United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
Jeffrey Alker Meyer, United States District Judge.
Jiquane Collins is a prisoner of the Connecticut Department
of Correction. He has filed a complaint pro se and
in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional
rights. After an initial review, I conclude that the
complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.
complaint names the following four defendants: the
Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”);
Correctional Officer Brito, Lt. Rivera, and Segregation
Counselor Reeves. All of the individual defendants were
employed at relevant times at the MacDougall-Walker
complaint alleges with sparse detail the following facts that
I accept as true solely for purposes of this initial review
order. On April 13, 2019, Collins was assaulted by his
cellmate and knocked unconscious. Doc. #7 at 5. Defendant
Brito “dragged me by my foot out of my room while I was
uncon[sc]ious.” Ibid. “When the C.O.
dragged me there was not medical employees around and when LT
Rivera came he told [B]rito to chill and let me go and try to
wake me up and have me walk to medical.” Ibid.
In addition, “when the C.O saw blood they dropped
me.” Id. at 6.
woke up the next day at UConn hospital with a fractured nose
and wounds on his head and face. Id. at 5. According
to Collins, he knows how Brito removed him from his cell
because later “the block I am housed in told me of what
was happening.” Id. at 6. He also speculates
that “the recorded footage can tell my tale, how acts
of cruelty [were] done upon me.” Ibid.
claims that his rights were violated due to “negligence
correctional corruption and plain and s[i]mple cover up due
to the fact while being uncon[sc]ious and dragging me out of
my room without medical attention present is a direct
violation of [protocol], policy and DOC rules as a
whole.” Id. at 6. He further claims that his
“rights were violated due to negl[i]gence,
8thAmendment rights [and] civil rights.”
addition, Collins alleges that during his “seg hearing,
” defendant Reeves coerced him into “signing the
ticket stating that it was unbeatable ‘just sign'
proving DOC standard corruption.” Ibid.
Collins does not state when the “seg hearing”
took place, with what he was charged, or whether it had any
connection to the incident in which he was assaulted by his
seeks “the maximum money damages for this vile assault
and cover up by the sum of ‘5, 000, 000 million
dollars, '” ibid, that is, five trillion
dollars. He also wants “my case to be public,
Facebook, CBS, FOX61 News, NBC.” Ibid.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner's civil complaint against a governmental entity
or governmental actors and “identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the compliant, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” If the prisoner is proceeding pro se,
the allegations of the complaint must be read liberally to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).
Supreme Court has set forth a threshold
“plausibility” pleading standard for courts to
evaluate the adequacy of allegations in federal court
complaints. A complaint must allege enough facts-as distinct
from legal conclusions-that give rise to plausible grounds
for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Notwithstanding the
rule of liberal interpretation of a pro se
complaint, a complaint may not survive dismissal if its
factual allegations do not meet the basic plausibility
standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers
Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
against DOC and against individuals in official
threshold matter, I note that Collins has sued the DOC solely
for money damages for violating his rights under the U.S.
Constitution, a claim that arises under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. But the DOC is not a “person” within the
meaning of section 1983, “and thus may not be sued
pursuant to this statute regardless of whether a state has
waived its sovereign immunity.” Smith v. Conn.