United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arises out
of the arrest of plaintiff Alexis Brown (“Brown”
or the “Plaintiff”) on August 5, 2016 by
defendants Jeffrey D. Neddermann and David Mocarsky
(collectively, the “Defendants”), both law
enforcement officers with the New Britain Police Department.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated her rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
when they used excessive force when arresting her. Pending
before the Court is the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is
DENIED.
Facts[1]
On
August 5, 2016, Officer Jeffrey Neddermann of the New Britain
Police Department was dispatched to 60 Roberts Street, New
Britain, Connecticut, after the police department received a
complaint from Beronica Fuente (“Fuente”)
regarding a landlord-tenant dispute. (Def.'s SMF at
¶ 1.) Fuente rented a third-floor apartment in a
multi-family home at that address. (Id. at ¶
2.) The property is owned by Green Tree Holdings, LLC, and
its sole owner, Brown, acts as landlord for the property.
(Id. at ¶ 3.) Fuente explained that Brown had
turned off the electricity to her apartment because
Eversource, the electricity provider, started billing
Fuente's electric service to Green Tree Holdings, LLC
after Brown failed to remediate a wiring issue in a common
area of the house. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) Fuente
could not turn the electricity back on because the breaker
was in the basement, which Brown had locked. (Id. at
¶ 4.) Neddermann called Eversource, which confirmed that
it was billing Green Tree Holdings, LLC for electric service
to Fuente's apartment due to the unremediated wiring
concern. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.)
After
speaking with Eversource, Neddermann called Brown and
instructed her to return to the property immediately to turn
on Fuente's electricity. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
During their exchange, Brown told Neddermann that he did not
need to be there, that she was coming right back, and that he
needed to “get off the property.” (Id.
at ¶¶ 14, 16.) At one point, Brown stated she was
having lunch. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Brown told
Neddermann that she “would finish up and come back,
” and she “yelled at [Officer Neddermann] to get
off [the] property” and then “hung up the
phone.” (Id. at ¶ 19 (alterations in
original).) After Brown ended the call, Neddermann called
Sergeant David Mocarsky and informed him of the situation,
and Mocarsky responded to the scene to provide assistance.
(Id. at ¶ 20.)
At
approximately 5:02 p.m., Brown arrived at 60 Roberts Street
and parked her vehicle on the street in front of the house
and in front of a police cruiser. (Id. at ¶
26.) Although Neddermann and Mocarsky recall Brown slurring
her words and smelling of alcohol while speaking to them
outside the house, Brown denies that she was slurring her
words or that she had alcohol on her breadth. (Id.
at ¶¶ 28-29.) Brown accompanied the officers into
the house. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Although the officers
and Fuente recall Brown being unsteady on her feet as she
went into the basement, Brown denies being unsteady on her
feet. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.)
Once
Brown turned the electricity back on in Fuente's
apartment, she returned to her vehicle. (Id. at
¶¶ 39-40.) As Brown walked toward her vehicle,
Neddermann asked Brown to provide her identification.
(Id. at ¶ 41.) Brown entered her vehicle and
locked the doors. (Id. at ¶ 42.) The parties
dispute what happened next, but video footage from the
dashcam on the police cruiser parked behind Brown's
vehicle shows Neddermann and Mocarsky approach the
driver's side of Brown's vehicle. (Def.'s Ex. H
at 5:53-6:10.) They spoke to her through her window and both
repeatedly gestured with their hands for her to exit the
vehicle, but she did not comply. (Id. at 6:05-6:47.)
Brown denies that the officers told her to get out of the
vehicle during this period but acknowledges that Neddermann
told her “several times” to “stop playing
games.” (Def.'s SMF at ¶ 46.)
Mocarsky
informed Brown through her closed driver's side window
that he would break her passenger side window if she did not
step out of the vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 49.) When
Mocarsky started walking around the back of Brown's
vehicle and toward the passenger's side, Brown unlocked
her vehicle's door and Neddermann opened it.
(Id. at ¶ 50; see also Def.'s Ex.
H at 6:47.) Brown handed her identification to Neddermann who
took it and then attempted to pull Brown from the vehicle.
(Def.'s Ex. H at 6:45-6:55.) Brown resisted.
(Id.) Mocarsky walked back to the driver's side
of the vehicle and assisted Neddermann in his efforts to
extricate Brown. (Id.) Brown claims that Neddermann
“somehow bent [her] thumb back” when he grabbed
hold of her left wrist, but Neddermann does not recall
touching or bending Brown's thumb in any manner.
(Def.'s SMF at ¶ 54.)
Once
Brown was removed from the vehicle, Neddermann held her by
the left arm while Mocarsky held her right
wrist.[2] (Id. at ¶ 63.) Mocarsky
attempted to place handcuffs on Brown. (Id.) The
video footage shows Mocarsky struggling to place handcuffs on
Brown's right wrist, but he was eventually able to
handcuff both wrists behind her back. (Def.'s Ex. H at
7:05-7:20.) Mocarsky then took hold of the handcuffs and
walked Brown to Neddermann's police cruiser so that Brown
could be transported to the police department. (Def.'s
SMF at ¶ 66.) While doing do, Mocarsky pulled the
connecting chain of the handcuffs upward which, it appears
from the video, caused Brown pain. (Def.'s Ex. H at
7:29-7:32.)
Brown
arrived at the police department for booking at approximately
5:26 p.m. (Def.'s Ex. K at 7:00.) Brown was booked on two
charges: interfering with an officer, in violation of Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53a-167a, and operating under the
influence, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §
14-227a.[3] (Def.'s SMF at ¶ 72.) While being
processed, Brown refused to submit to a breathalyzer
test.[4] (See Def.'s Ex. K at 11:15,
19:08-19:19.)
After
the booking process was complete, Brown, at her request, was
transported to the hospital where she reported an injury to
her left wrist and left bicep. (Def.'s SMF at ¶ 73;
Plf.'s SMF at ¶ 8; Plf.'s Ex. 1 at 9.) Brown
further requested that a blood alcohol test be performed.
(Plf.'s SMF at ¶ 9; Plf.'s Dep. at 200:4-7.) At
8:39 p.m. the test was administered and revealed that Brown
had a blood ethanol level of 00.056 gm%.[5] (Def.'s SMF
at ¶ 73.)
As a
result of her handcuffing and arrest, Brown suffered
bruising, pain in her wrists, and left upper arm pain.
(Plf.'s SMF at ¶ 12; Plf.'s Ex. 1 at 8.) Brown
testified at her deposition that any pain and bruising fully
resolved within two to three weeks, except that she continues
to have a “lingering” pain in her left thumb that
is “very, very faint” and “dull.”
(Plf.'s Dep. at 186:4-5, 186:7, 199:20-200:3.)
Standard
of Review
The
standard under which the Court reviews motions for summary
judgment is well-established. “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law, ” while a
dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if
“the evidence is ...