United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is
an administrative appeal following the denial of the
plaintiff, Jennipher Belbusti's, application for Title II
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and Title
XVI Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). It is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).[2] Plaintiff now
moves for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), or in the alternative, an order
remanding this case for a rehearing. [Doc. #15]. The
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming his
decision. [Doc. #16]. After careful consideration of the
arguments raised by both parties, and thorough review of the
administrative record, the Court grants Plaintiff's
motion to reverse/remand and denies the Commissioner's
motion to affirm.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will meet this definition if his or
her impairments are of such severity that the claimant cannot
perform pervious work and also cannot, considering the
claimant's age, education, and work experience,
“engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner must follow a sequential evaluation process for
assessing disability claims. The five steps of this process
are as follows: (1) the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe
impairment, ” the Commissioner must ask whether, based
solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which “meets or equals” an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations (the Listings). If
so, and it meets the durational requirements, the
Commissioner will consider the claimant disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience; (4) if not, the Commissioner then asks
whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or
she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or
her past work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform
his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work in the national economy which the
claimant can perform. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520; 416.920.[3] The claimant bears the burden of proof on
the first four steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden
of proof on the final step. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014).
“A
district court reviewing a final . . . decision [of the
Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v.
Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive….” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly, the district court may not make a de
novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in
reviewing a denial of disability benefits. Id.;
Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court's
function is to first ascertain whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal principles in reaching his
conclusion, and then whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d
983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Therefore, absent legal error, a
decision of the Commissioner cannot be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Berry v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial
evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be
“more than a scintilla or touch of proof here and there
in the record.” Id. If the Commissioner's
decision is supported by substantial evidence, that decision
will be sustained, even where there may also be substantial
evidence to support the plaintiff's contrary position.
Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1982).
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Facts
Plaintiff
filed her DIB and SSI applications on August 28, 2016,
alleging an onset of disability as of March 18, 2016 . Her
claim was denied at both the initial and reconsideration
levels. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing. On
February 5, 2018, a hearing was held before Administrative
Law Judge Deirdre R. Horton (“the ALJ”).
Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational
expert (“VE”), testified at the hearing. On March
15, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's
claims. Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ's
decision by the Appeals Council. On January 16, 2019, the
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision
the final determination of the Commissioner. This action
followed.
Plaintiff
was forty-four years old on the alleged onset date. (R. 21).
She completed high school and has past relevant work as an
accounting clerk, supervisor. (R. 20-21). Plaintiff's
complete medical history is set forth in the Statement of
Facts filed by the parties. [Doc. ##15-1; 16-1]. The Court
adopts these statements and incorporates them by reference
herein.
B.
The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ
followed the sequential evaluation process to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act.
At Step
One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of
March 18, 2016. (R. 12). At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (“COPD”), degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine with mild stenosis, diabetes
mellitus, right shoulder pain, status post remote fracture,
major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. (R. 12-13).
At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments. (R. 13-15). Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
retains the following residual functional
capacity[4]:
to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except: can frequently climb ramps and stairs;
cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can perform
frequent balancing; can perform occasional stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling; must avoid concentrated
exposures to respiratory irritants such as dust, fumes, and
gases; can perform simple routine tasks; works best in a
non-public setting; and can perform frequent overhead
reaching on the right.
(R. 15).
At Step
Four, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured,
Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R.
20). Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ relied on the testimony
of a vocational expert to find that there are jobs that exist
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
can perform. (R. 21-22). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff was not disabled from March 18, 2016, the alleged
onset date, through March 15, 2018, the date of the ALJ's
decision. (R. 22-23).
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
raises several arguments in support of her Motion to Reverse,
which the Court will address in turn.
a.
...