United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT.
Vanessa L. Bryant, United States District Judge.
the Court is Defendant Aleksandra Toczek's
(“Toczek”) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Order awarding Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A.'s (“Wells Fargo”) $9, 891.50 in
attorneys' fees. [Dkts. 25 (Order on Attys' Fees), 26
(Mot. for Recon.)]. The Court DENIES the motion.
Second Circuit, the standard for granting a motion for
reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1995); see D. Conn. L. R. 7(c) (requiring the
movant to file along with the motion for reconsideration
“a memorandum setting forth concisely the controlling
decisions or data the movant believes the Court
are three grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration:
(1) “intervening change of controlling law”; (2)
“the availability of new evidence”; or (3) a
“need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Fed.
Practice & Procedure, § 4478 at 790). If the
Court “overlooked controlling decisions or factual
matters that were put before it on the underlying motion,
” reconsideration is appropriate. Eisemann v.
Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curium).
However, a motion for reconsideration should be denied when
the movant “seeks solely to relitigate an issue already
decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257;
Patterson v. Bannish, No. 3:10-cv-1481 (AWT), 2011
WL 2518749, at *1 (D. Conn. June 23, 2011) (same).
argues that the Court granted an unreasonably high
attorneys' fee award for three reasons: First, it
overestimated counsel's expended hours because it failed
to consider that Wells Fargo's counsel used “cut
and paste work” from other cases and from other motions
in the same case. E.g. [Dkt. 26 at 5]. Second, the
Court awarded fees for Wells Fargo's reply, even though
the Court did not find that Toczek's objection wholly
lacked substance or merit. Id. at 6-7. Third, the
Court did not carefully consider Toczek's timely filed
objection. Id. at 8-9. Toczek does not argue that
there was an intervening change in law, or that new evidence
has become available. Ibid.
reviewing Toczek's arguments, the Court finds that none
of them provide grounds for granting her motion for
reconsideration, as it has already decided each. As to
Toczek's first argument, the Court did consider the fact
that Wells Fargo's counsel used research and case history
from other cases and other motions in the same case in
determining the hours it awarded. The Court cited Wells
Fargo's counsel's “involvement in similar cases
in this district, ” as well as “the firm's
relationship with Wells Fargo” as reasons to reduce the
reasonable hours awarded in drafting exhibits, checking
citations, and preparing corporate disclosure and appearance
forms. [Dkt. 25 at 8-9]. n the same sub-section, Toczek
alleges that Wells Fargo's counsel misrepresented the
number of hours they spent on this case, but does not provide
any evidence other than that the reported number of hours is
too high. [Dkt. 26 at 4-5]. Since Toczek does not introduce
any new evidences in support of this new allegation, the
Court does not give it weight.
Toczek's second point, the Court finds that it considered
the appropriateness of awarding fees for a reply in its
original Order. [Dkt. 25 at 9]. While the Court did find
merit in some of Toczek's objections to Wells Fargo's
requested reward, the Court found that her accusation of bad
faith was frivolous and Wells Fargo's reply therefore
merited attorneys' fees. Ibid. (citing Dixon
v. A Better Way Wholesale Auto, Inc., Civil No.
3:15-CV-691(AWT), 2017 WL 4876216 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2017)).
Moreover, as a plaintiff is generally entitled to time spent
preparing the fee application, and Wells Fargo had not sought
fees for preparing its initial motion, awarding fees for the
reply was not excessive. Ibid. (citing Weyant v.
Okst, 198 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
Toczek argues that, “to the extent the Court did not
consider fully or at all Defendant's objection on the
basis that he objection was untimely the court should fully
consider… Defendant's objection in its
entirety.” But, regardless of the timeliness of
Toczek's objection, the Court did consider and address
it, as stated in the original Order and has been demonstrated
throughout this Order. [Dkt. 25 at 3 n.2].
the Court finds that it has not overlooked any of the issues
raised by Toczek but has instead considered and decided them.
Reconsideration is not available to relitigate already
decided issues. Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion for
reconsideration. Tockzek is once again ordered to transmit to