United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER
VANESSA L. BRYANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Ruling
on Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 48]
I.
Introduction
Plaintiffs
Kurt Carlson (“Mr. Carlson”) and Elaine Carlson
(“Ms. Carlson”) (collectively, the
“Carlsons”) sue General Electric and multiple
other defendants for statutory product liability damages
under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 52-240a,
52-240b, and 52-572m., et seq.; for loss of
consortium; and for common-law product liability. [Dkt. 1-1
(Compl.)]. General Electric now moves for summary judgment on
the grounds that the Carlsons have not offered any admissible
evidence demonstrating that Mr. Carlson was exposed to any
asbestos-containing product manufactured by it. [Dkt. 48
(General Electric Mot. for Summ. Judgment)]. The Carlsons
have not responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment. For
the reasons below, the Court now GRANTS the motion.
II.
Standard for Summary Judgment Motion
“The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact
is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Ibid.
Where a
defendant presents admissible evidence tending to show there
is no genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide and
she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff
must produce admissible evidence raising a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Rule 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary
judgment… against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to a party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Bedor v. Friendly's
Ice Cream Corp., 392 F.Supp.2d 367, 373 (D. Conn. 2005)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)).
“In
determining whether that burden [of showing the absence of
any genuine issue of fact] has been met, the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual
inferences that could be drawn in favor of the party against
whom summary judgment is sought.” Vivenzio v. City
of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). But “[m]ere speculation or conjecture is
insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could
reasonably find for the nonmovant.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on the
allegations in its pleadings since the essence of summary
judgment is to go beyond the pleadings to determine if a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” Bedor,
392 F.Supp.2d at 373 (2005) (quoting Celote., 477
U.S. at 322 (1986)).
III.
Facts
The
Carlsons allege that Mr. Carlson was exposed to various
asbestos-containing products during the course of his
employment as a radiological control technician at General
Dynamics/Electric Boat Corp., Groton, CT from 1973 through
1974. [Dkt. 1-1, Count 1 ¶5]. The Carlsons allege that
this exposure contributed to his contraction of
asbestos-related mesothelioma and other asbestos-related
pathologies. Ibid. During this time period, the
Carlsons alleges that Mr. Carlson was exposed to
asbestos-containing products manufactured by multiple
defendants including General Electric. Ibid. at
¶ 6.
On
September 20, 2017, the Carlsons provided answers to General
Electric's Standard Interrogatories and Requests for
Production. [Dkt. 48-2 (General Electric Statement of Facts)
¶5]. Mr. Carlson did not identify General Electric as an
employer nor does he identify any asbestos-containing General
Electric product to which he claims he was exposed.
Ibid.
Mr.
Carlson was deposed on October 16, 17, and 18 of 2017.
Id. at ¶6. He did not identify General Electric
as an employer, nor did he identify any asbestos-containing
General Electric product to which he was allegedly exposed.
Id. at ¶9. No other witnesses have been deposed
in this case. Ibid.
IV.
Discussion
i.
Governing ...