United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A
Jeffrey Alker Meyer United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Angel Luis Cabasquini is a prisoner of the Connecticut
Department of Correction. He has filed a complaint pro
se and in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that the New Haven Police Department
(“NHPD”) violated his rights by arresting him
under the wrong name. After an initial review, I conclude
that the complaint should be dismissed.
Background
The
complaint alleges the following facts, which are accepted as
true only for purposes of this ruling. On April 23, 2019,
Cabasquini was arrested by an Officer Doe, Car #56, in
connection with a domestic dispute and brought to the NHPD
under the alleged name “William Crespo, ” which
was provided by the alleged victim. Doc. #1 at 4
(¶¶ 1-3). Nobody took his fingerprints at the
police station. Ibid. (¶ 4). Cabasquini
subsequently was arraigned, provided with an inmate ID card,
and listed in records-all under the wrong name. Id.
at 4-5 (¶¶ 4-9). He seeks damages “for
emotional distress and mental depression.” Id.
at 5.
Discussion
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner's civil complaint against a governmental entity
or governmental actors and “identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the compliant, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” If the prisoner is proceeding pro se,
the allegations of the complaint must be read liberally to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).
The
Supreme Court has set forth a threshold
“plausibility” pleading standard for courts to
evaluate the adequacy of allegations in federal court
complaints. A complaint must allege enough facts-as distinct
from legal conclusions-that give rise to plausible grounds
for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Notwithstanding the
rule of liberal interpretation of a pro se
complaint, a complaint may not survive dismissal if its
factual allegations do not meet the basic plausibility
standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers
Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
Cabasquini
names only the NHPD as a defendant. While a municipality is
subject to suit under section 1983, see Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a
municipal police department is not, see Reed v. Hartford
Police Dep't, 2004 WL 813028, at *2 (D. Conn. 2004)
(collecting cases). Accordingly, the claim against the NHPD
is dismissed.
Even if
Cabasquini were to name a proper defendant, it is clear that
his claim has no merit. He does not claim that he was falsely
arrested or otherwise challenge that there was probable cause
for his arrest, but that he was falsely named when
he was arrested and in subsequent proceedings and documents.
If there is probable cause to support the arrest of someone
for committing a crime, the Constitution does not require
that the police use the person's correct name. Cf.
Brown v. Kramer, 2009 WL 2190079, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (denying prisoner's challenge to conviction and
incarceration under wrong name) (citing Kaplan
v. United States, 18 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 1927)).
In any event, a review of the state court docket reveals that
Cabasquini is now identified by his correct
name.[1]
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED with
prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.
It is
so ordered.
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Notes:
[1] The docket also demonstrates that he
pleaded guilty to two of the three charges against him
arising from his arrest on April 23, 2019. See Pending
Criminal/Motor Vehicle - Search by Defendant Name, State
of Connecticut Judicial Branch, www.jud2.ct.gov/crdockets
(search Cabasquini, ...