Campbell v. Lantz

          INITIAL REVIEW ORDER AND RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

          CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR., SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Jesse Campbell, III, is a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at the Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”), a level five, maximum security institution. Northern is run by the Connecticut State Department of Correction (“DOC”). Plaintiff has filed a civil rights complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), against District Administrator Angel Quiros, Commissioner Scott Semple, Deputy Commissioner Monica Rinaldi, Director Karl Lewis, former Warden William Mulligan, Dr. Mark Frayne, Dr. Gerard Gayne, Director Craig Burns, Administrator Brian Libel, former Commissioner Theresa Lantz, former Commissioner Brian Murphy, former Commissioner Leo Arnone, former Commissioner James Dzurenda, former Warden Wayne Choinski, former Warden Jeffrey McGill, former Warden Edward Maldonado, former Warden Anne Cournoyer, former Director Suzanne Ducate, former Administrator Richard Furey, Dr. Heather Gaw, FNU Pettinger, and former Director Fred Levesque (collectively, the “Defendants”). Doc. 1 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 3-24.^[1] Plaintiff alleges that, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants (1) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process; (2) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws; (3) were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on the conditions of his confinement; and (5) violated his rights protected by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Id. ¶¶ 35-124. He seeks a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and money damages. Id. at 30 ¶¶ 1-3. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed in part.

         Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, requesting that the Court appoint pro bono counsel to represent him. Doc. 4 (“Motion for Appointment of Counsel”). For the reasons discussed herein, that Motion is denied without prejudice to re-filing.

         I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).^[2] “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must provide “more than the unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

         “[W]hether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64. When “well-pleaded factual allegations” are present, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Factual disputes do not factor into a plausibility analysis under Iqbal and its progeny.

         “Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is ‘inapplicable to legal conclusions.'” LaMagna v. Brown, 474 Fed.Appx. 788, 789 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Amaker v. New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs., 435 Fed.Appx. 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2011) (same). Accordingly, the Court is not “bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

         With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (in reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must assume the truth of the allegations, and interpret them liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[]”).

         Despite being subject to liberal interpretation, a pro se plaintiff's complaint still must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Therefore, even in a pro se case, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor may the Court “invent factual allegations” that the plaintiff has not pleaded. Id.

         II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

         These factual allegations, accepted as true only for the purposes of this Order, are taken from the Complaint and its exhibits.

         Plaintiff has a history of documented psychiatric disabilities. In 1995, when a juvenile court assigned Plaintiff to a residential treatment program, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Conduct Disorder. Doc. 1-1, at 10. Additionally, shortly after Plaintiff began serving his term of incarceration in 2000, a DOC mental health screening “resulted in an initial diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety, and borderline personality and antisocial personality disorder.” Id. In a 2001 evaluation, a DOC psychologist diagnosed Plaintiff with a “psychotic disorder, ” which was based on Plaintiff's “disorganized thinking and auditory hallucinations, ” as well as antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 10-11. Thereafter, a 2004 report by a Yale University professor and psychologist concluded that Plaintiff has a “schizotypal personality disorder, which makes him vulnerable to brief psychotic episodes and impaired social functioning.” Id. at 20. Plaintiff has also been diagnosed with dysthymia, or persistent depressive disorder. Doc. 1 ¶ 29.

         Plaintiff has been incarcerated since 2000 and an inmate at Northern since 2006. Id. at 10 ¶ 36. Northern is a high-security state prison which houses the state's male inmates serving long sentences for violent crimes. Plaintiff was on “death row” at Northern, having been convicted for murder. The Connecticut legislature abolished the death penalty in 2012, however. See Campbell v. Quiros, No. 17-cv-946 (CSH), 2018 WL 888723, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2018) (discussing Connecticut's abolition of the death penalty). Plaintiff's current sentence is for life imprisonment without the possibility of release. See Order Amending Initial Review Order, Campbell v. Quiros, No. 3:17-cv-946 (CSH) (D. Conn. May 21, 2018), ECF No. 31.

         When Plaintiff was transferred to Northern, he received an “automatic placement” on Restrictive Status, and, in particular, on Administrative Segregation Status (“Administrative Segregation”). Id. ¶ 39.^[3] In connection with that classification, Plaintiff was placed in a Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”), which Plaintiff refers to as solitary confinement. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.^[4] This classification process occurred without “due process, ” according to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 109.^[5]

         Plaintiff remains on Administrative Segregation and in the RHU. Id. at ¶ 37. As a result, Plaintiff does not have access to mental health units to treat his psychiatric disabilities. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff is also unable to participate in other activities that would presumably alleviate some of the symptoms of his disabilities. Id. ¶¶ 54-58.^[6] This is the case even though Defendants have known about Plaintiff's disabilities for a considerable amount of time. For example, early on Defendants were provided with Plaintiff's medical and psychological records which documented his disabilities. Id. ¶ 90. And they received repeated written communications from Plaintiff in which they were informed of his medical conditions. Id. ¶¶ 92-93.

         Nonetheless, Plaintiff has failed to receive proper medical care for his disabilities. For example, Plaintiff experiences headaches, a lack of energy, lethargy, and a lack of concentration. Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiff has had “thoughts that are disorganized at times, ” a “lack of ability to focus, ” and he has been “emotionally flat[, ] delusional, [and he has possessed] false beliefs.” Id. ¶ 67. His disabilities “cause[] him to withdraw” and he is unable to “sustain his sanity and calmness of mind.” Id. ¶ 70. Yet, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff “with adequate mental health care and treatment”-they have “ignored Plaintiff's mental illnesses as punishment for being on death row” and have “intentionally allow[ed] Plaintiff's mental health to worsen and . . . deteriorate.” Id. ¶¶ 63, 66, 77.

         Defendants' failure to sufficiently treat Plaintiff has exacerbated the symptoms of his disabilities. He has suffered from depression, loss of interest and anxiety attacks, heart palpitations. Id. ¶ 84-85. He has suffered from “self-mutilation, withdrawal, and obsessive ruminations.” Id. ¶ 86. And, the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement have substantially limited his ability to participate in major life activities, such as communicating, eating, sleeping, concentrating, and caring for himself. Id. ¶ 87.

         III. DISCUSSION

         Plaintiff brings a number of claims against Defendants. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Lantz, Murphy, Ducate, Levesque, Semple, Mulligan, Burns, Lewis, Rinaldi, and Frayne violated his rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by transferring him to Northern without a hearing. Id. ¶¶ 105, 123.^[7] Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Lantz, Murphy, Ducate, Levesque, and Choinski denied him procedural due process because he was transferred to Administrative Segregation without a hearing. Id. ¶ 109. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Lantz, Murphy, McGill, Choinski, Ducate, Furey, Gaw, and Pettinger violated his procedural due process rights by failing to provide him with a mental health hearing before or after his transfer to Northern. Id. ¶ 113. Next, Plaintiff claims that he was denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the transfer. Id. ¶ 117. He brings such claims against Lantz, Murphy, Levesque, Ducate, Choinski, and McGill, id. at 28 ¶ 120, as well as against Semple, Mulligan, Burns, Lewis, Rinaldi, and Frayne, id. ¶ 123; see also Id. ¶ 117. Plaintiff also argues that all Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, based on their failure to provide Plaintiff with adequate mental healthcare, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, id. ¶ 98, and that Defendants Lantz, Arnone, Dzurenda, Semple, Murphy, Choinski, McGill, Quiros, Maldonado, Cournoyer, Mulligan, Lewis, Rinaldi, Ducate, and Burns should be held liable for the same based on supervisory liability, id. ¶ 101.^[8] Plaintiff also claims that the conditions of his confinement- particularly the requirement that he is placed in restraints and is strip searched when he leaves his cell (among other allegations)-constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. ¶¶ 54-58, 123. Lastly, Plaintiff appears to bring claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act based on Defendants' failure to provide him with sufficient mental health care. Id. at 30 ¶ 1.

         A. Official Capacity Claims and Damages

         As to individual defendants acting in their official capacities, “the eleventh amendment immunity protects state officials sued for damages.” Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985)); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that claims for damages against defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages from state officials in their official capacity, his section 1983 claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and will be dismissed.^[9]

         B. Request for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief

         Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Doc. 1, at 30 ¶ 1-2. Declaratory relief operates prospectively “to enable parties to adjudicate disputes before either side suffers great damage.” In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988). In particular, “[t]o obtain prospective relief, such as a declaratory judgment or an injunction, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, ‘a sufficient likelihood that he [or she] will again be wronged in a similar way.'” Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1212 (2013) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). “That is, a plaintiff must demonstrate a ‘certainly impending' future injury.” Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).

         As for injunctions, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit the issuance of an injunction. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908). Where a plaintiff invokes the doctrine established in Ex Parte Young, the suit “is not deemed to be an action against the state. Instead, such an action proceeds against the state officer who, by acting contrary to federal law, acts without authority and therefore, under these circumstances, does not act in a representative capacity.” Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (footnote omitted).

         In this action, Plaintiff brings claims concerning alleged prior violations of constitutional law-in particular, Plaintiff's transfer to Northern in 2006, and whether he received due process in connection with his transfer and classification. A request for declaratory judgment with respect to those prior allegations cannot properly be characterized as “prospective, ” because Plaintiff does not allege how such relief would remedy a future constitutional violation by these defendants. However, Plaintiff also claims that he is experiencing ongoing suffering-that he still lacks access to proper medical care in connection with his psychiatric disabilities. Therefore, some, but not all, of his claims for declaratory relief will be dismissed.

         Additionally, the law will not bar injunctive relief here as Plaintiff seeks prospective relief. Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court directing Defendants to transfer Plaintiff, Doc. 1, at 30 ¶ 2, presumably to an impatient hospitalization program, id. ¶ 45. However, this leaves the question of whether Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is cognizable, which the Court will address infra in connection with his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process challenge to Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiff with a mental health hearing.

         C. Procedural Due Process Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment

         1. Transfer to Northern

         Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with a hearing in connection with his transfer to Northern. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 105, 123.

         The standard analysis for a procedural due process claim proceeds in two steps. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam). A court first “ask[s] whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so . . . whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient.” Id.

         In the prison context, which involves persons whose liberty interests have already been severely restricted because of their confinement in a prison, a prisoner plaintiff cannot show a cognizable deprivation of “liberty” unless he can show that he was subject to an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The Supreme Court further clarified the principle in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005): “After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id. at 223 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit has also explained that courts must examine the actual punishment received, as well as the conditions and duration of the punishment. See Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133- 34 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004).

         Assuming a protected interest exists, the Court must consider whether the inmate received process that was constitutionally due, which often depends on context. The procedural protections that are due to a prison inmate facing a disciplinary hearing, for example, are not as expansive as the due process protections for a criminal defendant standing trial. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1973); Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004). Of course, protections are still in place for a disciplinary hearing. An inmate must be given “advance written notice of the charges against him; a hearing affording him a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; a fair and impartial hearing officer; and a written statement of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken.” Sira, 380 F.3d at 69 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). Moreover, there must be at least “some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing.” See Washington v. Gonyea, 538 Fed.Appx. 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

         Plaintiff argues that he had a protected liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Northern. Doc. 1 ¶ 104. This due process claim must be dismissed. In Andrews v. Semple, No. 17-cv-1233 (SRU), 2017 WL 5606740 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2017), Judge Underhill dismissed a similar claim, concluding that the plaintiff possessed “a constitutional right to adequate mental health treatment, ” but he had “no constitutional right to be housed in any particular correctional facility.” Id. at *4. Judge Underhill also cited to Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248 (1983), for the proposition that “inmates have no right to be confined in a particular state or a particular prison within a given state, ” as well as to Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976), for the notion that an inmate's “transfer among correctional facilities, without more, does not violate [an] inmate's constitutional rights, even where conditions in one prison are ‘more disagreeable' or prison has ‘more severe rules.'” Id.

         The same is true in the instant case. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to be housed in any particular correctional facility. See Id. Additionally, based on Plaintiff's submissions, it appears that DOC policy does not otherwise prohibit Plaintiff from being housed at Northern. Doc. 1-1, at 63 (“Administrative Directives and CMHC policies do not prohibit people with a mental health score of 2 or 3 from being placed at Northern.”). Therefore, Plaintiff's due process claims against Lantz, Murphy, Ducate, and Levesque, Doc. 1 ¶ 105, as well as Semple, Mulligan, Burns, Lewis, Rinaldi, and Frayne, id. ¶ 123, based on his transfer to Northern, must be dismissed.

         2. Administrative Segregation

         Likewise, Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated when he was transferred to Administrative Segregation without a hearing. Plaintiff appears to be arguing that he was not afforded two types of procedures: (1) a general hearing prior to his placement in Administrative Segregation, id. ¶ 109; and (2) a mental health hearing prior to his placement in Administrative Segregation, id. ¶ 113. The Court will address each, in turn.

         Plaintiff claims that when he was first transferred to Northern in 2006, he received an “automatic placement” on Administrative Segregation Status. Id. ¶ 39. This classification process occurred “without due process, ” according to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 50. For purposes of this Order, the Court assumes that when Plaintiff refers to “automatic placement” into Administrative Segregation, he intends to convey that he did not receive notice, a hearing, or the opportunity to present witnesses, in accordance with a DOC directive. See Directive 9.4 ¶ 12(A), (B).^[10]

         This Court considered the question of whether Administrative Segregation in Connecticut raised a protected liberty interest in Ellerbe v. Jason, No. 12-cv-580 (MPS), 2015 WL 1064739 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2015). In Ellerbe, Judge Shea reasoned:

The Constitution itself does not give an inmate a liberty interest in avoiding more restrictive confinement such as Punitive Segregation or Administrative Segregation. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). But state policies regarding conditions of confinement may create a liberty interest in avoiding more restrictive confinement. Id. Such an interest may arise if “statutes or regulations require, in ‘language of an unmistakably mandatory character,' that a prisoner not suffer a particular deprivation absent specified predicates.” Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 81 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Ellerbe, 2015 WL 1064739, at *3.

         Judge Shea went on to hold that Directive 9.4-which Plaintiff cites in his Complaint, see Doc. 1 ¶ 50-provides “the basis for a liberty interest in avoiding Administrative Segregation, ” Ellerbe, 2015 WL 1064739, at *3. This liberty interest was invoked where the inmate had spent 243 days in administrative segregation as punishment. See Ellerbe, 2015 WL 1064739, at *5; see also Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Where the plaintiff was confined for an intermediate duration-between 101 and 305 days-‘development of a detailed record' of the conditions of the confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions is required.”).

         Based on Plaintiff's assertion that he was immediately placed on Administrative Segregation in 2006 and has since remained under that classification, Plaintiff's Complaint shows that he was committed to Administrative Segregation for more than 101 days.^[11] “Such a period of segregated confinement would ordinarily preclude dismissing a claim without fact-finding.” Ellerbe, 2015 WL 1064739, at *5. Plaintiff may therefore meet the first Sandin requirement of a deprivation of a liberty interest imposing an atypical and significant hardship; and, further fact-finding is needed.

         In connection with the second requirement, the Court must examine whether the procedures in place were constitutionally sufficient. The purpose of confinement matters greatly. “[N]otwithstanding the label ‘Administrative Segregation,' if ‘the purpose of more restrictive confinement is disciplinary or punitive,' then the heightened procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) apply.” Id. If such is the purpose, the Supreme Court has opined that inmates “should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.

         Plaintiff believes that his placement on Administrative Segregation Status was punitive. At this stage then, the Court will presume that Plaintiff was entitled to an Administrative Segregation hearing during which Wolff procedures were afforded to him. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Lantz, Murphy, Ducate, Levesque, and Choinski “fail[ed] to provide Plaintiff with a hearing[] before or after his . . . placement on Administrative Segregation.” Doc. 1 ¶ 109. Absent evidence that affording Plaintiff these procedures was not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, Defendants did not meet the Wolff standard. The second step of the Sandin test is thus met here. Plaintiff has therefore stated a plausible claim that Defendants Lantz, Murphy, Ducate, Levesque, and Choinski violated his procedural due process rights with respect to his confinement on Administrative Segregation Status.

         3. Mental Health Hearing

         Plaintiff next claims that his due process rights were violated when he was transferred to Administrative Segregation without providing him with a mental health hearing. Id. ¶ 113. Plaintiff also appears to believe that he would have been transferred out of Northern had he been afforded the mental ...