Argued
September 24, 2019
The
Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex, Aurigemma, J.
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Thomas
P. Willcutts, with whom, on the brief, was Michael J. Habib,
for the appellant (named defendant).
Benjamin
T. Staskiewicz, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
Keller,
Moll and Bishop, Js.
OPINION
MOLL,
J.
[194
Conn.App. 845] The defendant, Daniel J. Scroggin also known
as Daniel F. Scroggin also known as Daniel Scroggin, appeals
from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial
court, for the second time, in favor of the substitute
plaintiff, AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware Trust, Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, [194 Conn.App. 846] FSB,
Trustee.[1] The defendant makes the following
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claims on appeal: (1) the trial court improperly failed to
recuse itself pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183c
following our remand in Chase Home Finance, LLC v.
Scroggin, 178 Conn.App. 727, 176 A.3d 1210 (2017)
(Chase I ); (2) the trial court erred by granting
the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to liability
only without hearing oral argument on that motion; and (3)
the trial court erred in denying on timeliness grounds the
defendants motion for an extension of time, filed pursuant
to Practice Book § 17-47, to respond to the plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment. We agree with the defendants
second claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the
trial court.[2]
[194
Conn.App. 847] We begin with an abbreviated recitation of the
factual and procedural background of this dispute, as set
forth by this court in Chase I . "In December,
2009, Chase commenced the present foreclosure action against
the defendant. In its original one count complaint, Chase
alleged, in relevant part, that on July 20, 2007, the
defendant executed a promissory note in the amount of
$217,500 in favor of Chase Bank USA, N.A., and that the loan
was secured by a mortgage of the premises located at 25
Church Street in Portland, which was owned by and in the
possession of the defendant. Chase alleged that the mortgage
was recorded on the Portland land records, that the mortgage
was assigned to it, and that it was the holder of the note
and mortgage. Chase alleged that beginning on July 1, 2009,
the defendant failed to make installment payments of
principal and interest required by the note and that it had
exercised its option to declare the entire unpaid balance of
the note (in the amount of $214,939.97) due and payable to
it.... By way of relief, Chase sought, among other things, a
foreclosure of the mortgage and the immediate possession of
the subject premises.
"On June 7, 2010, Chase filed a motion for default for
failure to plead. On that
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same day, Chase filed a motion for judgment of strict
foreclosure and a finding that it was entitled to possession
of the subject premises. On June 16, 2010, the clerk of the
court granted the motion for default but, at that time, the
court did not rule on the motion seeking a judgment of strict
foreclosure.
"On September 8, 2010, Chase filed a request for leave
to amend its complaint and attached a proposed amended
complaint. The defendant did not object. The [194 Conn.App.
848] amended complaint consisted of six counts. The first
count brought against the defendant sought a foreclosure and
generally was consistent with the allegations brought against
the defendant in the original one count complaint .... The
second, third, and fourth counts of the amended complaint
were brought against Bank of America.... Counts five and six
of the amended complaint, both of which were directed at the
defendant, [were] related to Chases allegations with respect
to Bank of Americas mortgage interest in the subject
property....
"At no time did the defendant move to set aside the
default for failure to plead entered on June 16, 2010. On
November 2, 2015, however, the defendant disclosed a defense,
stating that he intend[ed] to challenge the plaintiffs
alleged right and standing to foreclose upon the subject
mortgage. On the same day, the defendant filed an answer to
Chases original complaint.
"The plaintiff did not file a motion for default for
failure to plead against the defendant with respect to the
amended complaint. On November 24, 2015, however, the
plaintiff filed a motion for judgment against the defendant
with respect to counts two, three, four, five, and six of the
amended complaint. On the same day, the plaintiff moved that
the court enter a judgment of strict foreclosure ....
On
April 4, 2016, the defendant filed an answer to the
plaintiffs amended complaint. In his answer to the amended
complaint, the defendant, among other things, admitted
portions of the allegations made in the first count and, with
respect to other portions of the first count, left the
plaintiff to its proof. Also, on April 4, 2016, the defendant
filed an objection to the plaintiffs motion for judgment as
to count six of the amended complaint and an objection to the
plaintiffs motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. On
that date, the court [Aurigemma, J. ] held a hearing
on the plaintiffs motion [194 Conn.App. 849] for judgment.
By order dated April 4, 2016, the court granted the
plaintiffs motion for judgment with respect to counts two,
three, four, and five of the amended complaint, but did not
rule with respect to counts one or six of the amended
complaint.
"Following the hearing, the plaintiff replied to the
defendants objection to its motion for judgment of strict
foreclosure, and the defendant filed a memorandum of law in
which he further articulated the reasons underlying his
objection to the motion for judgment of strict foreclosure.
At a hearing on April 18, 2016, the parties appeared and
presented additional arguments [before Judge Aurigemma]....
"The court granted the plaintiffs motion for judgment
of strict foreclosure ... and rendered judgment on count six
of the plaintiffs amended complaint in the plaintiffs
favor." ...