United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Charles S. Haight, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
On
December 2, 2019, Murtha Cullina LLP-the last counsel
standing for Defendants Best-Lock Construction Toys, Inc.,
Best-Lock Limited, Hong-Kong, and Counter Claimant Best-Lock
Group Limited (collectively “Best-Lock”)-moved to
withdraw its appearance through motions filed by Attorneys
Donnelly, Corea and Castricone. See Docs. 197, 198,
199. Attorneys Corea and Donnelly, in their virtually
identical filings, represent that good cause exists for
Murtha Cullina to cease its representation of Best-Lock due
to an “irreparable breakdown of communication”
between counsel and Best-Lock. See Docs. 199, 197.
Separately, Attorney Donnelly also filed a motion to withdraw
appearance on behalf of his former colleague Attorney
Castricone, who evidently “resigned from Murtha Cullina
LLP in February 2019” but “inadvertently
neglected to file a motion to withdraw [as Best-Lock's
counsel] at the time of her resignation.” See
Doc. 198. In all three motions for withdrawal, Murtha Cullina
represents that it provided actual notice to Best-Lock, both
electronically and via air mail, cautioning Best-Lock that
its “failure to either engage successor counsel or file
a personal appearance will result in the granting of the
motion to withdraw and may result in a dismissal or default
being entered against [Best-Lock].”[1] See
Docs. 197, 198, 199.
If
Murtha Cullina's motions to withdraw are granted,
Best-Lock will find itself unrepresented on the eve of trial,
which is scheduled to commence on January 21, 2020.
See Doc. 196.
DISCUSSION
District
courts have “a great deal of discretion” in
deciding motions for withdrawal of counsel. See Yachula
v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 199 F.R.D. 454, 457 (D.
Conn. 2000) (citing Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317,
320 (2d Cir.1999)). Pursuant to Local Rule 7(e),
“[w]ithdrawals of appearances may be accomplished only
upon motion, which normally will not be granted except upon a
showing that other counsel has appeared or that the party
whose counsel seeks to withdraw may and has elected to
proceed without counsel, and that the party has received
actual notice of the motion to withdraw.” D. Conn. L.
Civ. R. 7(e). Even “[i]n cases where the party has
failed to engage other counsel or file a personal appearance,
” the court may still grant counsel's motion to
withdraw if “good cause” for withdrawal exists
and counsel has given appropriate “notice” to the
party.[2] See id.; see also D.
Conn. R. Prof. Cond. 1.16(b)(7) (permitting a lawyer to
withdraw from representation where, among other reasons,
“good cause for withdrawal exists”); Eaton v.
Coca-Cola Co., 640 F.Supp.2d 203, 206 (D. Conn. 2009)
(noting that “court looks to the Rules of Professional
Conduct . . . to determine whether withdrawal is permissive
or mandatory” and that Rule 1.16(a) allows permissive
withdrawal where there is “good cause”).
“Good
cause” for withdrawal might exist where counsel asserts
that there has been “an irreparable breakdown in [the]
attorney-client relationship.” See Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Enviroguard, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-1620, 2014 WL
2881507, at *2 (D. Conn. June 25, 2014) (granting
counsel's motion to withdraw where “an irreparable
breakdown” of the attorney-client relationship
“impeded” counsel's ability to
“properly defend” the party and forced counsel to
pay the party's “out-of-pocket costs”);
Eaton, 640 F.Supp.2d at 206-07 (finding that there
was “good cause” for withdrawal where
counsel's relationship with the party was
“irrevocably broken” and the party threatened to
“report” counsel “to a disciplinary
authority”); CP Sols. PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 550 F.Supp.2d 298, 302 (D. Conn. 2008) (granting
counsel's motion to withdraw where the client filed a
malpractice action against counsel and counsel could
“no longer communicate directly with their
client”). Counsel's assertion that its relationship
with the party has irreparably broken down cannot be
conclusory but should be supported by specific facts. See
Hunte v. Anders, No. 3:05-cv-1017, 2009 WL 3273291, at
*5 (D. Conn. Oct. 8, 2009) (denying counsel's request to
withdraw where counsel provided “no factual
basis” for the assertion that “the
attorney-client relationship has broken down and the break
down [was] irreconcilable”).
Even if
counsel asserts that good cause exists, district courts may
also consider whether granting withdrawal would disrupt
“the prosecution of the suit” and delay the
proceedings. See Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317,
320 (2d Cir. 1999); Vachula v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., 199 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Conn. 2000); accord
Farmer v. Hyde Your Eyes Optical, Inc., 60 F.Supp.3d
441, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that, in ruling upon motions
to withdraw, courts consider both “the reasons for
withdrawal and the impact of the withdrawal on the timing of
the proceeding”). Accordingly, “a district court
has wide latitude to deny a counsel's motion to withdraw
. . . on the eve of trial.” See Whiting, 187
F.3d at 321; Vachula, 199 F.R.D. at 458 (concluding
that counsel's withdrawal on the eve of trial was
“inappropriate, ” despite plaintiff being
“a difficult client, ” because such withdrawal
would prejudice both parties and “disrupt the
proceedings”). But see Farmer, 60 F.Supp.3d at
444 (allowing counsel to withdraw on the eve of trial where
the court was satisfied that good cause existed and
withdrawal “[would] not disrupt the proceeding to the
point where denial would be warranted.”).
In the
instant case, because Murtha Cullina has made no
“showing that other counsel has appeared” on
behalf of Best-Lock, Murtha Cullina must establish that
“good cause” exists for its withdrawal and that
Best-Lock received appropriate notice explaining the
implications of counsel's withdrawal on Best-Lock's
defense in this action. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
7(e); D. Conn. R. Prof. Cond. 1.16(b)(7). Although Murtha
Cullina appears to have provided Best-Lock with appropriate
notice, [3] the Court is not convinced that
counsel's conclusory reference to “an irreparable
breakdown” of its relationship with Best-Lock is
sufficient for the finding of good cause. See Hunte,
2009 WL 3273291, at *5. As of this writing, Best-Lock and its
officers have not responded to their attorneys' notice of
withdrawal. Because Murtha Cullina provides no specific facts
explaining why its relationship with Best-Lock has
irreparably broken down, the Court cannot decisively conclude
whether counsel should be permitted to withdraw. Cf.
Eaton, 640 F.Supp.2d at 206-07 (alleging specific facts
showing that counsel's relationship with the party was
“irrevocably broken, ” such as the fact that the
party threatened to “report” counsel “to a
disciplinary authority”). Indeed, given that Best-Lock
has yet to appoint a successor counsel, it is possible that
Best-Lock disagrees with Murtha Cullina's representations
and disputes counsel's assertion that withdrawal is
warranted-especially in light of the timing of Murtha
Cullina's request to withdraw. It significant that Murtha
Cullina seeks to be relieved from its representation of
Best-Lock on the eve of trial and merely two weeks before the
Joint Trial Memorandum deadline. See Doc. 196.
Best-Lock's quest for a successor counsel, necessitated
by Murtha Cullina's withdrawal, would further delay this
8-year litigation and prejudice Best-Lock and Plaintiffs
alike, particularly in light of the impeding pre-trial
deadlines. See, e.g., Vachula, 199
F.R.D. at 458 (concluding that counsel's withdrawal on
the eve of trial was “inappropriate, ” despite
plaintiff being “a difficult client, ” because
such withdrawal would prejudice both parties and
“disrupt the proceedings”). With these
considerations in mind, the Court finds that it would be just
to give Best-Lock an opportunity to respond regarding whether
it would be appropriate for Murtha Cullina to withdraw from
its representation at this stage of the litigation.
Accordingly,
while the Court finds it appropriate to release Attorney
Castricone from her representation of Best-Lock due to her
resignation from Murtha Cullina, the Court reserves decision
on the remaining motions by counsel pending response from
Best-Lock. Best-Lock must file its response and declaration
of intentions no later than January 13, 2020. This is a
complex case, and questions of legal representation must be
resolved before the case can go forward. Consequently,
pending the resolution of whether Murtha Cullina should be
permitted to withdraw as counsel, all scheduling deadlines in
this matter are vacated and all proceedings are stayed.
Staying the proceedings would serve the interests of justice
and would allow Best-Lock an opportunity to retain a
successor counsel.
In view
of the provisions of this Order, Plaintiffs' Emergency
Motion for Telephonic Status Conference (Doc. 200) is denied
as moot.
CONCLUSION
Motion
to withdraw appearance of Attorney Castricone as counsel for
Best-Lock, (Doc. 198), is therefore GRANTED. The Court
reserves decision on motions to withdraw appearance of
Attorneys Donnelly and Corea, (Docs. 197, 199), pending
response from Best-Lock, which shall be filed no later than
January 13, 2020. Pending the resolution of
these motions, all scheduling deadlines in this matter
(see Doc. 196) are VACATED, and all proceedings are
STAYED.
Plaintiffs'
Emergency Motion for Telephonic Status Conference (Doc. ...