Argued
September 19, 2019
Procedural
History
Appeal
from the decision of the Workers' Compensation
Commissioner for the Third District denying the
plaintiff's motion to open a certain stipulation, brought
to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the
commissioner's decision, and the plaintiff appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Paul
T. Dombrowski, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Brian
L. Smith, for the appellees (defendants).
Alvord, Moll and Norcott, Js.
OPINION
MOLL,
J.
The
self-represented plaintiff, Paul Dombrowski, appeals from the
decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming
the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner
for the Third District (commissioner) of the Workers'
Compensation Commission (commission), denying the
plaintiff's motion to open a stipulation executed by the
plaintiff and the defendants, the city of New Haven (city)
and the Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agency
(CIRMA). On appeal, the plaintiff raises a number of claims
that, in essence, challenge the propriety of the board's
decision affirming the commissioner's denial of his
motion to open. We affirm the decision of the board.
The
following procedural history and facts, as found by the
commissioner in her ‘‘finding and dismissal,
'' dated October 11, 2016, or as undisputed in the
record, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The
plaintiff is a retired police officer who was formerly
employed by the city.[1] Following his retirement, the plaintiff
sought to settle certain pending workers' compensation
claims relating to several injuries that he had sustained
during his employment with the city. After numerous informal
hearings, the plaintiff, without the assistance of counsel,
agreed to accept a global settlement of his workers'
compensation claims for a lump sum payment of $22, 500. The
settlement was contingent upon the approval of the funds by
the city's litigation settlement committee, which
approved the funds on September 23, 2015. On September 29,
2015, the commission issued a notice providing that a
stipulation approval hearing was scheduled for September 30,
2015.
On the
morning of September 30, 2015, prior to the stipulation
approval hearing, the plaintiff, accompanied by Craig Miller,
the president of the police union, met with the
defendants' counsel. The defendants' counsel
presented the plaintiff with two documents: (1)a
‘‘Stipulation, '' dated September 28,
2015 (stipulation); and (2) a ‘‘Settlement
Agreement, General Release and Covenant Not to Sue,
'' dated September 29, 2015 (settlement agreement).
The stipulation provided in relevant part: ‘‘[I]t
is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the
[defendants] shall pay to the [plaintiff] in addition to the
compensation and medical benefits already paid by the
[defendants] the further sum of [$22, 500], the same is to be
in full, final and complete settlement, adjustment accord,
and satisfaction of all claims which the aforesaid
[plaintiff] might otherwise have against the [defendants], or
either of them, and be made and accepted in lieu of all other
compensation payments, in accordance with our [Workers'
Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et
seq.].'' The stipulation did not reference the
settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided in
relevant part: ‘‘[The plaintiff] . . . for and in
consideration of both monetary sums and by action previously
recited within the content of [the stipulation] attached as
Exhibit A hereto, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
[does] remise, release and forever discharge . . . [the city]
. . . as to any and all actions, causes and causes of action,
sums of money, covenants, contracts, controversies,
agreements, promises, damages, claims and demands whatsoever,
in law or in equity . . . as a result of [the
plaintiff's] employment or with severance of [the
plaintiff's] employment with [the city] from the
commencement of [the plaintiff's] employment with [the
city] to the date of [the plaintiff's] execution of the
[settlement agreement], whether known or unsuspected,
including all claims, demands, or causes of action under any
federal or state law, regulation or decision including but
not limited to causes of action under the [Workers']
Compensation Laws of the State of Connecticut . . . [t]he Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. [§]
621 et seq. [ADEA] . . . [and] [a]ny other federal, state or
local civil or human rights law or any other local, state or
federal law, regulation or ordinance.''[2] The settlement
agreement also provided in relevant part: ‘‘[The
plaintiff] represent[s] that [the plaintiff has] been advised
that [the plaintiff] should consult and acknowledge[s] that
[the plaintiff has] consulted a private attorney with respect
to [the settlement agreement] and [has] been given an
adequate opportunity to discuss all aspects of [the
settlement agreement] with counsel of [the plaintiff's]
choosing. [The plaintiff] agree[s] that [the plaintiff has]
had twenty-one (21) days to consider this agreement. . . .
[The plaintiff] further understand[s] that this settlement
agreement is contingent upon approval of [the stipulation]
attached as Exhibit A hereto. . . . [The plaintiff] further
understands that for a period of seven (7) days following the
execution of this agreement, he may revoke this [a]greement.
This [a]greement shall not become effective or enforceable
until the revocation period has expired.'' The
plaintiff had not seen the stipulation or the settlement
agreement prior to the morning of September 30, 2015.
Nevertheless, he signed both documents.[3]
That
same morning, Commissioner Jack R. Goldberg canvassed the
plaintiff with regard to the stipulation. As part of the
canvass, Commissioner Goldberg reviewed with the plaintiff
forms entitled ‘‘Stipulation and What It
Means''[4] and ‘‘Stipulation
Questionnaire.''[5] Commissioner Goldberg then approved the
stipulation after determining that the plaintiff had executed
the stipulation knowingly and voluntarily. None of the
parties asked Commissioner Goldberg to review or sign the
settlement agreement, and at no point did Commissioner
Goldberg examine or sign the settlement agreement.
On
October 1, 2015, a representative of CIRMA, the third-party
administrator for the city, mailed to the plaintiff a
settlement check in the amount of $22, 500. On or about
October 7, 2015, the plaintiff brought the check to his
police union office, signifying his rejection of the
settlement agreement. On or about October 14, 2015, the
police union returned the check to the plaintiff. On or about
October 19, 2015, the plaintiff mailed the check to CIRMA
with a note requesting that CIRMA accept the returned check.
Following these events, the commission held informal hearings
on January 15 and March 15, 2016, which resulted in
‘‘no resolution of the issues'' among the
parties. Thereafter, the commission held a formal hearing on
March 31, 2016, during which the parties agreed that the
plaintiff would file a motion to open the stipulation and the
defendants would file a response thereto.
On May
6, 2016, the plaintiff, who was represented by counsel at the
time, filed a motion to open, with an accompanying memorandum
of law, seeking to open the stipulation (motion to
open).[6] The plaintiff asserted that, prior to
September 30, 2015, the parties had agreed to settle only the
plaintiff's workers' compensation claims in exchange
for the sum of $22, 500, and that the settlement agreement
constituted a unilateral expansion of the parties'
agreement by the defendants. The plaintiff argued that he did
not knowingly and voluntarily execute the settlement
agreement, citing factors used in analyzing waivers of ADEA
claims on the basis that the terms of the settlement
agreement required him to waive causes of action arising
under the ADEA. The plaintiff further argued that the
stipulation was nugatory on the ground that his execution of
the settlement agreement was not knowing and voluntary;
however, the plaintiff expressly stated that he was not
challenging the canvass conducted by Commissioner Goldberg
that preceded the approval of the stipulation. In addition,
the plaintiff contended that the commissioner had subject
matter jurisdiction to open the stipulation pursuant to
General Statutes § 31-315.[7] On July 18, 2016, the defendants
filed an objection and an accompanying memorandum of law,
arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to establish
any cognizable ground upon which the commissioner could open
the stipulation and that the commissioner lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to interpret the terms of the settlement
agreement, which, the defendants contended, was a separately
executed agreement independent of the stipulation.
On
October 11, 2016, Commissioner Nancy E. Salerno issued a
decision, captioned ‘‘finding and dismissal,
'' denying the motion to open. After setting forth a
recitation of the parties' respective positions and her
findings of fact, Commissioner Salerno concluded that opening
the stipulation was not warranted because the plaintiff
failed to offer any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation,
accident, or mistake, and the plaintiff did not contest the
adequacy of Commissioner Goldberg's canvass concerning
the stipulation. In addition, Commissioner Salerno concluded
that Commissioner Goldberg approved the stipulation without
taking into consideration the settlement agreement, and that,
in accordance with our Supreme Court's holding in
Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., ...