Procedure 60(b) to reconsider termination of the Milburn
consent decree. We hold that Irvin has standing to invoke
Rule 60(b) to challenge the termination because he is
sufficiently connected with the underlying litigation and his
interests are strongly affected by the termination. We also
hold that the termination of the consent decree violated Rule
23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause because the class was
inadequately represented at the times relevant to the
termination proceedings.
Accordingly,
we reverse the denial of relief under Rule 60(b) and remand
to the district court for further proceedings.
BRIAN
MARC FELDMAN, Harter Secrest & Emerly LLP, Rochester, NY
(Gregory M. Dickinson, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant
Samuel Irvin and Intervenors Daniel Miller, Demetrio
Lifreiri, and Eugene Mazzio.
MARC
S. GRUBE, Assistant Solicitor General (Steven C. Wu, Deputy
Solicitor General, on the brief), for Barbara D. Underwood,
Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY, for
Defendants-Appellees David R. Harris and Thomas A. Coughlin,
III.
Before: POOLER, LOHIER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
POOLER, CIRCUIT JUDGE
Samuel
Irvin appeals from an order entered in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Preska,
J.), denying Irvin's motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) to reconsider termination of the Milburn
consent decree. We hold that Irvin has standing to invoke
Rule 60(b) to challenge the termination because he is
sufficiently connected with the underlying litigation and his
interests are strongly affected by the termination. We also
hold that the termination of the consent decree violated Rule
23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause because the class was
inadequately represented at the times relevant to the
termination proceedings.
BACKGROUND
This
case stems from a termination of a consent decree in 2015
that was first entered by the district court in 1982. The
consent decree's objective was to ensure that inmates at
Green Haven Correctional Facility had access to adequate
medical care. In September 1979, Louis Milburn, then an
incarcerated inmate at Green Haven, filed a pro se complaint
alleging deficiencies in its provision of health care
services. In April 1980, Milburn, at this time represented,
filed an amended complaint with 13 other co-plaintiff class
representatives, alleging that Green Haven's health care
services were so inadequate that they violated their Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. The district court subsequently certified
a class of "all persons who are or will be confined at
the Green Haven Correctional Facility" in December 1980.
Joint App'x at 105.
Eventually
the parties stipulated to an entry of final judgment whereby
plaintiffs agreed to discontinue the action in exchange for
certain reforms. In August 1982, the district court entered a
consent decree providing injunctive relief to the class
members.
About
seven years later, plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the
Green Haven defendants in contempt for violating the 1982
consent decree and to modify the consent judgment to achieve
its original purpose. In response the district court
appointed a medical auditor, Dr. Robert Cohen, who determined
that Green Haven was not in compliance with the consent
judgment and recommended additional modifications to improve
health care at the facility. In 1991, the parties entered a
proposed stipulation for entry of a modified judgment, and
plaintiffs withdrew their motion when defendants agreed to
amend the 1982 consent decree. As with the 1982 consent
decree, the court entered the 1991 consent decree after
concluding that the settlement was "fair, adequate and
reasonable to all members of the plaintiff class." Joint
App'x at 200.
Meanwhile,
Dr. Cohen continued to audit Green Haven's health care
system for the next 23 years. His three-year term was
repeatedly extended because Green Haven was not in full
compliance with the 1991 consent decree. In his most recent
report in 2014, Dr. Cohen finally found that Green Haven was
in compliance with the terms of the modified final judgment.
In July
2014, defendants moved to terminate the consent decree under
Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA") of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, on the
basis that the consent judgment was no longer necessary
"to correct a current and ongoing" violation of any
constitutional right and that, even if some unconstitutional
conditions persisted, the judgment was not the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. Joint
App'x at 385-86.
Initially,
class counsel opposed and filed a cross-motion to modify the
1991 consent decree to address ongoing deficiencies. But on
August 15, 2014, class counsel wrote a letter to certain
inmates-specifically, "all class members with whom
counsel had any contact in the preceding two years,"
Appellant's Reply Br. at 2 n.3-including Irvin and
intervenor Demetrio Lifreiri, explaining why counsel believed
that the risk of an adverse decision should be avoided. Class
counsel also explained that they had not yet made a
"final decision" on how to proceed but they would
nonetheless continue with discovery. Joint App'x at 344.
Without
further notice to any class members, class counsel next
informed the district court by letter dated March 2, 2015,
that they would no longer oppose termination. The letter
informed the court that "Plaintiffs have agreed to
withdraw" their opposition to the motion to terminate,
and that their opposition was "based on the
representation by counsel for Defendants that [certain Green
Haven officers] will promptly meet in person with
Plaintiffs' expert . . . to enable [him] to present his
expert findings and recommendations with respect to medical
care and record keeping at Green Haven." Joint App'x
at 288. On March 4, 2015, again without any notice to the
class members, the district court noted the withdrawal,
so-ordered class counsel's letter, and terminated the
consent decree. It is undisputed that at the time of
termination, neither Louis Milburn, nor any of the other
...